

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO #36, U. S. ARMY

OPERATIONS IN ITALY

JUNE, 1944

ANNEX #6

141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

SECTION I OF PART I

(Regimental History)

S E C R E T

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HISTORY OF OPERATIONS OF
141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT, RIFLE
JUNE, 1944

All three of the battalions were now northeast of VELLETRI. The present plan for the capture of VELLETRI was to first take the high ground along the ridge of MONTE ARTEMISO north of the town, sever the supply routes from the town and then attack the remaining elements. The 142nd Infantry had moved north to MONTE ARTEMISO and then west along the ridge behind VELLETRI.

On the afternoon of 31 May, the 141st Infantry was given the mission of capturing the town of VELLETRI. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to protect Engineers building a supply road running north through the gap protected by the 1st and 3rd Battalions. Operational instructions were issued at 1445 hours 31 May, for taking the town. The 1st Battalion from its position east of the town was to advance from the east while the 2nd Battalion was to advance southwest toward VELLETRI. The 3rd Battalion was directed to remain in its position until 1600 hours while the 85th Infantry Division on the 141st Infantry right flank crossed its front in its push toward the northwest. The 3rd Battalion was then to move into the area formerly occupied by the 2nd Battalion. The advance by the battalions was to be accomplished by patrolling aggressively to the front and subsequently bringing the main elements abreast of the patrolled sector.

At 1600 hours 31 May, G-3 notified the Regimental S-3 that plans for the attack on VELLETRI had been altered. The 141st Infantry would send one battalion to the west behind the town with the mission of severing the VELLETRI-MARINO highway running northwest from VELLETRI. The 2nd Battalion was given this mission and the 3rd Battalion of given the mission originally assigned to the 2nd Battalion of advancing south on VELLETRI from the northeast.

The 1st Battalion encountered heavy resistance as it slowly advanced toward VELLETRI during the afternoon. Mine fields had been laid through the sector and strong points of resistance organized by the enemy prevented the 1st Battalion from clearing or flanking the mine fields. Beyond initial gains of from 400-600 yards, no further progress could be made and the attack was delayed until Engineers could clear lanes through the fields. An enemy counter-attack with tanks and infantry was repelled without loss of ground. At 1800 hours the Regimental S-3 informed the 1st Battalion that a platoon of Engineers was being sent to clear the mines and, also, that Co "K", which had been given the mission of holding the 3rd Battalion road block, would be released and attached to the 1st Battalion for reinforcement.

At approximately 1800 hours the 2nd Battalion advanced toward their objective astride the VELLETRI-MARINO road approximately one and one-half miles northwest of VELLETRI. Encountering only slight resistance, the 2nd Battalion reached its objective at 0230 hours, blocking the enemy's main route of supply and escape.

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The 3rd Battalion remained in position astride the VELLETRI-VALMONTONE road until 1510 hours 31 May, when orders were issued to leave one company in position on the road block and move to an assembly area one mile north of the VELLETRI-VALMONTONE road opposite the gap which the other troops had passed through. At 2030 hours the 3rd Battalion began moving to an objective astride a road running north from VELLETRI approximately 1000 yards north of the town. The 3rd Battalion arrived on its objective at 1015 hours 1 June.

The assault against VELLETRI was made particularly difficult for the attacking forces due to the numerous vineyards and orchards dotting the hills which considerably restricted observation. VELLETRI, itself, is situated on a high hill which dominates the surrounding terrain and which afforded the Germans a distinct advantage. Russian prisoners of the Germans who had been used as forced laborers and who had escaped to our lines indicated that the enemy had been working for some time in the VELLETRI area on defensive installations.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions again launched their attack against the town meeting furious resistance. The enemy, in turn, launched a last desperate counter-attack at 1440 hours on 1 June, in an effort to break out of the cordon hammering against their positions. Using tanks and Infantry against the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, the Germans pounded the forward elements relentlessly in a vain effort to break through. The two battalions expended a large amount of ammunition in repelling the counter-attack and it was necessary to use every available vehicle to bring ammunition resupply up from the dumps. The Germans attempted to infiltrate the Battalions' positions with strong patrols and at one time had a large portion of Co "G" cut off from the 2nd Battalion. Hand to hand combat took place when units had exhausted their ammunition supply. When the counter-attack was stopped by the two Battalions, they again began to advance. The 1st Battalion pushed forward and entered the outskirts of the town on the north at 1715 hours. The 3rd Battalion continued to advance against heavy resistance to a point 500 yards north of VELLETRI.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion had launched a coordinated attack at 1530 hours southeast towards VELLETRI. Leading elements of Co "F" entered the town at 1630 hours followed by Co "E" and Co "G". The forward elements received strong sniper fire but continued mopping up the town. By 1730 hours Co "F" was in the center of town with Co "E" moving its right flank and Co "G" on the left flank. Numerous enemy were in the town and a great many of them were taken prisoner. Those who would not surrender were killed. The Battalion command post of the 2nd Battalion moved into VELLETRI at 2300 hours.

VELLETRI was a shambles. The almost constant artillery falling on the town during the attack had left scarcely a building unscathed. Dead Germans, enemy material, numerous knocked out enemy tanks and vehicles, dead horses, debris and piles of rubble littered the streets. Numerous German wounded and

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dead were found in the buildings. Hundreds of prisoners were rounded up--their number being so large that it was impossible to process them through the existing regimental and divisional prisoner of war interrogation facilities, and they were shunted back to Fifth Army prisoner of war enclosures. An inspection of the enemy defensive installations, after the town was taken, clearly indicated that it had been prepared for a key strongpoint in the VELLETRI-VALMONTONE line. Extensive fortifications, tunnels, reinforced dugouts and shelters and gun positions had been erected.

The 1st Battalion, after reaching the northern outskirts of VELLETRI was ordered to continue on to the high ground northwest of VELLETRI. The battalion arrived on its objective two miles northwest of VELLETRI at 0300 hours on 2 June.

At 2400 hours 1 June, the 3rd Battalion was ordered to furnish Infantry protection to Engineers clearing roads of mines to VELLETRI. One company was ordered to the railroad station southeast of VELLETRI and remain there until contact was established with the 36th Engineer (C) Regiment which was approaching toward VELLETRI from the south.

Taking no rest, the 2nd Battalion pushed northwest to Hill 332 overlooking Highway No. 7 which lay to the south. At 0734 hours on 2 June, the Assistant Division Commander ordered the 2nd Battalion to move from its position west along Highway No. 7. The Headquarters Company Intelligence & Reconnaissance platoon sent out motor patrols to reconnoiter the route and establish enemy contact.

At 1145 hours the Division Commander informed the Regimental Commander that the Commanding General, VI Corps, had ordered the 1st Battalion to occupy Hill 675 and the other two regimental battalions to occupy Hill 600 and Hill 680 due east of LAKE NEMI (Lago di Nemi). Orders were issued to all battalions to push northwest towards these objectives--three hills formed into a group called MT. ALTO.

The I&R Platoon was recalled from its position in front of the 2nd Battalion and the platoon leader was instructed to push ahead of the 1st Battalion advancing northwest on the VELLETRI-MARINO highway, and establish enemy contact in that area.

The 3rd Battalion, followed by the 1st Battalion, continued moving up the highway prepared to attack the MT. ALTO hill mass. Just prior to the attack four planes bombed and strafed the battalions' positions. One bomb fell near the 3rd Battalion command group and another on the Co "I" position causing numerous casualties. Preparations were again made for an attack but just prior to the time to jump off, heavy artillery concentrations fell on the leading companies and the attack was called off.

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The 2nd Battalion, after advancing west along Highway #7, was ordered to move into an assembly area behind the 3rd Battalion as soon as the 157th Infantry Regiment, which was moving up, had passed through it. After the 157th Infantry Regiment had passed through, the 2nd Battalion assembled and entrucked to move to the new assembly area. The Battalion arrived at the assembly area at 2110 hours and at 2200 hours received orders to advance at daylight and capture Hill 660 due east of LAKE NEMI and then block the road junction one mile to the northeast of the hill.

The Germans frequently laid down artillery concentrations, but no definite enemy defensive positions had been encountered. Scattered groups of enemy snipers harassed various units. Prisoners continued to drift back from the forward positions.

The 1st Battalion was ordered to push through the 3rd Battalion and take Hill 680. Encountering no resistance, Hill 680 was occupied at 0205 hours 3 June, and the 1st Battalion moved on to Hill 675 which was occupied at 0400 hours. Upon taking its objectives, the 1st Battalion reorganized and continued to advance on NEMI at 0630 hours. The battalion moved into NEMI at 0900 hours without opposition and remained there all day.

The 3rd Battalion began to move forward from its positions at 0400 hours 3 June and arrived on Hill 675 at 0945 hours. Upon reaching this location, orders were received to occupy the high ground between NEMI and Hill 660.

The 2nd Battalion advanced astride the VALMONTONE-MARINO highway to Hill 660, meeting concentrated enemy resistance in the form of artillery, machine gun and small arms fire. Overcoming all resistance the hill was occupied at 0945 hours. The 2nd Battalion continued to advance along the VELLETRI-MARINO highway continuing to receive counter-attacks by German armor and infantry. Lt. Colonel Robert C. Johnson, 017784, of White Plains, New York, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, was seriously wounded by the enemy machine gun fire while leading his troops in a forward position and died on the field before he could be evacuated. The Battalion was engaged by a sizeable German force around the crossroads on the VELLETRI-MARINO highway southeast of LAKE ALBANO (Lago Albano).

The 1st Battalion of the 361st Infantry Regiment was ordered to pass around either flank of the 2nd Battalion, cut the VELLETRI-MARINO road and continue west to block the road running northeast from ARICCIA.

Orders were issued to the 3rd Battalion to pass through the 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry after the 1st Battalion of the 361st Infantry Regiment had cut the road. The 3rd Battalion moved up to the vicinity of the rear of the 2nd Battalion prior to dark.

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During the night of 3-4 June, information was received from Division Headquarters that the Germans had broken and were withdrawing in a rout. The Regiment was ordered to press its advance with all possible speed.

The 1st Battalion was motorized and shuttled forward at dawn with the mission of contacting the retreating enemy. Reaching a point approximately one half mile southwest of MARINO at 0800 hours, enemy contact was established and the Battalion was forced to detruck and engage the Germans who were countering with small arms and artillery fire. Two tanks were hit by enemy anti-tank guns and knocked out.

The 3rd Battalion, meanwhile, was advancing up the highway on foot. Bypassing to the right of the 1st Battalion, the 3rd Battalion moved to the west in a flanking movement on German positions in the town of MARINO and began preparations to attack the town from the southeast while the 1st Battalion attacked from the south and southwest.

The Regimental command group, closely following the 1st and 3rd Battalions moved to a position one and one-half miles southwest of MARINO, preceding the 2nd Battalion which was moving forward on foot and by truck shuttles.

The Regimental I&R Platoon reported that the bridge in MARINO had been blown by demolitions and it was impossible to get large trucks through the town without establishing a by-pass.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, attacking MARINO simultaneously, met stronger enemy resistance than was anticipated, but quickly cleared the town of enemy forces. The pursuit of the Germans had become so close that forward observers reported the enemy left the town and fled to the north as the two battalions moved in to mop up the usual snipers and small groups left behind by the enemy as a delaying action. Numerous prisoners were again taken which resulted in a burden as all transportation facilities were tied up with the forward movement of supplies and troops.

Upon taking MARINO the 1st and 3rd Battalions moved to the northwest outskirts of the town. The 2nd Battalion, which had been motorized and had awaited on the outskirts of MARINO until the town was taken, moved northwest towards ROME behind tanks and tank destroyers. Company "C" was loaded on tank destroyers and spearheaded the motor column.

Upon reorganizing the 1st and 3rd Battalions moved forward toward ROME on foot. Without rest and extremely fatigued, the troops were still eager to enter ROME. The road led out of the ALBAN HILLS across a gentle, rolling plain to the Italian capital city. The populace was extremely friendly. The

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Italians lined the highway and cheered and applauded the tired men as they marched by, offering them wine, water and food.

The 2nd Battalion motor column, preceded by Company "C" on tank destroyers turned west to Highway #7 and continued on towards ROME. Military police held up the motor column on the outskirts of ROME as the 1st Armored Division was being given priority on Highway #7. The Commanding Generals of VI Corps and the 1st Armored Division ordered the motor column to move north to the parallel road running into ROME between Highway #6 and Highway #7. The 2nd Battalion and Company "C" moved to the indicated highway and headed directly into the city. At approximately 1700 hours the motor column had penetrated into a densely populated suburb on the southeast side of the city where it encountered enemy mortar and small arms fire. Artillery shells fell on the trucks transporting Company "E" troops killing five and wounding twenty men. It was later determined that American artillery shells had fallen on the troops. The men were immediately dispersed and upon orders of the Division Commander, who was with the forward elements, established security for the night, with orders to be prepared to advance at approximately 0450 hours on 5 June. The Regimental command post was set up approximately 1500 yards southeast of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, having made a long march from MARINO closed into an assembly area south of the Regimental command post.

At 2300 hours the Regimental Commander was called to the Division Command Post and received orders to organize a small task force composed of Infantry, Engineers, tanks and tank destroyers and be prepared to advance through ROME across the TIBER RIVER on order.

At 0200 hours on 5 June, the 2nd Battalion received orders to move immediately from its dispersed position to an area across the TIBER RIVER northwest of ROME. The Battalion being widely dispersed in outpost positions, made assembly impossible to accomplish in the time allowed. Consequently the Division Commander ordered the 142nd Infantry to pass through the 141st Infantry. Assembly of the Battalion accomplished, the task force moved just after dawn on its assigned mission. Guides from Regimental Headquarters Company preceded the 142nd Infantry Regiment through ROME and remained at strategic locations to guide Divisional units through the city. The streets of the city were utterly deserted as tanks guided by Italians established a route to be followed.

Moving through ROME to the cheers of the Roman populace who began to pour into the streets, the 2nd Battalion crossed the TIBER RIVER and moved south of the VATICAN CITY approximately one and one-half miles, and then turned north. The 1st and 3rd Battalions marched through the city of ROME leaving their assembly areas at 0900 hours. By that hour almost the entire populace of ROME was on the streets. Vehicles moved in single file down narrow lanes of cheering Italians. Foot soldiers had difficulty in maintaining their columns. No hostile act was committed by the civilians. Guerrillas with red banners and the Italian

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flag rode up and down the streets in battered vehicles or marched through the city to tumultuous applause. The troops thoroughly enjoyed their reception by the Romans. Only the very outskirts and that portion of the city in the vicinity of the railroad termini were damaged. Compared to the other parts of Italy in which the Regiment had been in combat, ROME was a most welcome sight with its broad clean streets and imposing buildings.

The vehicle artery used by the Division to lead out of the city was so jammed with all types of military traffic that the column extended for miles east of the TIBER RIVER to the leading tank and infantry elements two and one-half miles west of the city at 1200 hours. At approximately 1200 hours on 5 June, the 2nd Battalion began receiving small arms from snipers and by 1300 hours German artillery began to fall in the vicinity of the motor column. Actual enemy contact was not made until the 2nd Battalion reached the vicinity of STAZ DI S. ONOFRIO. Enemy small arms fire increased to machine gun, mortar and anti-tank fire. Company "G", attached to the 2nd Battalion, advanced into STAZ DI S. ONOFRIO, followed by the 2nd Battalion, and quickly cleared the town of enemy opposition.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions having moved up to the vicinity of S. ONOFRIO, were ordered by the Regimental Commander to occupy the high ground north of the town along with the 2nd Battalion. The Division Commander ordered the Regiment to establish contact with the 142nd Infantry on the left flank. The Regiment was placed on an alert status, but General Walker advised the Regimental Commander that the troops probably would be able to secure a night's rest. Efforts were made to contact the 142nd Infantry on the left. At 2215 hours contact was established with the 34th Reconnaissance Squadron which was also attempting to contact the 142nd Infantry. No contact was made with the 142nd Infantry during the night. Enemy planes operated during the night and dropped a few bombs to the northwest of the regimental position.

At 0835 hours on 6 June, the Division G-3 advised the Regimental Commander that the regimental mission was to advance north along the road from S. ONOFRIO. The I&R Platoon moved out ahead of the advance to establish a route for the Regiment to move over. No contact was made with the enemy during this reconnaissance. Combat Command "A" of the 1st Armored Division preceded the regiment. With the 3rd Battalion leading, the Regiment moved out at 1230 hours. Moving north to Highway #2, the Regiment proceeded northwest to the vicinity of M. DELIA STORTA. Moving west from Highway #2 via trails and in some cases making roads, the Regiment moved slowly northwest encountering artillery fire from enemy self-propelled guns. Combat Command "A" of the 1st Armored Division, which had moved via another route, was contacted at 2150 hours approximately two miles due south of LAKE BRACCIANO (Lago di Bracciano) along the Via Claudia which was reached two miles west of MAd. DI BRACCIANO. The regiment closed into a bivouac area south of LAKE BRACCIANO for the night, the foot elements closing into their areas at 2400 hours 6 June.

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On the morning of 7 June, the Regiment was reorganized and prepared to advance to the northwest. The 36th Division Assistant Division Commander issued orders to the Regimental Commander at 1035 hours that the Regiment would begin moving during the night by foot, keeping in contact with the 142nd Infantry. A reconnaissance was to be made for a bivouac area and vehicles were not to be moved until the bivouac areas was established. As many troops as possible were to move by organic transportation with the possibility that trucks might be obtained from Corps. When CIVITAVECCHIA is taken the Regiment will be relieved and given a chance to rest and visit ROME.

The Regimental Commander issued instructions to all units of the Regiment and all attached units to be prepared to move on order. The Regimental Adjutant was sent out with a quartering party at 1650 hours with instructions that the movement was to be non-tactical. The Regiment was to by-pass any resistance. The 142nd Infantry was fighting in MANZIANA and the 34th Infantry Division, it was learned, had already taken CIVITAVECCHIA by advancing up the coastal plain. The 36th Division, under the circumstances, would assemble in the area BIANCA-TOLFA-ROTA as soon as possible. Inasmuch as the 142nd Infantry was meeting resistance at MANZIANA, this Regiment would by-pass that town, if necessary at the time we approached it and move to a point at least 5 miles beyond it. If, however, the 142nd Infantry cleared the resistance before we arrived, it would move on to BIANCA and assemble there. We would then occupy the town of TOLFA as the next most western portion of our area. If we passed through the 142nd Infantry for any other reason than by-passing resistance, we would proceed to the most western limit of the Division assembly area, namely BIANCA, and go into bivouac there. The entire plan was designed to get the Division to its assembly area quickly, providing all resistance of any proportion had been reduced and to insure that the first regiment to reach the assembly area would proceed to the westernmost limit to avoid congestion in the area. If resistance at MANZIANA could not be readily overcome our advance would be only five miles beyond MANZIANA where we would be available to assist should the enemy be present in great enough force to warrant it.

At 1755 hours 7 June, the first troops moved out. As MANZIANA had been taken by the 142nd Infantry, the Regiment moved through the town at 1950 hours. There was considerable congestion on the roads west of town as the Regiment passed through the 142nd Infantry as the 142nd Infantry was attempting to reorganize in that locality. Once cleared of the traffic congestion, the Regiment, now completely motorized, moved rapidly to the west on the CIVITAVECCHIA-MANZIANA highway.

By 0020 hours 8 June, the head of the motor column had reached TOLFA LA ROCCA and proceeded on through ALLUMIERE to a bivouac area one mile west of it at town, closing into the area at 0430 hours. During this long motor movement no enemy contact was made.

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At 1005 hours the Assistant Division Commander advised the Regimental Commander that the Regiment would probably stay in its present area the rest of the day. The troops were to be given an opportunity to rest and clean up. When the Division left its present sector, the order of march would be the 143rd Infantry, 141st Infantry plus artillery, and then the 142nd Infantry. As many troops as possible were to be loaded on organic transportation. Division is sending out reconnaissance parties to make road reconnaissance for a movement north and parallel with Highway #1. The movement will be made to a road leading northeast from TARQUINIA.

At 1400 hours the Regimental Commander held a meeting with all members of the Regimental Combat Team. He advised the units that the 34th Division was in contact with the Germans in the vicinity of TARQUINIA. The Division will probably be employed to keep pressure on the enemy, moving by motor over secondary roads. When regiments move, the Headquarters I&R Platoon will be used for reconnaissance and guides. One battalion will be motorized and the other two battalions shuttled forward. If enemy contact is gained, artillery must be able to get on their targets within thirty minutes. Consequently the artillery must be kept well up in the motor column.

At 1450 hours the Division Commander informed the Regimental Commander that the 143rd Infantry would move forward during the night, the 142nd Infantry would move forward during the day of the 9th and the 141st Infantry would move on the night of the 9th. Movement will be by motor to initial positions and then by foot. Each Regiment is to be in the line three days with each battalion on forward positions for twenty-four hours. Thus each regiment will be out of the line for six days.

The Regimental I&R Platoon moved out on a road reconnaissance, moving west and then north. At 1900 hours the platoon leader reported that MT. RICCO, which lay approximately four miles southeast of TARQUINIA was occupied by the Germans in dug in positions. It was estimated that a force of one company held the position.

The Regiment remained in bivouac during the night of 8-9 June. At 1315 hours on 9 June, the Regiment was alerted to move at 1500 hours. Twenty-five 2½-ton trucks were furnished from the 1st Armored Division, and two 2½-ton and seventeen 1½-ton trucks were furnished by the 142nd Infantry to motorize the regiment. Leaving the bivouac area at 1500 hours, the motor column moved west to Highway #1 and then turned north along the coastal highway. All major bridges had been demolished by the Germans in their retreat and numerous detours and by-passes were encountered. Travelling rapidly despite these obstacles the Regiment closed into a bivouac area on the outskirts of MONTALTO DI CASTRO by 2345 hours.

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The Regimental Commander made plans to move all elements of the combat team forward on 10 June and for the 1st Battalion to pass through the 361st Infantry Regiment, which was attached to the 36th Division, to the north. The 361st Infantry Regiment column was approximately four and one-half miles long and the tailing element was sixteen miles from the Regimental Command post. All units were alerted to move with the unlettered units moving first, followed by the 3rd Battalion, 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion. The Regimental I&R Platoon was sent out to make a reconnaissance of the forward areas and at 1515 hours reported that there were between 150-200 Germans in the vicinity of the town of MONTAUTO seven miles northeast of MONTALTO DI CASTRO.

The 1st Battalion left its bivouac area at 1625 hours and was shuttled forward via motor truck with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions marching. The motor column was forced to make an eight mile detour over a dusty, rough road due to the bridge being destroyed over the FIORA RIVER at MONTALTO DI CASTRO. Foot troops crossed the river by means of a foot bridge and were not required to march over the long detour route. The I&R Platoon was ordered to reconnoiter in front of the 1st Battalion in the event the Battalion received small arms fire. Information from the 361st Infantry Regiment, which was to be relieved by the 1st Battalion, indicated that the enemy had considerable artillery in the sector to be occupied by the combat team. The 1st Battalion completed passing through the 361st Infantry Regiment by 2330 hours 10 June. The motor column was shelled intermittently as it advanced and the troops were finally forced to detruck and move forward on foot.

The 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel James G. Balluff, 019955, of Chicago, Illinois, continued to advance during the night. Company "A" reached an enemy road block on Highway #1 approximately three miles southeast of CIBBELLIO. The road block was defended with machine guns, anti-tank guns and barbed wire. The defensive fire power was so great that Company "A" was forced to withdraw to a defiladed position. The Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion to move to the east flank of the road block to prevent the enemy from looking directly down on the battalion's position from their superior positions on the hills overlooking the road. Considerable difficulty was encountered in securing artillery support. The Germans continued to concentrate mortar, artillery and self-propelled gun fire on the battalion position. In attempting to flank the road block the troops ran into mines. The 2nd Battalion was then ordered to flank the 1st Battalion on the east, moving between the 1st Battalion and the 361st Infantry Regiment which had moved to the east upon being relieved. At 0540 hours on 11 June, the 2nd Battalion had succeeded in coming up on the 1st Battalion's right flank and the Regimental Commander made plans for committing the entire Regiment. The 3rd Battalion was alerted to follow the 2nd Battalion if the situation was deemed necessary. The 131st Field Artillery had one gun knocked out by the intense enemy artillery concentrations.

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At approximately 0800 hours on 11 June, the Germans began a counter-attack preceded by artillery and mortar fire of unusual intensity which created numerous casualties. Directed at both the 1st and 2nd Battalions, the counter-attack drove back Company "A" and Company "B". Company "C", commanded by 1st Lt. Martin Tully, 01305347, of Chicago, Illinois, held its position. Company "A" and "B" were hastily reorganized and occupied positions 200 yards south of their original position. Infiltrating through wheat fields, the Germans cut off a few elements of the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion Communications Officer, 2nd Lt. Joseph Tyrrell, 01298957, of Annandale, New Jersey, tapped in on a phone line to Regiment and said that he and some of his platoon had been surrounded and must surrender. From this engagement 2nd Lt. Tyrrell was reported missing in action.

The 3rd Battalion was ordered forward to relieve the pressure being put on the 1st Battalion. Heavy artillery concentrations were placed on the German positions, and with Company "C" holding its position, the enemy began to withdraw.

The 2nd Battalion continued to advance against concentrated enemy mortar, artillery and automatic weapons fire. The Cannon Company, commanded by Captain Michael A. O'Leary, 01291505, of Solvay, New York, neutralized the enemy's fire power in front of the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion continued to advance west along the road north of Highway #1 without opposition. The 2nd Battalion of the 361st Infantry Regiment was attached to the Regiment at 1130 hours and was ordered to follow behind the 3rd Battalion and be prepared to envelope from the right or support the 2nd Battalion as the 3rd Battalion advanced.

The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Major Henry E. Lehman, 0323954, of San Antonio, Texas, attacked Hill 236 (MT. CAPALJISCO) against enemy small arms, machine gun, mortar and artillery fire and succeeded in occupying the hill by 1930 hours. The Battalion immediately re-organized and consolidated its position. The 3rd Battalion advanced to the southwest base of Hill 236 receiving intermittent artillery and mortar fire as it moved forward. The 2nd Battalion of the 361st Infantry Regiment moved to a position at the northeast base of the hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion continued to consolidate its position in the vicinity of the enemy road block southeast of ORJETELLO.

At 1805 hours the Division Commander ordered the 3rd Battalion to be committed immediately in order that the high ground to the west might be taken by dawn. Patrols were sent out from the 3rd Battalion to feel out the enemy's positions and found that the Germans were laying mines as a defensive measure.

At 2215 hours the Chief of Staff of the 36th Division advised the Regimental Commander that a small force of the 361st Infantry Regiment would relieve the 1st Battalion; the 2nd Battalion, 361st Infantry, would move to the northeast and occupy the nose of Hill 194 during the night and be ready to advance in the morning. The 2nd Battalion of the 141st Infantry will reorganize on Hill 236 and the 3rd Battalion will be pulled back to a reserve position. The 361st Infantry Regiment will pass through the 141st Infantry Regiment at

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0600 hours 12 June.

At 2240 hours the Division G-3 ordered the Regimental S-3 to alert one battalion to move to CUNINO at any time after 0700 hours on 12 June. This battalion was to follow troops of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron which was assigned a mission of moving to the northwest and assisting the Division's advance and contacting the French Expeditionary Corps on the right flank of the Division sector. The battalion was to be motorized during the entire period with the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron. The Regimental Commander ordered the 3rd Battalion to be prepared for this movement.

Armored units attached to the Regiment reverted to control of the 361st Infantry Regiment upon completion of the relief. Co "K" of the 361st Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion and established a road block on Highway #1. Upon being relieved the 1st Battalion moved to a bivouac area west of Highway #1 eight miles south of ORBETELLO.

At 0210 hours 12 June, the 2nd Battalion received a counter-attack with the Germans infiltrating the position of Company "G" and cutting it off from the remainder of the Battalion. The attack was successfully repelled with casualties of twenty-three wounded and five killed.

Russian prisoners of the Germans who had escaped advised the Regimental Intelligence Officer, Major Roswell K. Doughty, 0280726, of Walpole, Massachusetts, that the Germans had been working on gun positions for three days prior to the time the Regiment arrived in the sector. Information as to the positions of four artillery pieces, one anti-tank gun, four 88mm guns and two self-propelled guns were secured from the Russians.

The 2nd Battalion, which had become disorganized as a result of the enemy counter-attack, regrouped its forces and consolidated its position.

The trucks to motorize the 3rd Battalion were delivered to the Battalion at approximately 1100 hours on 12 June and the units immediately entrucked and began leaving the bivouac area at 1135 hours to contact the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron in the vicinity of MONTALTO DI CASTRO.

At 1425 hours on 12 June, the Division Commander issued orders that the 1st Battalion was to be prepared to move immediately up Highway #1, following Company "K" of the 361st Infantry Regiment. Two companies of the battalion were to be entrucked for the movement. Also, the 2nd Battalion was to assemble and be prepared for a movement. At 1540 hours the Division Commander called to advise that the movement of the 1st and 2nd Battalions had been cancelled. The 2nd Battalion would assemble, but the 1st Battalion would remain in its present bivouac area.

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Two hundred and fifty-one enlisted replacements were received by the Regiment on 10 June and remained with the Service Company field train until assignment to companies was accomplished. Replacements for the 1st and 2nd Battalions were sent to their companies on the afternoon of 12 June. The replacements appeared to be of a higher caliber than those received by the Regiment on previous occasions and performed creditably in combat in subsequent operations.

Two platoons of Company "E" were ordered detached from the Regiment and attached to the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, leaving the 2nd Battalion at 1800 hours on 12 June.

Units were notified early on the morning of 13 June, that no immediate movement was anticipated but all units were to remain on an alert status. At 1106 hours the Regimental S-3 notified all units of the combat team that the Regiment was to be part of a new task force called "Task Force Ramey" after Brigadier General Ramey, the commander. A non-tactical motor movement was anticipated to the task force sector to the northeast. The Regimental I&R Platoon was sent out to make a road reconnaissance for the motor movement.

At 1830 hours the Regimental Commander left for the Division command post and returned with the information that the Regiment would not move during the night but was to be alerted for 0600 hours on 14 June. All units were notified of this alert status.

At 0955 hours the Regimental Commander issued instructions in the event that the Regiment would move up Highway #1 to Highway #74 and thence east on Highway #74. The Regimental I&R Platoon, one platoon of riflemen and one platoon of anti-tank guns would precede the main motor column by five minutes.

At 1210 hours the trucks from IV Corps arrived at the Division Class I dump from IV Corps. An officer was sent to bring the trucks to the assembly areas to entruck the troops. A guide from the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron was sent to the regiment to guide the motor column along Highway #74 to SCANSANO. An enemy column was reported to be moving toward SCANSANO and if our movement was made quickly enough, there was a possibility of trapping them. At 1345 hours the Regimental Commander held a meeting with all unit commanders of the combat team and issued instructions for the motor movement. He advised that the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron was on the road in contact with the French Corps further to the east. The regiment had the mission of going into the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron sector and holding the town of SCANSANO and the roads around it. One platoon of the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron is in SCANSANO at the present time. The combat team may be able to reach the town without opposition, but a German unit is withdrawing from the 142nd Infantry Regimental sector and may get into SCANSANO. In that event a fight could be anticipated.

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At 1450 hours the advance guard of the motor column moved out and headed north on Highway #1 to Highway #74 with the main portion of the column following at a five minute interval. Proceeding rapidly despite the usual numerous blown bridges which occasioned detours and by-passes, the advance guard entered SCANDANO at 2000 hours after traveling fifty-one miles. The 1st Battalion moved to the west of the town and the 2nd Battalion moved east of the town. Road blocks were established on the outskirts of the town. At 2200 hours 14 June a message was received from Task Force Ramey headquarters directing that the Regimental Commander and S43 contact General Ramey the following morning. At 0755 hours on 15 June, they left for TFR (Task Force Ramey) headquarters to receive orders for commitment of the Regiment. At 1155 hours the regiment was alerted to move as soon as possible to the vicinity of S. CATERINA. The Regimental I&R Platoon was sent out ahead of the motor column to reconnoiter and establish enemy contact. Orders were issued for the movement to be the same as that of the 14th. The Regimental I&R Platoon was instructed to keep in contact with elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron which were moving up the same road. Two companies of medium tanks from the 752nd Tank Battalion were attached to the regiment for the pending operation. Leading elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron and the medium tanks of the 752nd Tank Battalion encountered mines and demolitions approximately five miles northeast of SCANDANO. Orders were issued to the regimental units to move no later than 1400 hours and close into the objective area by dark. Efforts were to be made to have Engineers clear the road of mines in order that the column could reach its objective on time. The regimental objective was the small towns of S. CATERINA, ROCCALBEGNA and VALLERONA. A column of friendly troops was moving north from ROCCHETTE DI FAZIO and if they encountered trouble, the regiment was to assist them. The movement was to be via truck as far as possible and then continue by foot. The advance party was to take one company and occupy ROCCALBEGNA followed by the rest of a battalion if it became necessary to commit that large a force. The 1st Battalion was designated as the leading battalion, to be followed by the 2nd Battalion. Cannon Company was to move forward with the 1st Battalion to give it close support.

As the motor column advanced it continued to encounter numerous road mines that considerably slowed up the movement. The mines were booby-trapped in many cases and had to be blown up rather than removed. The advance guard had moved to a position 1100 yards south of S. CATERINA when it encountered German small arms and mortar fire which caused slight casualties. The tanks were ordered forward to use all of their fire power. At 2120 hours Company "C" entered S. CATERINA with Company "B" on the west and Company "A" on the east of the town.

The 2nd Battalion had been shuttled forward to a position one and one-half miles southwest of VALLERONA by 2220 hours. Patrols were sent out to determine if the enemy occupied the town. The 1st Battalion also sent patrols out to find

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but if the enemy occupied ROCCALBEGNA. At Dawn the 2nd Battalion advanced on VALLERONA and the 1st Battalion moved toward ROCCALBEGNA. VALLERONA was occupied at 0600 hours 16 June and ROCCALBEGNA was occupied at 0630 hours. No opposition was encountered in taking the towns. The battalions consolidated their positions around the two towns. The regimental mission, upon occupation of the towns was to hold a line extending from CANA, which lay two and one-half miles west of VALLERONA to TRIANA, which lay two miles east of ROCCALBEGNA.

At 1118 hours on 16 June, General Ramey ordered the Regimental Commander to alert all units to move at 1200 hours.

At 1210 hours the 3rd Battalion, which was still detached from the regiment, was reported two miles south of TRIANA moving by foot. One company of the 1st Battalion was ordered to contact the 3rd Battalion while the remainder of the battalion occupied both ROCCALBEGNA and VALLERONA which latter town was to be taken over from the 2nd Battalion.

The remainder of the regiment was assigned the mission of taking CAMPAGNATICO approximately twelve miles to the northeast across the OMERONE RIVER. The road network in the present regimental sector necessitated that most of the motor vehicles move south of SCANSANO and thence north to the vicinity of the TRASUBBLE RIVER. The command group with armored attachments moved from S. CATERINA west to CANA and thence cross country via trails to the east-west road running to GROSSETO.

At 1830 hours General Ramey advised the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion that it was released from attachment to the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron and would revert to regimental control. The battalion commander contacted the Regimental S-3 and informed him that the battalion was widely scattered, but he would assemble it completely, motorize at SCANSANO and join the regiment as quickly as possible.

The motor column and command group joined forces at 2010 hours in the vicinity of POLVERAIA. Reports from reconnaissance elements and civilians indicated that the enemy had defensive positions on a hill mass south of the junction of the MELACCE RIVER and OMERONE RIVER. The regiment closed into an assembly area at 2100 hours and plans were made for advancing northwest the following morning. At 0500 hours on 17 June, the 2nd Battalion moved forward supported by tanks to the hill mass where enemy defensive positions had been reported. Encountering only light opposition from the Germans occupying the hill mass, the position was quickly taken over. Several artillery concentrations from enemy self-propelled guns were laid down on the advancing troops. The 3rd Battalion advanced to the northwest in conjunction with the 2nd Battalion along the high ground 1100 yards east of the 2nd Battalion's sector.

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Both battalions continued moving forward along the high ground paralleling the OMERONE RIVER--the 2nd Battalion on the west flank and the 3rd Battalion on the east flank. Continued light opposition was encountered from small groups of Germans with increased artillery fire from self-propelled guns.

Task Force Ramey advised the Regimental Commander at 1130 hours on 17 June, that the 1st Battalion had been relieved from its position in the VALLENCIA-ROCCALBESCA area and was instructed to contact the regiment for moving the battalion to the present sector.

Both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced to the northwest and leading elements crossed the OMERONE RIVER at approximately 1400 hours, encountering intense enemy artillery concentrations and machine gun fire. Supporting artillery was called upon to fire on CAMPAGNATICO from which superior position, as the town was located on a high hill, the enemy was able to fire most effectively with their self-propelled guns. Movement of vehicles was made difficult because of heavy rains during the previous night and supporting tanks had difficulty in finding approaches to cross the river in support of the infantry elements.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalion joined forces at 0200 hours on 18 June and continued to press forward. At 0315 hours the 2nd Battalion was within 100 yards of the outskirts of CAMPAGNATICO, with Company "F" in the lead. Company "F" was ordered to proceed into town, followed by Company "G". Company "G" had run into booby traps in its advance. Company "E" brought up the rear of the 2nd Battalion with Company "I" immediately behind the battalion.

The artillery was ordered to lift its fires on CAMPAGNATICO and at 0445 hours the 2nd Battalion began to enter the town against stiff opposition by snipers, artillery and mines. The town was completely taken over at 0700 hours and orders were issued to press forward to the north and northwest.

The heavy rains caused the OMERONE RIVER to rise. Vehicles that formerly were able to ford the river, stalled and had to be towed out. Resupply of ammunition was held up at the river while efforts were made to have Engineers bridge the fording site. At 0855 hours a site was found where vehicles could cross provided the river did not continue to rise. Engineers continued to work on the crossing site in an effort to get tanks across to support the advance of the Infantry.

The 1st Battalion, which had rejoined the regiment at 0200 hours on 18 June, moved by foot north to CAMPAGNATICO and entered the town at 1130 hours.

Reconnaissance elements had difficulty with their observation due to the continued heavy rains. Enemy tanks continued to shell the town of CAMPAGNATICO and the supply roads.

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At 1445 hours 18 June, General Ramey ordered the Regimental Commander to send the 1st Battalion, plus one company of tanks, to PAGANICO and the road junction due east of MT. MONTORSAJO which lay three miles southwest of PAGANICO. Other elements were to organize and remain in Camp PAGANICO.

At 1710 hours, the Regimental Commander instructed the Commanding Officer of Company "E" to send his company, less the two platoons still attached to the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, to the east side of the OMBRONE RIVER where it would become a part of a small task force comprised of a reconnaissance platoon, a tank platoon, Cannon Company, a platoon of Engineers and the 59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. This task force was to be under the command of the Regimental Intelligence Officer, Major Roswell K. Doughty, and was to be called "TFD". The mission of TFD was to protect the right flank of the regiment until French forces had advanced an equal distance to that of the regiment's spearhead which thrust deep into German held territory.

The 1st Battalion was ordered to assemble and be prepared to move on PAGANICO in the morning. The 3rd Battalion was deployed on the southeast side of Camp PAGANICO while the 2nd Battalion occupied the town itself.

The problem of resupplying the regiment in its present position was unusually difficult. Supplies had to be hauled forward a distance of approximately seventy miles. Evacuation of the wounded and dead was similarly complicated by the long distances to be travelled. The efforts of the Regimental Section and Service Company were especially commendatory in keeping the regiment supplied with food, water and ammunition.

At 0932 hours on 19 June, General Ramey ordered the Regimental Commander to gain and hold a line starting at PAGANICO and extending due west for approximately four miles. A road block was to be established two miles east of the town. When this was accomplished, the regiment could re-organize, rest and prepare for another advance.

The 1st Battalion, preceded by reconnaissance elements and tanks began to move on PAGANICO at 0600 hours, moving west from Camp PAGANICO approximately one mile and then cutting north cross-country along the high ground overlooking the PAGANICO-GROSSETO road. The 3rd Battalion, following at 0700 hours, moved along the high ground on the west flank of the 2nd Battalion. Two vehicles of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron were knocked out by anti-tank guns as the leading elements probed the enemy positions along the highway. German machine gun and small arms fire was encountered by the 1st Battalion at 0955 hours. The Germans had established a road block approximately two miles southwest of PAGANICO and vigorously defended it. Artillery was laid up and down the length of the road running northeast into PAGANICO as enemy tanks had been observed moving along it. Continuing to move forward despite the enemy resistance, the 1st

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Battalion sent elements across the highway to the high ground immediately overlooking PAGANICO from the south west. The 3rd Battalion also crossed the highway further to the south.

At 0800 hours the 3rd Battalion had taken two hills approaching PAGANICO from the southwest, but two more hills remained between the town proper and the leading company. The 1st Battalion also began to move into the town from the high ground southwest of PAGANICO, attacking with a company of tanks. Enemy tanks, infantry and self-propelled guns were observed within PAGANICO. Elements of the 1st Battalion entered town at 1115 hours and street fighting occurred. Not until 1400 hours was the town completely cleared of the enemy. The 3rd Battalion moved from the high ground southwest of the town and proceeded up the highway to PAGANICO and thence northwest to the high ground at the road junction two miles west of the town. During the afternoon and early hours of the evening the town became a target for numerous concentrations of artillery and tank fire as the Germans attempted to block movement on the road network leading out of PAGANICO.

At 1545 hours 20 June, General Ramey informed the Regimental Commander that Cannon Company had been withdrawn from the right flank because the French had two companies of Infantry in CINIOLANO. However, they would not definitely leave the sector until patrols had made contact with the French. General Ramey also stated that a task force was to be formed consisting of the 2nd Battalion, plus Company "I", which would be in the lead, the 59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, which would be in direct support of the leading elements, Cannon Company, a platoon of Anti-Tank Company and a medical company. The mission of the task force was to seize and hold positions at the road junction three miles north of ROCCASTRADA. This force would remain on position until Combat Command "3" of the 1st Armored Division passes through it. It would then revert to control of the 36th Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion was directed to be prepared to support the 2nd Battalion task force.

The 1st Battalion outposted PAGANICO and established road blocks. The Germans increased their artillery fire on the town to such a degree that vehicular traffic was stopped.

At 0330 hours 21 June, the 2nd Battalion began to advance, passing through the 1st Battalion at 0510 hours. Moving up a trail south of the PAGANICO-ROCCA-STRADA road, the 2nd Battalion advanced without opposition. The enemy had set up defensive positions all along the railroad but the battalion moved south of the railroad. Friendly troops were reported moving up Highway #73 two miles west of the 2nd Battalion advance column.

At 1530 hours General Ramey ordered one battalion, which was designated as the 1st Battalion, to be deployed between CAMPAGNATICO and PAGANICO. The battalion commander at PAGANICO will be in command at both places. Road blocks will be established outside of the towns.

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At 1750 hours the 2nd Battalion had reached its objective and was ordered to hold its position and await further orders.

At 0730 hours 22 June, Task Force Ramey informed the Regimental Commander that the regiment would be relieved by the 1st Armored Division when it had passed through the regimental sector. The regiment, meanwhile, had reverted to control of the 36th Infantry Division as of daylight 22 June.

The commander of the 1st Armored Division ordered the 1st Battalion to move its road block on the outskirts of PAGANICO 1000 yards further east. At 0900 hours nine light tanks of the 1st Armored Division passed through the 3rd Battalion and artillery fell in the 3rd Battalion area which it was believed was directed at the tanks. The 1st Battalion and TFD were given the further mission of protecting the right flank of IV Corps with TFD under the control of the 1st Battalion.

At 1600 hours Task Force Ramey informed the Regimental Commander that IV Corps had ordered the regiment to stay in a defensive position. The regiment was to remain attached to Task Force Ramey until further instructions were received from the Commanding General of IV Corps. The 3rd Battalion was given the mission of advancing with Combat Command "A" of the 1st Armored Division to seize and hold the road junction two miles northeast of ROCCASTRADA. Company "1" was relieved of attachment to the 2nd Battalion and returned to control of the 3rd Battalion. With one company of Infantry riding on tanks, the 3rd Battalion advanced, encountering light opposition, and closed in around ROCCASTRADA at 1340 hours on 23 June. Upon occupying the town the 3rd Battalion set up defensive positions. The entire regiment was then in a defensive sector awaiting orders to revert to the control of the 36th Infantry Division which, in turn, was contingent upon Combat Command "B" of the 1st Armored Division, passing through the regimental sector.

At 1800 hours on 24 June, Combat Command "A" of the 1st Armored Division had passed through the regiment and the French had taken CIVITELLA. Release from Task Force Ramey was confirmed at 0800 hours on 25 June. The combat team received orders to move by motor to a bivouac area in the vicinity of ROME. Leaving the combat area at 1515 hours, the regiment closed into a bivouac area eight miles northwest of ROME at 2100 hours.

Thus concluded the regiment's most successful combat venture in the Italian campaign since it landed on the shores south of SALERNO on 9 September 1943.

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Due to the rapidity of movement of the regiment during combat operations in the month of June 1944, no estimate could be made of the number of Germans killed and wounded and the vast quantity of military materiel captured and destroyed. 1150 German prisoners were known to be captured by the regiment and it is justifiable to estimate that at least 700-800 additional prisoners were sent to prisoner of war enclosures in the rear without being tabulated.


END

Report of Operations written by:

Robert D. Dieterle

M/Sgt ROBERT D. DIETERLE, 16082500
Service Company, 141st Infantry.

OFFICIAL



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HEADQUARTERS 56TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO #36, U. S. ARMY

OPERATIONS IN FRANCE

AUGUST 1944

ANNEX #6

141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

Part I of two (II) Parts

Part I, Section 1.....Regimental History

Part I, Section 2.....Casualty Report

Part I, Section 3.....Regimental Journal

DECLASSIFIED

DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958

NMW by 7-10-31-63

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HEADQUARTERS 141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO #36, U. S. ARMY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By E7 NARS Date 12-4-73

19 September 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Regimental History and Conclusions of Operations
TO : Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO #36, U. S. Army

1. Inclosed is the history of the 141st Infantry Regiment covering operations in southern France during the month of August 1944.

2. The following conclusions are made based upon the operations in the month of August:

a. In all pursuit all available transportation must be used to carry Infantry to contact the enemy. Supporting artillery, tanks and tank destroyers should be used as well as shuttling by organic vehicles. Experience in this campaign to date indicates that by the rapid displacement of our foot troops, we were able to keep the enemy off-balance and to strike before hostile positions could be adequately prepared to stop us. The use of additional truck companies would assure greater unity and better striking power at vital times.

b. The missions of defending and attacking at the same time on a wide regimental front are incompatible. The high ground east of the Rhone River valley was of vital importance but could not be taken in time due to the necessity of attacking Montelimar to the south of it and of defending against attack by tanks and Infantry from both the north and southeast. In conjunction with the first point above, if additional vehicles had been available to transport the entire regiment to the vicinity of Montelimar when the time came to strike, sufficient force would have been available to take the salient hill mass and to establish more successfully and maintain a block across the main route of German withdrawal.

c. More training is needed in the close cooperation of tanks, tank destroyers and Infantry. It is particularly noted that difficulty has again been experienced in obtaining obedience to commands of a combat team commander by attached tanks and tank destroyer subordinate commanders. It is believed that this is partially due to a failure on the part of such subordinates to understand the nature of a combat team. Instances were encountered where platoon leaders of a tank destroyer unit refused or were too slow in obeying the commands of the Infantry officer to whose organization they were attached, when such orders varied from original missions assigned by officers of the larger tank destroyer unit. Under certain circumstances it was necessary that tanks and tank destroyers move forward with leading Infantry elements, but objections were raised by the armored commanders that this provided inadequate Infantry protection to the tanks or tank

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Ltr, Hq 141st Inf, APO #36, U. S. Army, 19 Sept 44, subject "Transmittal of Regimental History and Conclusions of Operations".

destroyers. Again this was a failure to obey the orders of the responsible commander in time to capitalize on a situation which would have meant losses to the enemy.

2. c. Night attacks require adequate time for reconnaissance in daylight and unless such time is made available, the attack bogs down quickly and can seldom be reorganized before daylight. It is suggested that when a situation is not clear and when no time is available for daylight reconnaissance and planning that it would be more advisable to allow the attacking echelon to rest during darkness and to strike during daylight the next morning. Efficiency would be better served this way.

d. Motor maintenance in a drawn-out pursuit is of prime importance inasmuch as vehicles lost through mechanical break-downs are normally irreplaceable and the consequent overloading of the remaining vehicles results in additional failure which in time handicaps the entire operation.


G. E. STEELE
Colonel, 141st Infantry
COMMANDING

4 Incls:

- #1 - History of Operations (6).
- #2 - Casualties of Operation (6)
- #3 - Journal of Operations (1)
- #4 - Maps of Operations (1)

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CLASSIFICATION CANCELED

By authority of *DDO Director*
5200.9, Sept 27, 1958

By *NMW-P.W.*

Date *10/31/63*

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141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

OPERATIONS IN FRANCE

AUGUST 1944

The beginning of the operation SIGOT-ANVIL—the invasion of southern FRANCE occurred long before the regiment actually began the operation on the French Riviera coast. Leaving the ROME, ITALY, area on 2 July 1944, the regiment moved to the vicinity of PESTUM, ITALY, to participate in amphibious training at the Invasion Training Center. Immediately upon arrival at PESTUM, Transport Quartermasters were assigned the task of combat loading the 141st Regimental Combat Team and its attachments on invasion craft. While personnel of the combat team were undergoing rigorous training at PESTUM, AGROPOLI, and later north of NAPLES in the POZZUOLI area, the regimental commander and his staff worked on the plans of the operations.

Prior to the embarkation of the troops for the actual invasion, all vehicles were placed on ships in the harbors at POZZUOLI, BACOLI and NAPLES. The troops began loading on 9 August, and all personnel had embarked by the night of 10 August, with the exception of follow-up detachments. The majority of the equipment and personnel of the combat team was loaded on LOI's (Landing Craft Infantry), LOT's (Landing Craft Tanks) and LST's (Landing Ship Tanks). The regimental command group loaded on LOI's with the senior proportion of the assault troops and moved from the POZZUOLI harbor to SALERNO on the evening of 10 August. Remaining at SALERNO all day on 11 August, the large convoy of LOI's pulled out of the harbor at 0830 hours on 12 August, accompanied by many escort warships ranging up to cruiser size. The convoy moved up the west coast of ITALY, passing the PONTINE Islands, and then turned northwest towards CORSICA. On 13 August, the convoy moved into the straits between SARDINIA and CORSICA and proceeded up the west coast of CORSICA to anchor in the harbor of AJACCIO at 1730 hours. During the trip from SALERNO to AJACCIO the troops were oriented as to the location of the invasion site, enemy known defenses, nature of terrain, and probable enemy strength in the invasion area. With this knowledge at hand, neither Army nor Navy personnel were permitted to go ashore on the mainland of CORSICA. The other large convoy of ships lay at anchorage in the AJACCIO harbor when the LOI convoy entered it.

The LOI convoy left the AJACCIO harbor at 1545 hours on 14 August, and proceeded northwest towards the coast of southern FRANCE. At 1830 hours the LOI convoy was joined by another convoy of large troop ships escorted by five battleships. Ships stretched on a north-south line on the horizon as far as the eye could see, ranging from gigantic battleships and troops transports to tiny LOI's and PC (Patrol Craft) boats. Maps of the landing areas were issued to the troops along with rations. Officers gave orientation lectures to the

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enlisted personnel on the operation and issued last minute instructions. All personnel were advised that D-Day was 15 August, and H-Hour was 0800 hours.

The night of 14-15 August passed without incident and dawn arrived with a murky overcast sky and a slight fog on the water near the coast. The ships arrived at their rendezvous area and the assault troops began unloading into LCVP's (Landing Craft Vehicle-Personnel) in the semi-darkness of early morning.

Seventy (70) minutes before H-Hour the Navy began shelling the beaches from battleships and cruisers. The Air Corps was scheduled to bomb the beaches thirty (30) minutes before H-Hour but the overcast sky and mist along the coast precluded this assistance for the assault forces. The troops in the assault boats crouched low in their landing craft as the boat waves formed and headed for the shore. Specially designed craft mounted with tions of rocket launchers sped ahead of the assault boats. As the rocket bearing craft drew within range of the beach, they swung parallel to the shore and fired their rockets with a screaming roar directly upon the beaches and their upper defenses. As the assault craft plunged towards the beaches immediately in the wake of the rocket concentrations. At 0800 hours the first assault boats hit the ground their bottoms on the rocky shore of the beaches and the troops dashed off in the face of slight machine gun, small arms and anti-aircraft fire on GREEN beach and on BLUE beach in the face of more concentrated enemy fire.

The regimental combat team had been split to assault two separate beaches. The 2d and 3d Battalions assaulted GREEN beach while the 1st Battalion assaulted BLUE beach. Neither GREEN nor BLUE beaches could be called beaches in the technical sense of the word. An extremely narrow strip of rocky shore separated the water from steep embankments directly to the rear of both beaches. Beyond the coastal highway and railroad which paralleled the shoreline along the bluff above the beaches, the terrain ascended in height to high hills which in turn rose into a mountainous sector to the north. The entire shore area was dotted with villas, hotels and resorts of the famed Riviera, "Cote d'Azur".

The 1st Battalion was assigned a beach with a length of approximately eighty (80) yards, lying in a small inlet of which the western tip of land was known as PTE d'ANNECQ, on which a known pillbox was located. On the eastern portion of land of the inlet three (3) other known pillboxes were situated in advantageous defensive positions flanked by trenches. Anti-aircraft weapons comprised the remainder of the enemy's known defenses in this area. Immediately behind the beach, which had a width from ten to fifteen (10-15) yards, a steep embankment arose to the coastal highway which, in turn, was paralleled by a railroad. Other than the narrow beach, all portions of land bounding the narrow inlet comprised rocky cliffs.

The 2d and 3d Battalions landed abreast on GREEN beach--the 2d Battalion on the right (east) and the 3d Battalion on the left (west). GREEN beach extended for a length of approximately 700-800 yards to the west of CAPE

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DRAMMONT (Cap de Drammont). Three hundred (300) yards from the west tip of CAPE DRAMMONT lay the small island of ILE D'OR on which a prominent lighthouse was located and also an enemy pillbox. Atop of CAPE DRAMMONT a large German radar station was located—its tower being very conspicuous from the sea. On the bluff above and on the left side of GREEN beach were located three known pillboxes in close proximity to each other. On the western portion of CAPE DRAMMONT two more pillboxes were located. Trenches lay to the rear of the pillboxes. GREEN beach had a depth of approximately ten to twenty (10-20) yards and then crossed in precipitous embankments to a small bluff. Immediately behind the bluff ran the coastal highway and the railroad that paralleled it. Further to the rear of the highway and railroad were two (2) rock quarries on the side of a high hill. The small town of DRAMMONT lay to the east of the quarries.

Between GREEN and BLUE beaches was situated the Bay of AGAY which was bounded on the west by CAPE DRAMMONT and on the east by POINTE DE LA BAUMETTE. Within the bay an excellent beach, which had been designated as YELLOW beach, was located. However, the area around the bay was so heavily fortified and its waters so extensively mined that no attempt was to be made to assault the beach. The forces landing on GREEN and BLUE beach would flank YELLOW beach and eliminate its defenses from the rear. When YELLOW beach was taken, Engineers were prepared to neutralize its mines and prepare it for landing supplies.

The regimental mission was divided into two (2) phases. Phase I consisted of landing on BLUE and GREEN beaches with battalions abreast, clearing the beach defenses, securing a line extending 1000 yards east of BLUE beach and 1000 yards west of GREEN beach and penetrating inland on a semi-circular basis from 1000-2000 yards. When the area 1000 yards west of GREEN beach and 1500 yards north of the town of AGAY was secured, the 143d Infantry Regiment was to land on GREEN beach and attack toward ST RAPHAEL. Upon clearing the Phase I line of the regiment's western sector, the 143d Infantry relieved the regiment of its responsibility for the security of GREEN beach west of the mouth of the AGAY River.

The mission of the 1st Battalion was to clear BLUE beach of the enemy's defenses, establish a road block on the highway 500 yards east of the beach, occupy the PLATEAU de FEYSSEIN southwest of the beach, and proceed to the high ground to the northwest to deny the enemy observation from LE RUSTEL D'AGAY, and then make contact with the 2d Battalion on Hill 74 east of the AGAY River. After the high ground was taken, the battalion was to proceed to RADE D'AGAY and destroy the enemy's coast defenses around YELLOW beach. When these missions were accomplished, the 1st Battalion was to proceed to the north and northeast and hold the high ground to prevent hostile movement into the beachhead from the north and northeast and thus protect the right flank of the Division.

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The 2d Battalion's mission was to clear the right half of GREEN beach of enemy defenses, seize CAPE DRAMMONT and then move north to the town of DRAMMONT and the high ground immediately north of the town, establish a road block 1000 yards north of the town of AGAY on the east side of the AGAY River, and send detachments to destroy the enemy coast defenses of RADE D'AGAY west of the AGAY River and contact the 1st Battalion. After the RADE D'AGAY was mopped up, the battalion was to occupy the high ground north of DRAMMONT and AGAY and deny the enemy movement south into the beachhead.

The 3d Battalion was assigned the mission of clearing the left half of GREEN beach, destroying the enemy strong points at the west end of the beach, establish a road block 400 yards west of the beach, seize Hill 144 to the north of the beach and then proceed to Hill 172 and attack enemy defenses north of the town of DRAMMONT from a northwesterly direction, occupy the high ground to the west to prevent the enemy from moving into the beachhead from the west, establish contact with the 2d Battalion 1000 yards northwest of AGAY. When the 143d Infantry Regiment passed through the battalion's position, it was to assemble in an area approximately 1000 yards west of AGAY.

Phase II of the regimental mission was to move to the north and northeast to establish and defend road blocks north of THEOULE SUR MER on the coast highway, one situated two and one-half (2½) miles west of LA NAPOULE, and another three (3) miles west of LE FLAESTEL to protect the right flank of the 36th Infantry Division. The 1st Battalion was to move northeast along the coastal highway to establish the road block north of THEOULE SUR MER while the 2d Battalion moved north followed by the 3d Battalion to establish the other road blocks.

Although the initial boat waves did not meet concentrated enemy resistance, the Germans did fire mortars, machine guns, small arms and antitank gun fire at the assault troops. The 1st Battalion drew heavier fire on BLUE beach than the 2d and 3d Battalions did on GREEN beach. The Germans had deflected their antitank guns to fire directly upon the assault boats. Several of the assault craft were hit and casualties created by this fire. Boats of the fourth and fifth waves, landing on GREEN beach, received machine gun fire from CAPE DRAMMONT. For the most part, however, the assault troops were amazed at the slight opposition they encountered.

At 0925 hours on 15 August, the Regimental Commander, Colonel JOHN W. HARMONY, 015240, of Sidney, Ohio, landed with his command group on the left side of GREEN beach and proceeded inland 350 yards to establish the command post. At 0950 hours the first radio communication was received from the battalions when the 3d Battalion reported that it had taken five of its objectives. Prisoners began to arrive at the command post in large groups and were processed by the regimental interrogators before being taken to the prisoner of war enclosure on the beach. Initial information obtained from the prisoners indicated that most of the troops in the landing area had moved to GANNES and FREYJUS over

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a week ago; further that both ST RAPHAEL and CANNES were lightly held. The Germans had expected an invasion in the vicinity of TOULON and MARSEILLES and had concentrated their 19th Army in that sector.

At 1002 hours the 2d Battalion commander, Lt Colonel JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD, 022656, of FARGO, NORTH DAKOTA, radioed that the town of DRAMMONT and CAFE DRAMMONT had been taken with the exception of a few snipers which were by-passed.

A liaison officer from the 143d Infantry Regiment, who had landed with the 3d Battalion, reported to the command post that the 3d Battalion had taken all of its objectives and the 143d Infantry could now land on GREEN beach and proceed on its mission in accordance with the Division plans.

By 1200 hours the 1st and 2d Battalions were moving to encircle the RIDE D'AGAY. The regimental command post had moved into the town of DRAMMONT at 1100 hours. The first enemy artillery shells began to fall in the vicinity of DRAMMONT and GREEN beach about this time, coming from a northwesterly direction. The 93d Armored Field Artillery Battalion had one battery ashore in position and began firing at the direction of forward observers with the battalions.

By 1215 hours the 143d Infantry had landed on GREEN beach and was pushing through the 3d Battalion towards ST RAPHAEL and FREYJUS. The 142d Infantry, which was to have made a delayed landing on RED beach further to the west of GREEN beach, met such concentrated machine gun fire and found the waters so heavily mined near RED beach that it also landed on GREEN beach behind the 143d Infantry. Thus, the initial success of the 141st Infantry in taking GREEN and BLUE beaches was exploited by the entire 36th Infantry Division.

Both the 1st and 2d Battalions encountered increasing German resistance in endeavoring to clear up the AGAY sector. The enemy's coastal defenses in the vicinity of YELLOW beach proved to be stubborn barriers to overcome. However, the Germans were prevented from blowing up two of the three bridges over the AGAY River. The troops continued to press their attack and took a large number of prisoners. At one time several hundred prisoners were marching down the coastal road towards GREEN beach while their cohorts in arms were involved in a fierce fire fight in the hills directly above them within plain view and firing range of small arms.

At 1345 hours the 143d Infantry advised that its 1st Battalion was ready to relieve the 141st Infantry's 3d Battalion, but it was not until 1535 hours that the 143d Infantry was actually in position and the 3d Battalion began to assemble on the high ground west of AGAY. The 2d Battalion encountered mortar fire in its attempts to cross to the east side of the AGAY River. The banks of the river were found to be mined. Elements of the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon were ordered to find a crossing and move out ahead of the battalions to begin Phase II of the operation. A platoon of tanks and

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another of tank destroyers were sent to the 1st and 2d Battalions to assist them in their advance. The 131st Field Artillery Battalion was ordered to remain in position in the beach area to support the forward movement while the 937th Field Artillery Battalion moved with the regiment's battalions to their new positions until the 131st Field Artillery could displace forward. At 1730 hours the regimental command post displaced to a new location 200 yards north of AGAY. By 2045 hours the 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt Colonel WILLIAM A. BIRD, 0280648, of Barberton, Ohio, had advanced two miles northeast along the coast road while the 2d Battalion had advanced four and one-half miles due north of AGAY. The regimental command post moved for the third time to a position in the mountains, which lay two miles northeast of AGAY on a straight line but a distance of approximately eight miles by the narrow winding road.

During the night of 15-16 August, the regiment continued forward towards its objectives. A hurried call was put in for an Engineer bulldozer to work on the coastal road as it had been dynamited in several places and the tanks and tank destroyers could not get through. The 2d Battalion surprised a column of German vehicles moving along the highway from CANNES to FREYJUS. The Germans were driving with their headlights on, having no idea that the Americans had been able to penetrate their positions so far and so quickly. Unfortunately, the artillery had not been able to displace forward quickly enough to be in position to fire on the column. However, the Germans were turned back by small arms and machine gun fire.

The 2d Battalion established its road block on the CANNES-FREYJUS road two and one-half miles west of LA MAPOULE, but became engaged in a fire fight with the Germans three and one-half miles west of LE PLANESTEL along the same road. The 3d Battalion, commanded by Major CARTEL N. MORGAN, 0342878, of San Antonio, Texas, also engaged the enemy near SOMMET DES GROSSES GRUES, which was a mountain one and one-half miles southwest of THEOULE-SUR-MER. The 1st Battalion continued its slow advance up the coast being retarded by numerous pillboxes which had to be reduced. The regimental command post moved to a position in the mountains three miles west of THEOULE-SUR-MER at 1050 hours on 16 August.

At 1222 hours the 2d Battalion received a radio report from wounded paratroopers in the vicinity of CAMP DES OIS, which lay one and one-half miles north of FREYJUS, which stated German half-track vehicles and ambulances were moving up and down the highway near their position. This information was reported to the 36th Infantry Division as the paratroopers were out of the regimental sector.

Enemy resistance continued to increase. Artillery fire from tanks and self-propelled guns reached an unusual intensity at times. The Germans began infiltrating in the 2d Battalion's area. Due to the large area being covered, it was an impossibility to block all paths although the enemy was never able to infiltrate a very large force. The route to the position of Company "F" was cut at one time, but after a short fire fight, it was re-opened without serious

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consequences. By 1500 hours the 1st Battalion had progressed as far as POINTE NOTRE-DAME. Efforts to contact the 143d Infantry on the regiment's right flank proved fruitless.

It became increasingly difficult to supply the regiment the further it moved into the mountainous sector. Distances by air miles were short but when it was necessary to travel by the winding, narrow roads it entailed driving numerous miles. Stream beds in the mountains were dry and water had to be hauled from the beach area. A shortage of gasoline at the supply dumps further complicated movement on the minimum number of supply trucks allotted the regiment.

Artillery forward observers reported large enemy troop movements from CANNES south to LA NAPOULE and artillery concentrations were placed along the coastal highway. The 1st Battalion moved ahead more rapidly and by 2000 hours had passed through THEOULE-SUR-MER and began organizing a defensive position 1000 yards south of LA NAPOULE. Both Company "A" and Company "B" were in contact with the enemy at this point. The 3d Battalion also continued to advance inland from the 1st Battalion along the narrow, winding mountain trails. By 2030 hours the 1st Battalion had reached its final objective and Phase II of the regimental mission was completed. Except for sporadic German attempts to infiltrate across the broad regimental front, enemy resistance appeared broken.

During the night of 16-17 August, Company "E" became engaged in a fire fight with an unknown number of Germans who attempted to infiltrate through its position. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was sent out beyond the regimental sector to feel out enemy positions. One patrol was fired upon by small arms and machine guns and had to withdraw. Another patrol captured two light armored enemy vehicles northwest of the regimental area. It was not until 0500 hours on 17 August, that the 143d Infantry was contacted one mile south of LE PLAINESTEL. The 1st Battalion received enemy shelling of an unusually heavy caliber which was believed to be from coastal guns on the ILE STE MARGUERITE located off of the coast from CANNES and which created more casualties than the landing operation had entailed.

At the completion of Phase II of the regimental mission, the regiment reverted to a defensive status. The 1st Battalion blew up the bridge in front of its position on the coastal road and the 2d and 3d Battalions prepared bridges in their areas for demolition.

At 1015 hours on 17 August, the Assistant Division Commander of the 36th Infantry Division instructed Colonel HARMONY that the 141st Infantry would take over the road blocks of the 143d Infantry as both the 142d and 143d Infantry Regiments were scheduled to begin an attack. This gave the regiment a front of eighteen and one-half (18½) miles to cover. Orders were also issued to maintain a strong mobile reserve which, considering the extremely long frontage of the regiment and shortage of transportation, was a task of no mean proportions. The 1st French Armored Corps had landed and was ready to move on to TOULON and the Assistant Division Commander desired to know whether or not the regiment

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desired to retain the naval support assigned to it. In view of the large area to be covered it was requested that naval support be made available to at least 1200 hours on 18 August. Immediate steps were made to take over the 143d Infantry road blocks to the west and northwest.

Company "C" was left in position covering the coastal road block while Company "A" and Company "B" were alerted to be moved from the coast to the northwest as quickly as transportation could reach them. Company "F" was assigned the task of holding the area from its present position on the left flank of the 2d Battalion to that of Company "C" on the coast. The 3d Battalion took over the 143d Infantry sector. All areas of the regiment continued to be harassed by the shelling from German coastal guns on ILE STE MARGUERITE and from CAPE de la CROISSETTE east of CANNES. A naval mission was requested against these large caliber guns and by late afternoon of 17 August, the shelling had slackened considerably.

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion seemed to be the only unit in radio contact with paratroopers who had landed to the northwest in the FAYENCE, CAILLON and MONTAURoux area. By relaying the paratrooper messages to Division Headquarters, ammunition, rations and other supplies were dropped to them by plane and bombing missions on the main road south of FAYENCE was effected by their direction with excellent results.

The paratroopers marked their positions where they desired ammunition and rations dropped by yellow banners. They also used large white arrows to point at enemy concentration areas in the FAYENCE-CAILLON-MONTAURoux sector. The paratroopers reported an enemy concentration of approximately 400 men with tanks and guns on a mountain 800 meters north of FAYENCE. This information was passed on to Division Headquarters with a request for a bombing mission.

By 2230 hours on 17 August, the regiment had taken over the 143d Infantry sector and had completed its reassignment in accordance with the 36th Division orders. The regimental command post moved to MON FIE DU MALPEY—two miles south-east of LE PLANESTEL. The 36th Reconnaissance Troop was sent to the north to patrol the roads towards CAILLON and FAYENCE by way of LE MUYS and BAGNOLS.

The night of 17-18 August, passed without incident. A 36th Reconnaissance patrol encountered a few Germans. Enemy heavy caliber guns on ILE STE MARGUERITE had ceased firing since the last naval bombardment. Radio contact was maintained by the 2d Battalion with the paratroopers. At 0920 hours on 18 August, Division Headquarters advised that the regiment's left (west) boundary would be extended to include BAGNOLS. Meanwhile, the 36th Division was preparing to send assistance to the wounded paratroopers near CAILLON by the use of tank destroyers. At 1510 hours the 2d Battalion established contact with the paratroopers who stated that the tank destroyers had never reached them. They further stated that they had had elements in CANNES four days ago and the enemy defenses were very light. Between CANNES-GRASSE-NICE they estimated approximately 1500 Germans.

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At 1705 hours on 18 August, the Division Chief of Staff ordered two companies authorized and sent to BAGNOLS. There they would be joined by a company of tank destroyers and a reconnaissance platoon. This force was given the mission of attacking CAILLON and relocating the paratroopers who were trapped there and then proceeding on to attack FAYENCE.

The regimental commander ordered Company "B" and Company "I" with two sections of heavy machine guns, one section of 81mm mortars, a mine squad from the Antitank Company, a reconnaissance platoon and one platoon from Company "B", 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion—which platoon was all that could be assembled at that time alerted for this operation. The units were placed in a task force called Task Force Eitt (TFE) under the command of Major HERBERT E. EITT, 0404188, of San Antonio, Texas, who was the Executive Officer of the 2d Battalion.

At 1935 hours the 2d Battalion reported that one of its observation posts could see both CAILLON and MONTAUBOURX. There were an estimated 100 Germans in CAILLON, 150 in FAYENCE and a small force in TOURETTES. Later eight trucks loaded with enemy troops came into FAYENCE from DRAGUIGNAN and continued down the highway and then turned north into CAILLON. The troops detrucked at 1900 hours. There were also an estimated 400 Germans in a strongly fortified position north of FAYENCE. Another observation post reported heavy demolitions occurring in the port area at CANNES. Partisans reported that all the main roads into FAYENCE were covered by antitank guns.

During the night of 18-19 August, the heavy caliber shelling from ILE STE MARGUERITE began again and was directed on the position of Company "C". Company "L" was engaged in a small fire fight with a group of Germans who tried to infiltrate through its position.

At 0900 hours on 19 August, Task Force Eitt encountered an enemy road block at a crossroads 1500 yards southwest of CAILLON, but it was able to break through and continue its advance toward the town.

The paratroopers reported a German division assembling at GRASSE and another enemy division coming in from ITALY. They hoped to attack GRASSE before the Germans had time to set up a strong defensive position.

By 1230 hours Task Force Eitt had progressed to the outskirts of CAILLON. The buildings in the town were widely separated and the attack was slowed down while the troops fought for each building. Division Headquarters advised that a company of tank destroyers and a battalion of armored field artillery was at DRAGUIGNAN on call. A request was made for their immediate movement to the CAILLON area. A call for Naval support was answered with the reply that the Navy would fire on anything 500 yards north of the town. It was evident that the Germans intended to try and hold CAILLON. They used tanks and a great deal of artillery and kept infiltrating troops into the northern sector of town. By 1745 hours the task force had advanced to within 600 yards of the center of

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CALLAN in a series of sharp encounters. It was not until 2030 hours that the town was taken and a defensive position set up. Snipers continued to be active and had to be hunted down. Wounded paratroopers found in the town were evacuated through medical channels.

At 2300 hours the Division G-3 advised that the regiment would be relieved on 20 August, and to assemble as much or as many of the units as possible without weakening the defenses and road blocks.

Early on the morning of 20 August, information was received from Division Headquarters that the regiment was to be relieved by the 1st Airborne Task Force. Liaison officers from this force arrived at the regimental command post to be comprised of the regimental situation. In turn, they sent units to the battalions to check positions. The regiment was ordered to assemble at DRAGUIGNAN as soon as possible. With the shortage of transportation within the regiment and the many miles covered, it was apparent that it would require many hours to completely assemble all units and transport them to DRAGUIGNAN. By shuttling with the Cannon Company, Antitank Company and artillery vehicles and by securing ten vehicles from Division, the entire combat team closed into a bivouac area at DRAGUIGNAN by 2400 hours.

At 1845 hours on 20 August, the Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post and issued orders for the combat team to move to CASTELLANE on 21 August. Later the orders were changed for the regiment to move further north to DIGNE. By overloading vehicles and shuttling again, the regiment moved to DIGNE closing in at 2230 hours on 21 August. At 2200 hours Division ordered the regiment to establish road blocks at NOYERS and ANTONAVES. One platoon from Company "K", one platoon from Antitank Company and one squad from the Regimental I&R Platoon were sent to ANTONAVES. A siliir force from the same units was sent to NOYERS. Both road blocks were established by 0600 hours on 22 August. Orders were issued by Division at 2230 hours on 21 August, to move to the vicinity of ASPRES-SUR-BUECH on 22 August with one battalion to arrive by 1000 hours. The 2d Battalion was alerted for immediate movement and arrived at ASPRES-SUR-BUECH at 1100 hours on 22 August.

The many miles covered by the regiment in the previous two days had placed a severe strain on the Service Company. The drivers received very little rest and the supplying of gasoline, rations and water for all units of the combat team proved to be a most difficult and arduous task.

The country through which the regiment travelled was mountainous, comprising portions of the French Alps. A good highway was available most of the way but the Germans had made enough demolitions to cause numerous detours. The enemy had evidently left the sector very hurriedly as there were many places where effective demolitions could have appreciably held up the motor columns. This mountainous region was a stronghold of the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) and the information and assistance furnished by this force was invaluable. It was extremely improbable that the Allied thrust so far north in a

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few days could have been accomplished without their aid.

At 1130 hours on 22 August, the Division Commander issued orders that immediately upon arrival of the 141st Combat Team at ASPRES-SUR-BUECH two battalions were to be sent to LIVRON which lay to the west along the main north-south highway along the east side of the RHONE River. The 2d Battalion, having already arrived in ASPRES-SUR-BUECH was ordered to proceed to LIVRON while the other two battalions were still enroute from DIGNE. The road block at ANTONVRES was released and another road block established at ROSANS upon Division order.

The regimental commander moved out with the 2d Battalion, taking Regimental Headquarters Company, Antitank Company, Cannon Company and Company "A" of the 11th Medical Battalion as the remainder of the force. Upon arrival at ASPRES-SUR-BUECH the 1st Battalion was alerted to follow the 2d Battalion, but a shortage of gasoline grounded all units. It was not until 0330 hours on 23 August that gasoline was obtained and the 1st Battalion left ASPRES-SUR-BUECH loaded on vehicles of the 131st Field Artillery Battalion. Orders had been changed prior to departure for the battalion to proceed west to CREST and turn south to contact friendly troops for the exact location of the regimental area. The 3d Battalion was alerted to move as quickly as trucks could be made available to haul it.

The regimental command post was located in the small town of CONDILLAC which lay four miles east of the RHONE River and six miles northeast of MONTEILMAR. At 0930 hours the 1st Battalion commander and his staff arrived at the command post. They were given the mission of attacking Hill 300 which was three and one-half miles north of MONTEILMAR and extended in a long ridge north to LA GOUCOURDE, and placing a road block on the main highway east of the RHONE River. The 2d Battalion was prepared to attack MONTEILMAR in conjunction with a platoon of tank destroyers and some tanks.

By 1200 hours, Company "A" had occupied the north slopes of Hill 300 without opposition. The 3d Battalion, then under the command of Major ROBERT E. OSBORNE, 0229280, of Los Angeles, California, arrived at the regimental command post at 1300 hours and was given the mission of occupying the high ground four miles south of LIVRON and blocking the roads running north and south from the western slopes of the ridge which dominated the terrain in that area.

The regimental commander advised the staff that Task Force Butler, which had preceded the regiment into this sector, was to be relieved by the regiment as soon as all units were in position. Reports from the FFI and civilians indicated a considerable number of Germans were to the south of the regimental area. At 1325 hours three tanks from Company "3", 753d Tank Battalion, were sent to CLEON D'ANIRAN which lay eight miles southeast of the regimental command post to stop an enemy armored threat.

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The tanks and tank destroyers, which were to assist the 2d Battalion in its attack on MONTEILIMAR at 1630 hours, had not reached the battalion area by 1500 hours. The 2d Battalion had closed into an assembly area in the vicinity of ST MARCEL LES SAUZET after establishing contact with units of the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron. The French Maquis, who were to have assisted in the attack, had been dispersed by a German counter-attack although two companies of their force still remained available. Supported by the 59th Armored Field Artillery, the 2d Battalion moved out to attack MONTEILIMAR without supporting armor of tanks and tank destroyers, meeting enemy resistance in the form of small arms, machine gun and artillery fire.

At the same time the 2d Battalion began its attack, the Germans launched a counter-attack against the 1st Battalion with tanks and Infantry in an effort to take Hill 300 from the south. The tank destroyers supporting the 1st Battalion withdrew and had to be tracked down to get them back into position. Although the 1st Battalion command post had to draw back because it was receiving direct enemy artillery fire, the battalion held its positions. However, the enemy began to infiltrate through and around both the 1st and 2d Battalions. The network of roads and trails in the area was a veritable maze and with the extensive area that had to be covered, insufficient troops were available to adequately block the infiltrations.

By 1830 hours the 2d Battalion advance guard had reached SAUVAN CHAU where it was engaged by German small arms and machine gun fire.

A task force consisting of Company "B", Antitank Company, Cannon Company and two troops of the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, under the command of Captain CLAUDE D. ROSCOE, 0367264, of Brownwood, Texas, Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, was placed at a vital road junction four miles east of LIVRON, and north of the DROME River.

Enemy artillery was very active throughout the regimental area. The road from MARSANNE to CONDILLAC, which was the main supply road of the regiment, was subjected to almost constant harassing fire.

At 1945 hours Division Headquarters ordered the road block on the RHONE River highway put in. Division was advised that it was impossible in that area as the Germans were shelling with heavy artillery almost incessantly. Also, the supply of ammunition for the regiment's supporting artillery was very low and had to be conserved. The 1st Battalion kept calling for harassing artillery fire on German positions, but its request could not be complied with.

The 2d Battalion mission was changed at 2140 hours. Instead of attacking MONTEILIMAR, it was to by-pass the town and implant itself on the high ground north of the main road running east from town. A German counter-attack was expected early in the morning and both the 1st and 2d Battalions were alerted. The 3d Battalion was recalled from its position south of LIVRON and was moved

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into an assembly area in the vicinity of the regimental command post with instructions to take over the positions of Company "A" and Company "C" in the morning.

During the night of 23-24 August, enemy activity could be heard across the entire front. Tanks could be heard moving in front of Company "C". The 2d Battalion of the 143d Infantry, which held a position north of the 1st Battalion, desired mines laid in the 1st Battalion area. However, due to the constant enemy artillery, it was not feasible to lay them that night.

At 0730 hours on 24 August, the 2d Battalion received a counter-attack which was repelled. In turn, the 2d Battalion attacked with Infantry, tanks and tank destroyers and gained the upper hand. Patrols were sent out to the ROUBION River to find a possible fording site so that the battalion could proceed to the high ground east of MONTELMAR, but a fording site could not be found. The Germans withdrew to the high ground south of the 2d Battalion, reorganized and counter-attacked again. Twenty prisoners were taken and twenty of the enemy were killed in these attacks. In turn, the Germans captured a three man patrol of the 2d Battalion. The ridge running from the 2d Battalion's position south to the ROUBION River was heavily fortified by the Germans. The enemy continued to try and infiltrate around the west flank of the battalion and the route to the battalion's rear was constantly cut. Combat patrols had to be sent out constantly to re-open the route. Since a suitable fording site could not be found to cross the ROUBION River, the 2d Battalion held its positions.

The 117th Reconnaissance Squadron detachments attached to the regiment received numerous attacks in the vicinity of SAWASSE during the morning of 24 August. The 3d Battalion occupied Hills 300 and 294 in the vicinity of the same time and received considerable enemy artillery fire. At 1130 hours Company "B", less one platoon which remained on the northern road block near LIVRON, was returned to the 1st Battalion.

The Division Artillery advised that all bridges west of MONTELMAR had been knocked out. Since the Air Corps and the FFI had already effectively blocked or destroyed the bridges across the RHONE River, the only escape route of the Germans lay to the north through the regimental positions.

The constant enemy infiltrations kept all units occupied in beating off piecemeal counter-attacks. At 1200 hours Company "A" was engaged by a force of Infantry. Tanks infiltrated through Company "L" and to the rear of Company "M". The 2d Battalion advanced to LE MARTINET which lay one mile northwest of MONTELMAR and organized a defensive position. The battalion continued to be harassed by artillery and tank fire and every movement to the rear for supplies necessitated forcing a route.

At 1415 hours the regimental commander informed the Assistant Division Commander that the regiment was so spread out that it was virtually impossible to

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keep the Germans from infiltrating through to the rear. The Assistant Division Commander approved dissolving the task force holding the road block near LIVRON and returning it to the regiment. Also, the regiment was to take up new positions on the high ground east of the RHONE River.

The 1st Battalion had attacked LE COUCOURIE during the afternoon and by 1430 hours had entered the town and was completing clearing the enemy out. Three enemy tanks were observed coming down the road towards MARSANNE from the north and Division Headquarters was notified that they would have to take care of them as all units of the regiment were committed in either attacking or defending their respective sectors. The 1st Battalion continued its attack to clear out the valley between Hill 300 and the river but encountered increasing heavy resistance. Company "C" suffered quite a few casualties and called for heavy artillery support. Company "L" on Hill 300 was also engaged in repelling a German counter-attack at the same time. The enemy held the two top peaks of the hill but the company still tenaciously held on to the lower northern slopes. After Company "C" had been subjected to numerous intense enemy artillery concentrations, the Germans counter-attacked and drove the company back with heavy losses to its original position.

Meanwhile the 2d Battalion was engaged in beating off a frenzied German attack comprising a battalion of Infantry and eighteen tanks supported by artillery. During a portion of the fight, the 2d Battalion was cut off and without any communication with the regiment. It was forced to fight its way back and withdrew to SAUZET to re-organize.

At 2000 hours the regimental commander ordered the 1st Battalion commander to take up positions on the high ground on the regimental right flank. Company "K" was to remain on Hill 294 in the center while the 2d Battalion held the left flank and the 3d Battalion remained in reserve. However, the 2d Battalion was so hard pressed by the German counter-attacks that the 3d Battalion was ordered to move to the high ground east of SAUZET at 2030 hours. German tanks kept infiltrating the 2d Battalion's positions as it fell back towards SAUZET. Again, supporting tanks and tank destroyers were not available when needed. The 2d Battalion finally withdrew to positions on a hill east and north of the town. The Germans kept pouring reinforcements into SAUZET. By 2130 hours fifty-eight vehicles had entered the town and a convoy was coming in as darkness fell and out of observation. Supporting artillery kept shelling the Germans with excellent results.

After the 2d Battalion had extricated itself under cover of darkness and began re-organizing, the 3d Battalion moved into position on its left flank holding the ground from east of SAUZET to a point just west of LA LUPRIE. The regimental command post moved to the vicinity of MARSANNE. Two platoons of the 11th Engineer (C) Battalion were designated to fill the gap between the 3d Battalion and the 142d Infantry instead of a battalion from the 143d Infantry as originally planned. The Engineers moved to the vicinity of BONLIEU which made a scant defensive force on a wide frontage.

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All artillery, tanks and tank destroyers of supporting units were alerted for the expected continued German counter-attacks at daylight. The enemy was making a desperate effort to break through to the north and afforded the regiment no rest. During the night German artillery shelled the entire regimental sector with harassing fire. German vehicles and troops continued to filter through along the RHONE River highway where the 1st Battalion effort to establish a road block had been knocked out. Artillery was directed along this escape route.

At 0830 hours on 25 August, the regimental commander advised the 1st Battalion commander that every effort must be made to put a road block in across the RHONE River highway. He directed that patrols be sent north of LA COUCOURDE in an effort to work their way through to the highway. The Division Commander called right after instructions were issued to the 1st Battalion commander and ordered an attack in force to physically cut the road at all costs and block further German traffic. Both the 1st and 2d Battalions had suffered such heavy losses in personnel from the incessant German counter-attacks the regimental commander did not believe he could organize a sufficient force to establish the road block and hold it against the sizeable forces the Germans were throwing against the regiment. However, having been ordered to put the road block in at all costs, he proceeded to organize the 1st and 3d Battalions for an attack supported by tank destroyers. The 2d Battalion of the 143d Infantry, which had also been trying to reach the highway, had been unsuccessful in its efforts from the high ground north of the 1st Battalion. A route could be found down the side of the hill, but supporting weapons were not able to traverse it. By the use of artillery, traffic on the main road was denied to the Germans at 1020 hours.

Attacks from the north also continued. Eight enemy tanks and fifty personnel carriers were observed moving along the RHONE River bed from GRANE toward CREST. Task Force Butler was given the mission of destroying this force.

Arrangements were completed for the 1st Battalion, less Company "B", with Company "G" of the 141st Infantry and Company "G" of the 143d Infantry to attack and put in a road block. The attack began at 1500 hours and progressed satisfactorily. Company "G" of the 143d Infantry occupied the northern slopes of Hill 300 from which Company "A" had been driven the previous day. Company "K" occupied the south slopes. With these portions of Hill 300 re-taken, the remainder of the companies were ready to attack. Pushing towards LA COUCOURDE, two rifle companies supported by eight tank destroyers and three tanks were able to establish a road block on the main highway. The regimental commander did not believe this was enough of a force to hold the road block because the troops were not in position to be resupplied or reinforced. By 2040 hours the Germans had brought up three truckloads of Infantry to within 800 yards of the road block and detrucked the men. The regimental commander requested the Chief of Staff at Division to permit this force to blow the bridge in the vicinity of LA COUCOURDE and withdraw to the high ground to the east. At 2100 hours orders

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by the Division Commander that the road block must be physically manned.

While the road block was being put in, the Germans were launching a counter-attack across the entire regiment's front and in the sector occupied by the elements of the 11th Engineer (C) Battalion. Both Company "E" and Company "K" were hard pressed in repelling Infantry and armored counter-attacks. The Germans continued to build up a strong force around SAUZET and their artillery was unusually heavy throughout the regimental area. The 11th Engineers reported that the enemy had infiltrated through BONLIEU and had overrun their positions. Enemy tanks and Infantry were observed moving northeast of SAUZET. Division Headquarters was requested to put in a force of sufficient strength in the BONLIEU sector to prevent the Germans from constantly infiltrating on the regiment's left flank. Division G-3 stated that a battalion of the 143d Infantry was moving over to fill the gap between the 141st and 142d Infantry Regiments but it would be several hours before the battalion was in position. In the meantime, 200 German Infantry troops, supported by tanks, advanced north up the road from BONLIEU to MARSANNE. Six tank destroyers and two tanks were sent out to attack this enemy force. The Germans were so close to the artillery positions that the artillery could not fire into them without endangering friendly troops and hasty preparations were made to displace the artillery to the north. The tank destroyers engaged the enemy tanks and successfully knocked out two of them and left them burning. The other German tanks turned south while the enemy Infantry was scattered by machine gun fire.

German Infantry continued to penetrate toward the road block on the main highway from both the north and south. By using artillery until darkness eliminated observation, the Germans were kept dispersed and no sizeable force was able to form. At 0100 hours on 26 August, preceded by artillery concentrations of heavy intensity, the Germans counter-attacked with a sizeable force of Infantry and tanks and drove the road block back. Three tanks and six tank destroyers were knocked out by the Germans in this attack. Infantry elements were scattered and disorganized and were forced to withdraw to the high ground to the east in an effort to re-organize. The Division Commander was notified through the Chief of Staff that the road block had been knocked out. The Chief of Staff inquired as to whether or not enough of a force was available to attack again. He was given a negative reply. At 0445 hours the Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander that Task Force Butler would retake the road block as soon as possible. The remnants of the troops who had been on the road block were ordered back to the portion of Hill 300 occupied by Company "A". Upon breaking the road block, the Division artillery placed extra fires along the highway to harass the traffic it was known the Germans were trying to force through. By 0830 hours on 26 August, Task Force Butler was passing through MARSANNE on its way to attempt to put in the road block.

At 0930 hours the 3d Battalion was being subjected to intense enemy artillery concentrations which created numerous casualties in Company "I" and Company "M". At 1145 hours the Germans launched a counter-attack against the 2d

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Battalion. An enemy column began moving up between the left flank of the 2d Battalion and the right flank of the 3d Battalion. All possible artillery was directed against this German effort which finally broke and retreated.

Task Force Butler planned to attack at 1300 hours and seize the ridge running from Hill 300 north to LA COUCOURDE. If the ridge was taken, the regiment was to retake Hill 294 which lay east of the ridge. Company "G" of the 141st Infantry and Company "G" of the 143d Infantry were designated to remain in position on the northern slopes of the ridge after it was taken by the task force. When Task Force Butler completed putting in the road block, Hill 300 was to be taken over by the regiment with one battalion and the road block held. Plans were made by the regimental commander to hold the ridge line with the 1st Battalion. Traffic on the highway was to be stopped by artillery, heavy machine guns and mortar fire.

At 1615 hours the Division Chief of Staff ordered all tanks attached to the regiment turned over to Task Force Butler. All units were to patrol vigorously to their front during the night and be prepared to take over the road block as quickly as it was put in. The 3d Infantry Division was reported to be approximately ten miles south of the regiment which accounted for the constant efforts of the Germans to break through as quickly as possible.

The gap between the 3d Battalion on the regiment's left flank and the 142d Infantry was filled by a battalion of the 143d Infantry shortly before dusk. However, the troops were still spread too thin to stop all enemy infiltration. It was necessary to move Company "K" from the 1st Battalion to a position between the 1st and 2d Battalions where enemy Infantry was probing. The 3d Battalion moved back to the north slightly to readjust its line with the flanking units and gain a better defensive position.

At 2030 hours Task Force Butler was still engaged in a hard fight to take Hill 300. The regimental battalions were still beating off German counter-attacks all across their fronts. The troops were becoming excessively tired from engagements of either attacking or receiving counter-attacks and the unusually heavy enemy artillery fire for the past three days. Casualties in all ranks were steadily mounting.

Division G-2 advised that the 198th German Infantry Division and elements of the 11th German Panzer Division were operating across the regimental front. A 36th Division operations plan had been captured by the Germans from an officer of another organization and the BONLIEU sector was considered to be the weakest point in the Division's defenses. The 305th German Infantry Regiment had attacked the regiment's position on 26 August, and the 320th German Infantry Regiment was expected to attack on 27 August.

At 2140 hours on 26 August, the regimental commander sent Company "G" to replace Company "K" between the 1st and 2d Battalions. Company "K" was drawn back

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to the rear of the 3d Battalion as reserve. Company "G" of the 143d Infantry reverted to its own regimental control while Company "B" of the 141st Infantry took over the position of Company "G" of the 141st Infantry.

During the night of 26-27 August, the 1st Battalion patrols encountered resistance all along the ridge line east of the main highway. The 2d and 3d Battalion patrols made no physical contact with the enemy in their sectors.

By 0630 hours all companies had changed positions in accordance with the regimental commander's orders. The 2d Battalion of the 143d Infantry was still attacking Hill 300 and a battalion of the 157th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Division, which was attached to Task Force Butler, was attacking LA COUCOURIE. Company "B" occupied the north slope of Hill 300 while Company "C" was on a nose of Hill 430. Company "A" took up a position west and north of Company "C".

At 0906 hours the tank destroyers were ordered to go into concealed positions for use as antitank guns with the warning that they would probably have to be placed near the road block on the highway when it was established. A road block had been put in temporarily at the base of Hill 300, but Task Force Butler still had not been able to clear the enemy from the hill itself. Until the hill was cleared the road block could not be considered as being established.

At 1040 hours the Regimental Intelligence Officer, Major ROSWELL K. DOUGHTY, 0280726, of LeRoy, New York, informed the Division G-2 section that information secured from prisoners indicated that the 308th German Infantry Regiment had attacked yesterday and the 326th German Infantry Regiment was to attack today. The enemy had but one motor vehicle for each company. Their artillery was horse-drawn. Sixteen tanks were with each German regiment.

At 1045 hours the battalion of the 157th Infantry Regiment, which had attacked LA COUCOURIE and entered the town, received a counter-attack and was driven out. It was believed that the Germans had committed their third and last regiment in this counter-attack. However, the road block was still not established and German vehicles still managed to filter through to the north. All tank destroyers from Company "C", 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which had been attached to the regiment, were ordered released. This placed the regiment in a precarious position against German armored attacks.

At 1630 hours the Regimental Commander, Colonel JOHN W. HARMONY, was wounded by a shell fragment and evacuated. The 2d Battalion commander, Lt. Colonel JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD, was summoned to regimental headquarters to take temporary command of the regiment.

A great deal of enemy activity was observed in the vicinity of SAUZET. Troops and vehicles could be seen going east, west and south to and from the town. Artillery concentrations were constantly thrown in and around SAUZET with excellent results reported by observers. However, the Germans still kept coming north as the 3d Division kept pounding at their rear.

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At 1800 hours the Assistant Division Commander advised that during the night and following morning would undoubtedly be the critical time in preventing the Germans from breaking through. After Hill 300 was taken and the road block established, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 143d Infantry were to hold the sector from the RHONE River east of the highway to the present position of the 141st Infantry, while the regiment held the line just to the east of LA LUPIE. A force of Maquis was on the regiment's left flank and the 1st Battalion of the 143d Infantry between the Maquis and the 142d Infantry which was on the Division's extreme left flank. The 3d Division was scheduled to attack north during the night with the 36th Division probably attacking south in the morning. Company "B" was attached to the 3d Battalion of the 143d Infantry for this operation.

Allied planes had been operating against the enemy motor columns south of MONTELIBAR with great success. However, on several occasions they miscalculated and strafed troops in the regimental area. At 1930 hours four Allied planes strafed between the 1st and 2d Battalions on Hills 300 and 430 causing slight casualties.

At 2120 hours the 1st Battalion commander advised that a physical road block had been created across the main highway by enemy vehicles wrecked by our artillery fires. Enemy tanks were trying to get around it, but both tank destroyers and artillery were firing at them.

At 2140 hours Division Headquarters ordered strong combat patrols to move out during the night to contact the enemy, capture prisoners, and if possible to contact the 3d Division. The 141st Infantry was ordered to attack at daylight in the direction of SAUZET and MONTELIBAR and clean out all German resistance northwest of the ROUBION River and north of SAUVY and CHAU. When this mission was completed, the regiment was to move to the north by way of S.N. MARTIN and CREST.

The regimental commander issued orders to all battalions and attached units at 2315 hours for the attack in the morning. At 0700 hours an artillery preparation was to be laid for ten minutes on the hill on which the small village of CLARY was situated and which hill lay to the front of the 3d Battalion. The 3d Battalion was to move out at 0700 hours to take the high ground. Three tank destroyers were to move into position during the night so that they would be in position to fire on SAUZET in direct support of the 3d Battalion attack. The 2d Battalion would move out when the 3d Battalion had reached its objective and take Hill 294. The 1st Battalion would move into the position vacated by the 3d Battalion for the attack and be prepared to move south and clean up SAUZET on order. When all of these objectives were taken, both the 2d and 3d Battalions would move to the north bank of the ROUBION River and the regiment's mission would be completed.

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At 0510 hours on 28 August, the Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander that the 7th Infantry Regiment was to attack in a westerly direction towards the regiment front; the 15th Infantry Regiment was to attack MONTELMAR at 0600 hours; while the 30th Infantry Regiment attacked in a northwesterly direction from LA BEGULE DE MAZENE with the mission of driving the enemy toward the RHONE River at 0800 hours.

During the night of 27-28 August, the 143d Infantry released Company "B" from attachment and the company was withdrawn so that it could participate in the 1st Battalion attack. At 0630 hours, however, the regimental commander of the 143d Infantry demanded that Company "B" be returned as its release had been an error. Upon endeavoring to return to its original position the company was pinned down by machine gun fire by the enemy who had occupied the sector after the company had pulled out the previous night. It was not until 1100 hours on 28 August, that the company was able to regain its former position.

At 0700 hours on 28 August, the 3d Battalion began its attack toward CLARY. The battalion had to advance through intense artillery and mortar fire. At 0755 hours the commanding officer of the 131st Field Artillery called to say that Division had ordered all artillery taken away from the regiment inasmuch as it was only receiving small arms fire. The artillery was to be placed on the RHONE River highway instead. The fallacious information that the regiment was only receiving small arms fire in its attack was immediately reported to Division. At 0820 hours the Division Chief of Staff called back to advise that the regiment could retain the fires of the 131st Field Artillery and 141st Field Artillery except for one battery. At 0825 hours the 3d Battalion had reached its first objective and began moving into CLARY with tanks and Infantry. As the battalion moved closer to the town the German fire power increased and it became evident that they intended to make a strong effort to hold it. At 0840 hours Company "L" entered CLARY with Company "I" laying down a base of fire for the entry. By 1000 hours both Company "K" and Company "K" were in CLARY engaged in street fighting. At 1140 hours the 2d Battalion had started to move on SAUZET while the 3d Battalion was still endeavoring to clear up CLARY.

At 1235 hours the 2d Battalion was forced to withhold its attack on SAUZET inasmuch as the 3d Battalion was encountering increasing resistance in its efforts to mop up CLARY. The 3d Battalion had several tanks knocked out and was suffering heavy Infantry casualties. At 1315 hours the Germans had thrown so many troops into CLARY that the 3d Battalion called for smoke shells to screen its withdrawal from the town. The battalion had incurred many casualties and had become disorganized.

The Assistant Division Commander was informed that the attack on SAUZET and Hill 294 could not begin until the 3d Battalion had completely withdrawn from CLARY. The tank destroyers were ordered into position to fire on CLARY and the 131st Field Artillery was instructed to fire phosphorous shells into the town as soon as the 3d Battalion had withdrawn.

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At 1500 hours the Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post and inquired as to why the entire regiment was not attacking. The Commanding Officer of the 143d Infantry notified the Division Commander that the RHONE River highway was not blocked. Over 400 enemy vehicles were observed north of MONTELMAR banked hub to hub. The 142d Infantry was pulled off of the Division's left flank which left that sector extremely weak. Units were alerted for a possible break-through in that area.

At 1745 hours the 3d Battalion was still being pounded by German artillery and Infantry counter-attacks and its position was so precarious that its commander was worried about the battalions ability to hold.

At 1850 hours the Assistant Division Commander notified the Regimental Executive Officer that the 141st Infantry would not attack to the south during the night but would hold its present position. The 15th Infantry Regiment was north of MONTELMAR and was pushing north to contact the 143d Infantry along the RHONE River. The 7th Infantry Regiment was close to the regimental line. The 3d Battalion was to be withdrawn from OLARY as quickly as possible and the entire front protected to prevent any Germans from escaping. The 143d Infantry was to be relieved and pulled out as soon as the 15th Infantry contacted it. The regiment would be relieved by the 7th Infantry Regiment upon orders of the Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division. Upon its relief, the regiment would assemble and prepare to move to the north.

At 2116 hours the Assistant Division Commander ordered the regiment to make a night attack on both OLARY and SAUZET. Division Headquarters was notified that the troops were in such shape and their disposition such as to make it almost an impossibility to make a night attack on the two towns. Company "B" was in the process of being relieved by the 143d Infantry and could not rejoin the 1st Battalion before early morning. The 2d Battalion was still being subjected to heavy enemy artillery concentrations. The 3d Battalion was still disorganized with some of its men cut off in the town of OLARY by the enemy. The 143d Infantry had notified the regiment it was going to attack OLARY with the assistance of the 132d Field Artillery Battalion and to make a tight defense which was being done. The 3d Battalion had no strength and the 1st Battalion was badly beaten up. The 5d Division was near and it was expected the regiment would contact them shortly. This information was passed on to the Division Commander who issued instructions to contact the Assistant Division Commander and apprise him of the situation.

The Assistant Division Commander was notified of the regiment's status but at 2218 hours he ordered the 1st and 2d Battalions to get in an assembly area and get ready to attack as soon as possible. At 2300 hours the Assistant Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post and issued orders for the attack. The 1st Battalion would attack OLARY with one company of the 3d Battalion attached at 0400 hours. The 2d Battalion would attack SAUZET at 0400 hours while the 143d Infantry attacked Hill 294 at the same time. The 1st

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Battalion was to attack with two companies abreast and one in reserve. Company "I" was attached to the 1st Battalion for this attack. The artillery was directed to lay two concentrations on CLARY at 0200 and 0230 hours—five rounds from each gun with seven batteries firing each time. The 3d Battalion reported that all of its men would be out of CLARY by 2400 hours with the exception of the wounded and prisoners which were estimated to be approximately 100 men.

Information from prisoners indicated that the Germans had originally intended to evacuate CLARY and SAUZET on the previous day and move to the southwest via a dry stream bed. However, in order to screen their movements in the valley, it was decided to hold the towns which were then strongly reinforced.

The 143d Infantry was ordered to attack Hill 294 before 0100 hours on 29 August, instead of at 0400 hours. At 0450 hours it was reported that they had met no opposition and everything was proceeding satisfactorily.

The 1st Battalion attack also proceeded according to plan. Company "A" and Company "I" had reached CLARY by 0525 hours while the 2d Battalion had advanced to the outskirts of SAUZET. Enemy tanks were observed moving in the town but Company "F" entered and caught many Germans asleep. By 0625 hours Company "F" had reached the main street of SAUZET and was encountering machine gun and self-propelled gun fire. Company "E" moved behind the town to prevent any enemy withdrawal and at 0725 hours the 2d Battalion reported SAUZET had been taken. The battalions re-organized in the towns and patrols were sent to the south and southwest to contact the 7th Infantry Regiment. Company "I" returned to the control of the 3d Battalion and Company "B" rejoined the 1st Battalion at CLARY.

At 0855 hours Division Headquarters advised that the 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment was at ST MARCEL LES SAUZET moving north toward LA COUCOURDE. As soon as physical contact was made with this force, the regiment was relieved and was to assemble and move up Highway #7 after the 143d Infantry. At 1048 hours elements of the 3d Division were contacted to the east of Hill 300 and the battalions began to assemble their companies.

At 1140 hours Colonel OLYDE E. STEELE, 016159, arrived at the regimental command post to take over command of the regiment. Lt Colonel JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD reverted to the command of the 2d Battalion.

The regimental commander ordered the 3d Battalion to be prepared to move by 1530 hours, the 1st Battalion by 1730 hours and the 2d Battalion by 1930 hours via MARSANNE, PUY ST MARTIN, CREST and CHABEUIL. The Assistant Division Commander ordered reconnaissance elements to the north to contact the 36th Reconnaissance Troop which was operating north of CREST. Transportation was available for only the 3d Battalion which was entrucked and ordered to go as far as possible and then dismount and advance by foot. The trucks were then to return and shuttle the 1st and 2d Battalions forward. The 2d Battalion was instructed to stop at CREST.

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until it was decided whether or not it would move by an alternate route to the east of CHABEUIL and attack BOURG DE PEAGE which had been designated as the regimental objective. The French Maquis reported that bridges at both ST MAZIERE and EYMEUX, which lay on the route proposed for the 2d Battalion, were still in. In BOURG DE PEAGE two bridges over the ISERE River had been blown and the third bridge was mined. The Division Commander stated that BOURG DE PEAGE had to be taken in order that the 3d Division could pass through to the northeast.

The FFI was dispatched to determine if the bridge at EYMEUX was still intact as reported inasmuch as the attack hinged upon being able to use this bridge. At 2150 hours the FFI advised that the bridge was still in and was being protected by the Maquis. The 2d Battalion was ordered to move immediately via CREST, BEUFORT, ST JEAN and ST MAZIERE with instructions to attack ROMANS which lay across the ISERE River from BOURG DE PEAGE, but to attack only upon radio order that artillery was in position on the south side of the river to support the attack. The 1st Battalion was loaded on trucks of the 141st Field Artillery and brought up to support the 3d Battalion.

The 3d Battalion encountered German resistance on the outskirts of CHABEUIL at 2300 hours. The regimental commander then had no hopes of attacking BOURG DE PEAGE from the south inasmuch as CHABEUIL would have to be attacked in the morning. The 2d Battalion was instructed to secure the bridge at EYMEUX and await the forward displacement of the artillery to support its attack after CHABEUIL fell. The EYMEUX bridge was to be secured before daylight.

Plans were made for the 1st Battalion to attack in the morning supported by tanks to by-pass CHABEUIL. At 0040 hours on 30 August, the 3d Battalion pulled back to try and flank the town. At 0245 hours the regimental commander instructed the 3d Battalion commander not to try and take CHABEUIL during the night but to send a combat patrol forward to knock out enemy machine gun positions. At 0830 hours the 3d Battalion had patrols inside of CHABEUIL and Company "A" was by-passing the town on the east. It became evident that the Germans in CHABEUIL had withdrawn. The Maquis stated that the enemy had withdrawn to MONTELIER to the north. The Maquis also reported that the 45th Division had attacked BOURG DE PEAGE from the west on the previous night. This was not known by the regimental commander. Division Headquarters was notified and it developed that even VI Corps had not known BOURG DE PEAGE was being attacked by the 45th Division. The regimental commander requested that the 45th Division hold up its attack until it could be coordinated with that of the 2d Battalion advancing from the east on the town.

The 1st Battalion, having by-passed CHABEUIL and the 3d Division, moved rapidly on toward MONTELIER. A Maquis report indicated that there had been several tanks, 88mm and 105mm guns and between 700-800 Germans in CHABEUIL the previous night. Some of the Germans had been wearing French insignia and the tanks were flying French flags. All had cleared out of town by 0130 hours with the exception of a small holding force. 150 Maquis joined the 3d Battalion at CHABEUIL.

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Fifty Maquis were sent to the west of town to establish a road block while 100 went forward with the battalion.

At 1028 hours a message was sent to the 2d Battalion to begin the attack on BOURG DE PEAGE immediately inasmuch as the artillery would be in position to support the attack by the time it could begin.

The 1st Battalion reached MONTELIER and pushed on without encountering enemy resistance. The 3d Battalion was motorized at ORLÈVEUIL and by-passed the 1st Battalion, reaching the southern section of BOURG DE PEAGE at 1320 hours. The 2d Battalion reached the northern area of ROMANS without German resistance. The route taken by the 2d Battalion was recommended by the Division Commander to the VI Corps for the 3d Division to move by motor to the GRENOBLE area.

At 1630 hours the regimental commander advised the Division Commander that the 3d Battalion was putting in strong road blocks to the west of the CREST-ORLÈVEUIL-BOURG DE PEAGE highway. The 1st Battalion was remaining in the vicinity of BOURG DE PEAGE while the 2d Battalion took up defensive positions north of the ISERE River in the vicinity of ROMANS. A strong road block was also put on the main highway from VALENCE to BOURG DE PEAGE.

Allied planes had again strafed the regiment during its movement from CREST to BOURG DE PEAGE on two different occasions. The second time seven casualties occurred north of MONTELIER. The Regimental I&R Platoon and the 36th Reconnaissance Platoon were sent out to reconnoiter to the north.

At 2215 hours the Division Commander ordered a field officer placed in command of a force to go to VALENCE, secure the town and contact wounded American soldiers known to be in the city, and send a reconnaissance unit to the railroad bridge north of the city. The 3d Battalion Executive Officer was sent in command of this force with a platoon of Infantry, three tank destroyers and a section of the I&R Platoon.

A patrol from the 1st Battalion and one from the I&R Platoon ran into enemy road blocks during the night and casualties ensued.

At 0850 hours on 31 August, another company of the 3d Battalion was sent to TANKE north of VALENCE and a reinforced company from the 1st Battalion was sent to join the force entering VALENCE. The 3d Battalion commander was sent to VALENCE to take command while the 3d Battalion Executive Officer was ordered to take his force to the north of VALENCE and secure the bridge over the ISERE River and establish a road block.

The force in VALENCE met enemy opposition from approximately 200 Germans who had been cornered in a park in the city. Another platoon of Infantry and two more tank destroyers were sent to assist the attackers in VALENCE. At 0930

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hours VALENCE was taken. A force was sent from BOURG DE PEAGE to TAIN to establish a road block ten miles north of VALENCE. Two companies from the 3d Battalion, supported by machine guns, mortars, antitank guns and tank destroyers were sent to CHATEAU-NEUF southwest of ROMANS to clean enemy opposition from that area. The 1st Battalion was ordered to move to the north bank of the ISERE River above VALENCE while the 3d Battalion was instructed to pick up all of its road blocks, tank destroyers and anti-tank guns and turn them over to the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion was to continue on its mission of preventing the Germans from escaping to the north.

At 1400 hours on 31 August, Division Headquarters advised that the combat team would assemble in the vicinity of BOURG DE PEAGE and prepare to move to the south of BEAUREPAILLE at 1900 hours. All regimental road blocks were released when the 142d and 143d Infantry Regiments passed through them and cleared the regimental area. All units were notified to assemble as quickly as possible. The road to be used by the regiment was also being used by both the 142d and 143d Infantry Regiments. Many of the bridges along the route had been demolished by the enemy in their retreat and by-passes were not completed. Thus, the entire column was moving very slowly. The Division Commander issued orders that the regiment would move at daylight on 1 September instead of 1900 hours on 31 August as previously instructed.

Thus, the month of August 1944 closed with the regiment pursuing the Germans north in one of the greatest routs in military history; it had established a beachhead across which the entire 36th Infantry Division had moved to begin its operations in southern FRANCE; it had withstood seven days of the most savage counter-attacks that elements of three German Divisions could throw against it in a vain effort to break through to the north; it had captured over two thousand prisoners and killed and wounded many more; and it had destroyed and captured untold quantities of German war materiel.

German prisoners for the period 15 August through 31 August, were taken by the regiment as follows:

August 15.....	850	August 24.....	51
16.....	751	25.....	0
17.....	32	26.....	23
18.....	225	27.....	1
19.....	14	28.....	1
20.....	215	29.....	9
21.....	0	30.....	3
22.....	43	31.....	0
23.....	0	TOTAL.....	2218

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The quantities of enemy war materiel captured and destroyed could not be tabulated due to the swift movement of the regiment. A record of only a small fraction of the German war materiel was kept which is as follows:

NO. KNOWN DESTROYED

Tanks (Mark IV and VI).....	4
105 mm guns.....	3
Motorcycles.....	5
Armored Half-track vehicle.....	2
Trucks (all types).....	14

NO. KNOWN CAPTURED

Railroad Cars.....	105
Trucks (all types).....	6
Motorcycles.....	2

NO. KNOWN KILLED

German soldiers.....	80
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The 3d Infantry Division reported that the area around MONTELLIMAR south of the regimental sector where seven days of constant fighting had occurred was strewn with the wreckage of vehicles, tanks, guns, and other equipment while dead Germans and horses used for drawing artillery pieces lay unburied in large numbers.

END

Report of Operations Written by:

Robert D. Dieterle

M/Sgt ROBERT D. DIETERLE, 16 162 508
Service Company, 141st Infantry

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APO #36, U. S. ARMY

SEPTEMBER 1944

141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

Four Sections

- Section I.....Conclusions of Operations, Narrative,
Casualty Report, Awards & Decorations
Report and Officer Roster

Section II....Regimental Journal with supporting
documents and overlays for period from
1 September to 15 September 1944

Section III...Regimental Journal with supporting
documents and overlays for period from
15 September through 30 September 1944

Section IV....Maps

SECTION I

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
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HEADQUARTERS 141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO #36, U. S. ARMY

CEL/RKD/rac

30 October 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Regimental History and Conclusions of
Operations for the Month of September 1944

TO : Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO #36,
U. S. Army

1. Inclosed is the regimental history of the 141st Infantry
covering operations in southern France during the month of September
1944.

2. The following conclusions based upon these operations are
made:

a. The operations re-emphasized the need for fast-moving
daylight reconnaissance of routes to be traversed at night. On sev-
eral occasions vehicular moves were ordered to be made so late in the
day that the regiment could not initiate reconnaissance of a previ-
ously unreconnoitered route before darkness. The result was that ad-
vances were delayed and slowed down until daylight. The Intelligence
and Reconnaissance Platoon was forced, under the circumstances, to
roll down roads with no visibility in areas where the enemy was min-
ing and blocking our main advance. Such reconnaissance, actually, is
no reconnaissance. While radio contact was maintained to warn of en-
emy installations, any hostile contact resulted in a long delay while
foot reconnaissance was instituted to determine the size and dispo-
sition of enemy forces. More efficient operations would have result-
ed if the entire operation could be postponed until daylight where
plans could not foresee such conditions as outlined above. This would
result in troops receiving a night's rest, which is especially im-
portant in a long, hard pursuit, and would prevent an excessive delay
by relatively small groups of enemy whose size is deceptive in the
dark.

b. River crossings in a fast pursuit can be made rapidly
on a narrower front than would be normally employed in an attack
against a well-defended river line. Prompt reconnaissance by the
battalions concerned enabled the regiment to locate a dam, ford or
foot bridge overlooked by the enemy in his hasty withdrawal. Once a
battalion had secured such a site, the entire regiment could cross
rapidly with its foot troops and in many cases with its vehicles.

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Transmittal of Regt History and Conclusions of Opns

Local assistance from friendly natives proved of great importance in planning reconnaissance for crossings and in the actual location of underwater dams, fords and other crossing sites.

2. c. River crossings where the far bank is defended by the enemy from prepared positions require detailed reconnaissance in daylight. Where such proceedings can be done with secrecy, crossings can be made on a narrow front by infiltration at night. In the instance of the MOSELLE River crossings, the regiment was fortunate enough to have found a member of the French Forces of the Interior who had escaped through hostile territory the day before the actual crossings. This man knew of a ford that was relatively lightly defended. Reconnaissance was directed to that area, although the entire sector was reconnoitered on the afternoon of the day the crossing was effected. It is pointed out that while a re-entrant is a likely place for a crossing of a river line, it is also a logical place to defend for flanking fires are available to both attackers and defenders at such a site. There was such a re-entrant in the vicinity of ELOYES but the reconnaissance of units of the regiment, supplemented by the information offered by the French Forces of the Interior member who had passed along the hostile sector opposing us, indicated the enemy was ready for any attempt that might be made there. There were many machine guns with grazing fields of fire across the river as well as several batteries of mortars set up to cover the area. All means available were employed to gain surprise including a feint by one battalion into the salient at ELOYES, radio silence until contact and cover of darkness, with the result that the leading battalion crossed without drawing fire and secured a bridgehead which shattered the enemy defenses along the MOSELLE River in that sector.

d. Under circumstances of terrain such as were encountered in the MOSELLE River area, where time was not sufficient to allow marking of routes through the woods with tape or luminous buttons to ensure that all elements of a command arrived at their objective intact at night, local guides were indispensable.

e. Densely forested, high ground is of little value to the offense or defense. The Germans did not defend the hills in the FORET DE FOSSARD except at their bases just inside the woods. Attacks through such terrain were often greatly slowed down by a few snipers who had to be run down individually in thick underbrush with resulting loss of direction. Photos were of little value in determining trail nets through woods and existing maps of 1/100,000 or 1/50,000 scales were not sufficiently detailed to be of any great assistance in such areas. Individual fighting holes were of little

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value unless covered with logs to prevent casualties from flying shell fragments that resulted from numberless tree bursts.

Charles H. Owens
CHARLES H. OWENS
Colonel, 141st Infantry
COMMANDING

6 Incls: (sextuple)

- #1 - Narrative
- #2 - Casualty Report
- #3 - Awards & Decorations Report
- #4 - Officer Roster
- #5 - *Journal w/overlays and supporting documents
- #6 - *Maps

* Journal and Maps submitted in single copy only to accompany original copy to War Department, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

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141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

OPERATIONS IN FRANCE

SEPTEMBER 1944

The beginning of the month of September found the regiment concentrated in the vicinity of BOURG DE PEAGE (145080, Sheet 131) under orders from the Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, to move to a bivouac area north of BEAUNE AIRE, which lay almost twenty (20) miles due north of BOURG DE PEAGE.

The leading elements of the combat team left the assembly area at 0700 hours on 1 September, and reached LENTHOL (178372, Sheet 13N) at 1015 hours where the rear elements of the 143d Infantry were contacted on the road. The convoy was halted until interval could be taken and maintained between the march units. Bridges and culverts along the main highway between BOURG DE PEAGE and BEAUNE AIRE had been blown by the Germans and numerous detours were entailed that took the motor column on occasions five miles to the east to find a passable road. By 1210 hours the road from LENS LESTAC (120360, Sheet 131) to BEAUNE AIRE (124412, Sheet 13N) had been cleared of mines and demolitions had been bridged or filled in to the extent that the main motor column was able to use the direct route.

Although elements of the 142d Infantry Regiment encountered the enemy on the left flank of the regiment, the 141st Infantry made no enemy contact and was able to advance beyond BEAUNE AIRE to SEPTIME (083650, Sheet 131). The 1st Battalion closed into an assembly area at 2000 hours; the remaining units closing into bivouac areas by 2340 hours.

At 2400 hours the Regimental Commander, Colonel CLYDE A. STEELE, 016159, of Cincinnati, Ohio, was ordered to the 36th Division Headquarters to receive orders covering movement of the regimental combat team to the vicinity of LYO (Sheet 131) in the morning of 2 September. The Reconnaissance Company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which was attached to the combat team, was alerted at 0327 hours to move to the town of JALLEYRIAS (157723, Sheet 131) and then north to the R. O. River to the town of JONS (132738, Sheet 131) to reconnoiter a route for the combat team. At 0440 hours Colonel STEELE held a meeting at the regimental command post with all unit commanders to instruct them on the coming movement. The VI Corps had been directed to advance on LYO with the 3d, 45th and 36th Divisions abreast. The 36th Division was to advance on LYO with three regiments abreast on a north-south line with the 141st Infantry on the north, 142d Infantry in the center and 143d Infantry on the south. The mission of the 141st Infantry was

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to advance on LYON from the east and secure the south bank of the RHONE River east of LYON and secure a line from LEYZIEUX (074888, Sheet 131) to GENAS (072849, Sheet 131). The 1st Battalion was to move by motor and marching to an assembly area in the vicinity of JARNEYRIAS, advance quickly to the north to VILLETTE D'A THON (166930, Sheet 131), reporting to regimental headquarters its arrival at this town, and then move west to assist the 2d Battalion in securing LEYZIEUX and finally organize a defensive position with its right flank on the RHONE River. The 2d Battalion was to advance to an assembly area in the vicinity of JARNEYRIAS, advance west to clear PUSIGNAN (124877, Sheet 131) and hold until the 1st Battalion was prepared to assist in the advance on LEYZIEUX, organize a defensive position and maintain contact with the 143d Infantry Regiment on the left flank and the 1st Battalion on the right flank. The 3d Battalion was to remain in regimental reserve in the vicinity of PUSIGNAN. All orders were to be subject to change upon reaching the assembly area in the vicinity of JARNEYRIAS and looking over the terrain and situation. The combat team tanks and tank destroyers, which were still moving up from BEAUREPAIRE, were to arrive in time to join the column before it moved out in the morning.

As was usual in all the late motor movements made by the regiment, transportation created a distinct problem. The rear elements of the regiment and supply dumps now lay many miles to the south. The full quota of Service Company trucks still had not arrived from ITALY eighteen days after the invasion although they had been scheduled to arrive on D-plus-five day. The tireless work of the Service Company drivers and other members of the company in keeping the regiment supplied over the many miles from the beachhead merited the commendation of the Regimental Commander to all members of the company through Captain CHARLES H. BRACHAL, 0420093, of San Antonio, Texas, the Regimental S-4.

Using all organic transportation available and loading troops on tanks, tank destroyers and artillery vehicles, the regiment moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of JARNEYRIAS--the 1st Battalion starting at 0800 hours on 2 September and reaching JARNEYRIAS at 1130 hours. The town of JARNEYRIAS was found to be lightly held by reconnaissance elements of the 3d Division who had engaged German forces there the previous day.

The regimental command post closed at SEPTRE at 1130 hours and displaced forward to JARNEYRIAS, arriving at 1250 hours. The 1st Battalion continued on to VILLETTE D'A THON and then moved west to the vicinity of DECINES CHARPIEU (046882, Sheet 131) to assist the 2d Battalion in its move on LEYZIEUX. Upon approaching VILLETTE D'A THON

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the 1st Battalion encountered a small force of approximately fifty Germans who were sniping at the troops from concealed positions. One company was left at VILLETTE D'ANTHON to clear out this opposition while the rest of the battalion moved to the west through JONAS and JOMAGE. Fifty-seven prisoners were taken at JOMAGE by Company "B". Pressing on to DECINES CHARPIEU the 1st Battalion captured an additional one hundred prisoners, arriving at the town at 1930 hours.

The 2d Battalion occupied PUSIGNAN at 1430 hours without opposition. The Maquis reported German troops two kilometers to the west on the road to MEYZIEUX and patrols were sent to the west in an effort to make contact with the enemy. A company was sent to occupy the town of QUINCIEUX (085854, Sheet 134) southwest of PUSIGNAN.

At 1711 hours on 2 September, 36th Division headquarters advised that the regiment was to take up a position concentrated in the area of the towns DECINES CHARPIEU, CHASSIEUX (051863, Sheet 134) and MEYZIEUX. The 1st Battalion was ordered to occupy the area around DECINES CHARPIEU, the 2d Battalion CHASSIEUX and the 3d Battalion MEYZIEUX--all battalions being instructed to be prepared to move to the west upon Division order.

The Maquis reported there were no Germans in LYON south of the RHONE River and there had been none in the city since 0900 hours in the morning. All bridges in the city had been blown up by the Germans prior to their retreat. The MFI (French Forces of the Interior) and the Maquis were very active in the LYON area and over 1600 men were placed at the disposal of the regimental commander by the local Maquis chief.

At 1840 hours the regimental command post moved from JANDLYN to PUSIGNAN. The weather throughout the day was unusually cold with almost constant rain. The troops were wet and tired and the Regimental Commander ordered that after all objectives were taken, the men were to be placed under shelter wherever possible and given an opportunity to rest and get dry. Only a skeleton force was to be outposted as protection through the night.

Division headquarters ordered patrols sent to LYON and along the south bank of the RHONE River to find a crossing site to continue pursuit of the enemy to the north. The Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon entered LYON but reported that all bridges inspected had been blown with at least thirty foot gaps. The Reconnaissance Company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion reported the bridge at DECINES CHARPIEU had been blown and personnel had received sniper fire from the north bank of the RHONE River. A foot bridge was intact at JOMAGE that was suitable for Infantry but which could

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not support vehicular traffic without being reinforced considerably by the Engineers. The Engineers reported that the bridge would hold Division traffic with a little work. Tanks, tank destroyers, and artillery, however, could not cross the bridge. Division headquarters stated that the bridge at LOYETTES (230903, Sheet 13L), which lay in the 3d Division area, was the only one that could be used for traffic up to ten tons. Traffic heavier than ten tons would have to use a pontoon bridge erected east of LOYETTES.

At 1000 hours on 3 September, Division advised that the Reconnaissance Company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion was detached from the regiment on orders to proceed to the northeast while the 142d Infantry Regiment was motorized and standing by to move after the reconnaissance units, while the 141st Infantry was to stay on an one hour alert status.

However, at 1045 hours the 1st Battalion advised that a crossing had been found via a bridge at JONAGE and thence over a secondary road to a dam which bridged the canal paralleling the RHONE River to the north. This information was given to Division headquarters which immediately advised that the regiment was to move at once and the 636th TD Reconnaissance Company was to be reattached to the regiment. At 1145 hours on 3 September, the Regimental Commander issued instructions for the crossing of the RHONE River. The combat team was to assemble in the vicinity of LA BOISSE (097972, Sheet 13L) and await orders from the Division Commander as to whether to proceed to the west or northwest. At 1450 hours the 1st Battalion reached LA BOISSE and the Division Commander was advised and asked for additional orders. The Regimental Commander, who was with the forward elements, advised the S-3 Section at 1650 hours that he was pushing forward to a concentration area north of MIONNAY (014028, Sheet 13L). At 1755 hours the 1st Battalion stated that they had passed an enemy road block at MIONNAY consisting of felled trees which were mined and booby trapped but which was not manned by personnel.

At 1805 hours the Regimental Executive Officer, Lt Colonel DONALD A. MACGRATH, 0260431, of New York, New York, notified Colonel STEELE that the Division Commander had ordered the 141st Infantry to push on to ST ANDRE DE CORCY (030068, Sheet 13L) for the night and then push north from that point in the morning. The 1st Battalion had already reached the vicinity of ST ANDRE DE CORCY and the remainder of the combat team closing into bivouac areas at the time this message was received. The regimental command post was established at VERNANCE CHAU (018080, Sheet 13L) which lay one and one-half miles northeast of ST ANDRE DE CORCY. The entire regiment had closed into its bivouac area by 2100 hours.

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At 2210 hours the Division Commander radioed that the regiment was to continue to move during the night and that a liaison officer was on the way to the regiment with operations instructions. All units were alerted for the move pending receipt of the Division orders. At 0020 hours on 4 September the Division Chief of Staff called to state that VI Corps had directed the regiment to move out during the night toward MACON (9248, Sheet 13L). The Reconnaissance Company of the 636th TD Battalion was sent out ahead of the 1st Battalion and reached AMERIEUX EN DOMBES (988141, Sheet 13L) at 0150 hours with the 1st Battalion close on its heels. At 0410 hours on 4 September, the Regimental Commander notified the 1st Battalion commander that the progress of the 636th TD Reconnaissance Company was unsatisfactory and that the 1st Battalion should push forward with an advance guard as rapidly as possible, advancing the main body of troops by bounds between successive points. At 0415 hours the 1st Battalion had reached ST TRIVIER SUR LOIGNANS (980222, Sheet 13L) and at 0505 hours had pushed on to CHATILLON SUR CHALARONNE (025278, Sheet 13L). After dawn the forward elements were able to move more rapidly and at 1130 hours a temporary regimental command post was set up in LA MAGDELAINE (953477, Sheet 13L) when the column was halted by enemy demolished bridges to the north. However, the 636th TD Bn Reconnaissance Company elements had pushed forward to PONT DE VAUX (000623, Sheet 13L) by 1150 hours.

The Regimental Intelligence Officer, Major ROSWELL K. DOUGHTY, 0280726, of Le Roy, New York, reported to Division headquarters that a strong force of Maquis had cleared MACON, which was two miles east of LA MAGDELAINE, of the Germans during the night. The bridge over the SAONE River between MCCI and ST LAURENT DE L'AIN (930480, Sheet 13L) had been blown but the French were repairing it at the present time. Meanwhile a small footbridge could be utilized to cross to the city of MACON.

At 1320 hours the Assistant Division Commander ordered the regiment to assemble in the vicinity of PONT DE VAUX, sending reconnaissance elements forward until contact with the Germans was established. The Regimental Commander held a meeting in LA MAGDELAINE at 1335 hours with all unit commanders to advise them of the plans for moving north. All commanders were notified that a German force of twenty tanks and other vehicles was observed moving west the previous day from the area now occupied by regimental units at the present time. The 1st Battalion was ordered to occupy the town of SERMOYER (028698, Sheet 13L), the 2d Battalion occupy ARBIGNY (020669, Sheet 13L), while the 131st Field Artillery Battalion and the 93d Armored Field Artillery Battalion carrying the 3d Battalion bivouac in the vicinity of LA CROIX (026672, Sheet 13L) and LES COUCHOUX (029684, Sheet 13L) together with Company

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"C", 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company "A", 753d Tank Battalion. Before leaving LA MAGDELAIN, thirty-three prisoners from various German units fleeing north were rounded up from hiding places. The prisoners had been travelling north on whatever transportation they could find, travelling at night for the most part, constantly harried by the Maquis and FFI and fearing the closing gap that separated them from the fast moving American forces.

By 2000 hours the regiment had closed into a bivouac area in the vicinity of PONT DE VAUX, AMBIGNY and SERRUYER. At 1700 hours reconnaissance troops reported the bridge across the SEILLE River (028718, Sheet 13L) had been blown and they had received sniper fire from across the river. Patrols were sent out to investigate Maquis reports that between 300-400 Germans were digging in positions north of the river in a wooded area fronted on the south by a swamp. Artillery fire was directed on these positions. Apparently the Germans withdrew as patrols failed to contact their forces upon crossing the SEILLE River.

At 2015 hours on 4 September, the Regimental Commander held a meeting with all unit commanders to summarize the known enemy information and issue instructions for the movement on 5 September. Orders had been issued by Division for the entire 36th Infantry Division to advance with three regimental combat teams abreast--the 141st Infantry on the left (west), the 143d Infantry in the center and the 142d Infantry on the right (east)--toward the north. The 141st Infantry was to move via CUISERY (042766, Sheet 13L), then ST GERMAIN DU PLAIN (023928, Sheet 13K) to NAVILLY (140190, Sheet 13K). If the regiment was not engaged with the enemy upon arrival at NAVILLY, it was to go into bivouac. The order of march was to be the 1st Battalion, 2d Battalion and then the 3d Battalion. The 1st Battalion was to move out at 0615 hours on 5 September, completely motorized, with the 2d Battalion following loaded on the armored column vehicles. The 3d Battalion was to begin marching and be shuttled forward as trucks returned from hauling the 1st Battalion. The Regimental I&R Platoon and the 636th TD Reconnaissance Company were to precede the motor column to reconnoiter routes.

At 2400 hours on 4 September, Division headquarters advised that all plans had been changed. The regiment was to move at 0700 hours in the morning with a different objective and a different route. All units were immediately notified of the change and alerted to receive instructions as soon as the detailed plan was received from Division. The new Division instructions ordered the regiment to move to the vicinity of ST GERMAIN DU BOIS (220988, Sheet 13K). All units were again notified of the new destination and instructions for the movement re-

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remained the same as for the former destination.

Reconnaissance units found that enemy demolitions had been most effective to the north and west. Many bypasses had to be made and Company "A" of the 111th Engineers was called upon to bridge several streams and rivers. The regiment followed a route from CUISERY to BRIENNE (055768, Sheet 13L) to JOUVINCON (083785, Sheet 13L) to BRANGES (175867, Sheet 13K) and thence to ST GERMAIN DU BOIS. The movement was made on 5 September without enemy contact and all units closed in to bivouac areas by 1800 hours. At 1740 hours Division advised that the regiment would move again on 6 September and details were on the way for the movement.

At the town of VERDUN SUR LE DOUBS, where the SAONE and DOUBS Rivers join, Germans were reported burning homes and preparing to destroy the bridge. A platoon of Infantry supported by two sections of 30 caliber machine guns, one section of 81mm mortars, and one Anti-tank Company platoon were sent to secure the bridge site at VERDUN SUR LE DOUBS (048145, Sheet 13K), but the force was disbanded and withdrawn before it reached the town due to receipt of orders which moved the regiment east instead of north. The regiment was ordered to move to POLIGNY (5710, Sheet 14K) on 6 September, starting at 1100 hours.

At 1115 hours on 6 September the 2d Battalion moved out with the remainder of the combat team behind it and moved through SENS (278983, Sheet 14K) to LE TERTRE (320980, Sheet 14K) to BLETTERRANS (378987, Sheet 14K) to ARLAY (441007, Sheet 14K) and thence to POLIGNY. The route was heavy with traffic and the entire column was stopped several times to gain sufficient clearance between march units. However, the entire combat team closed into the POLIGNY area by 2140 hours.

At 1200 hours on 7 September the Division G-3 called to alert the regiment for movement. One battalion of Infantry and one battalion of artillery was to move immediately via the towns ARBOIS (615172, Sheet 14K), MOUCHARD (633256, Sheet 14K), QUINGEY (692400, Sheet 14K) to AVANNE (747509, Sheet 14J), to relieve a battalion of the 3d Infantry Division and have the mission of seizing the high ground overlooking two highways leading into BESANCON (7955, Sheet 14J) from the west--Highways No. 67 and No. 73, and protect the left flank and rear of 3d Division. Two battalions of a regiment of Germans were reported in BESANCON with small groups of the enemy drifting in from the west which was the reason for seizing and blocking the two highways.

The 3d Battalion began moving to AVANNE at 1355 hours followed by Company "A" of the 753d Tank Battalion and the 93d Armored Field Ar-

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tillery Battalion. When sufficient road clearance was obtained, the 2d Battalion moved out followed by Antitank Company, Cannon Company, 131st Field Artillery Battalion and the regimental 1st Battalion. A tentative plan was formulated whereby the 2d Battalion, after crossing the bridge at AVANNE, would seize the high ground in the vicinity of CHEMAUDIN (693533, Sheet 14J) while the 1st Battalion seized the high ground in the vicinity of CHAMPVINS (722570, Sheet 14J). Road blocks were to be put in during the night consisting of Infantry, machine guns and antitank guns.

The regimental command post closed at POLIGNY at 1430 hours and the Regimental S-3, Major HERBERT E. EITT, 0404188, of San Antonio, Texas, contacted the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Division to obtain the tactical dispositions of the 3d Division and receive orders as to the exact location the regiment was to occupy. Major EITT was advised to have the 3d Battalion move into position and hold the 1st and 2d Battalions south of AVANNE in assembly areas until definite instructions from 3d Division headquarters could be received. At 1700 hours the regiment was officially attached to the 3d Division until the 36th Division arrived in the BESANCON area. The 93d Armored Field Artillery went into position on the south bank of the DOUBS River near the AVANNE bridge until all elements of the regiment had crossed and the 131st Field Artillery was in position on the north side of the river.

At 1800 hours the Regimental Commander issued instructions for one platoon of Infantry from the 2d Battalion, one platoon from Antitank Company, one section of machine guns and one section of mortars to remain in the vicinity of the AVANNE bridge. The 1st Battalion occupied a sector north of the 3d Battalion with one company in reserve which was not to be committed except on regimental order. The 1st Battalion was ordered to maintain contact with the 30th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Division on the right (northwest). The 2d Battalion went into position south of the 3d Battalion with one company in regimental reserve in the vicinity of ST FERJEUX (765546, Sheet 14J). The Cannon Company occupied positions primarily in support of the 2d Battalion. One platoon each from the Antitank Company and Company "C", 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the 1st and 2d Battalions while Company "A", 753d Tank Battalion went into an assembly area southeast of the regimental command post which was established in ST FERJEUX. The 1st and 3d Battalions proceeded to relieve the 2d Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment along the high ground northwest of BESANCON blocking Highways No. 67 and No. 73. The 2d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment by 2030 hours. The 1st and 3d Battalions completed their relief by 2100 hours.

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The 3d Division advised that elements of the German 251st and 9th Reserve Infantry Regiments of 159th Reserve Infantry Division had been in BESANCON during the afternoon, while elements of the 11th Panzer Division had left BESANCON and moved toward VESOUL (8798, Sheet 14J) during the afternoon. At 2250 hours information was received that the 142d Infantry had crossed the DOUBS River to the east of the regimental sector and was driving an enemy column north and northeast which might possibly enter or try to escape through the 141st Infantry area.

During the night of 7-8 September, the 1st Battalion took over three hundred prisoners in its sector. The 3d Battalion patrols encountered a German road block in the vicinity of the railroad and highway (712519, Sheet 14J) approximately two and one-quarter miles west and north of AVANNE. The Germans shelled the entire regimental area intermittently during the night.

At 0800 hours on the morning of 8 September, the regiment was re-attached to the 36th Infantry Division. The regimental mission continued to be that of protecting the left (west) flank of the 3d Division. Company "B" became involved in a fire fight with two enemy machine guns at 0900 hours one-half mile west of BARBAND (729594, Sheet 14J) and took prisoners. Light resistance was encountered by the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of FRANCOIS (616544, Sheet 14J) and POUILLEY LES VIGNES (720574, Sheet 14J). German planes flew over the regimental positions but made no attacks. At 1100 hours the enemy tried to infiltrate into the 1st Battalion's positions one mile west of BARBAND. At approximately the same time a patrol entered FRANCOIS and found no enemy within the town. Enemy self-propelled guns were very active and intense artillery fire was received throughout the regimental area. A heavy caliber gun continued to fire on the bridge crossing at AVANNE and a sub plane was sent up in an effort to locate the gun. The AVANNE bridge had begun to sag from the heavy traffic that was constantly crossing it and a pontoon bridge was erected on the outskirts of BESANCON.

At 1215 hours on 8 September, the Regimental Commander issued orders to the 2d Battalion commander, Lt Colonel JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD, 022656, of Fargo, North Dakota, to attack the town of GRIGNOULINE (700503, Sheet 14J) and extend its line to the south of the DOUBS River. The 3d Battalion was ordered to move forward slightly to maintain a line with the 2d Battalion. At the same time the 142d Infantry was to attack ROUTELLE (665470, Sheet 14J) to the southeast. At 1320 hours the Division Commander ordered CHERAUDIN taken also and the 3d Battalion was given this mission. Company "L" was released from regimental reserve near ST FERJENX to assist the 3d Battalion. Company

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"A" of the 753d Tank Battalion was attached to the 3d Battalion for the attack. The 1st Battalion was assigned the mission of blocking any infiltration into the regimental area during the attacks and also of keeping contact with the 3d Battalion. The 3d Battalion was instructed that if the Infantry elements were stopped, it was to call for time fire from the artillery and send the tanks into town under the artillery fire. Company "G" was released by Division headquarters from guarding the AVANNE bridge with the exception of one platoon and was instructed to take over the road block held by the 3d Battalion in the vicinity of the railroad and Route Nationale De Moulins (710519, Sheet 14J).

At 1540 hours one platoon from Company "F", commanded by Captain PARKHURST C. HOUGH, 01288056, of Fredricktown, Massachusetts, entered GRANDFONTAINE without encountering enemy resistance. One platoon from Company "A" and one platoon from Company "C" occupied FRANCOIS which lay on the route to CHEVAUDIN to be traversed by the 3d Battalion. The outpost of the Company "K" road block was cut off by an estimated thirty Germans and a force had to be sent out to extricate them. This necessitated holding off the attack until 1600 hours at which time Company "L" was to move generally down Highway No. 73, supported by a platoon of tanks and seize and hold the ground north and west of the town.

At 1625 hours the Division Commander ordered the regiment to hold a line from CUSSEY SUR L'OGNON (722662, Sheet 14J) along the L'OGNON River to RECOLOGNE (641588, Sheet 14J). The road from RECOLOGNE to BESANCON was to be the boundary between the 141st and 143d Infantry Regiments. This sector was to be held by the regiment less one battalion. The 1st and 2d Battalion were assigned to take over the sector while the 3d Battalion continued to clean up CHEVAUDIN. The regimental mission was to hold this sector and clean out all pockets of enemy resistance. The 1st Battalion was ordered to hold the left sector from the town of MONCLEY (688628, Sheet 14J) to a swampy area three-quarters of a mile east of CHEVIGNY SUR L'OGNON and from the swamp area to the RECOLOGNE-BESANCON road. The 2d Battalion was to occupy the right (west) sector from MONCLEY to CUSSEY SUR L'OGNON. After taking CHEVAUDIN the 3d Battalion was to go into an assembly position and remain as Division reserve while all tanks, tank destroyers and antitank platoons attached to it reverted to regimental control.

The 2d Battalion advised that it was in the process of cleaning up enemy resistance in the high ground around GRANDFONTAINE and could not complete the task before darkness. However the close proximity of friendly troops to the 2d Battalion sector was sufficient to handle the situation and the battalion was ordered to move immediately.

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The 3d Battalion met increasing resistance. Company "I" became involved in a fire fight in the vicinity of FRANCOIS while Company "K" met resistance in its sector also. At 1932 hours the 3d Battalion reported that it had reached the east edge of CHEMAUDIN and was being held up by mortar fire and five or six enemy machine guns. Actually the battalion was in the small town of LE FELIE (715540, Sheet 14J) and had not reached CHEMAUDIN. As soon as the actual position of the battalion was reported accurately, the battalion commander was ordered to hold a line from LA FELIE to FRANCOIS to the Company "K" road block and send out patrols to contact the 1st Battalion to the north.

The 1st Battalion began moving to its new position at 1900 hours and had reached a point one-half mile west of POUILLEY LES VIGNES when it ran into an enemy road block. Several vehicles were knocked out and quite a few casualties occurred in Company "C" which was leading the column. The movement was stopped until this force could be eliminated and resulted in a change of plans. The 1st Battalion was instructed to occupy the high ground southwest of POUILLEY LES VIGNES, contact the 3d Battalion on the left and the 2d Battalion on the right and push into the zone of action. The 2d Battalion was to occupy the high ground northeast of POUILLEY LES VIGNES with one company. When the high ground was taken this company would be attached to the 1st Battalion while the remainder of the battalion moved northeast.

The 308th and 326th German Infantry Regiments of the 198th German Infantry Division were identified from prisoners as having the mission of keeping open the road to BESANCON. These regiments had left DOLE the afternoon of 7 September and had arrived in the BESANCON area at 0400 hours on 8 September. Prisoners stated that both regiments were short of supplies and that company strengths were very low due to the fighting around MONTILLMAR in August.

By 2055 hours on 8 September, the 1st Battalion had one platoon of Infantry and two tank destroyers in PELOUSEY (713591, Sheet 14J), and held the high ground overlooking LES MOULINS (715575, Sheet 14J). The 1st Battalion commander, Lt Colonel WILLIAM A. BIRD, 0280648, of Barbeton, Ohio, was ordered to hold this position until the 2d Battalion arrived to relieve him. The 1st Battalion was then to swing into its sector, sending a force northeast along Highway No. 67 and another force to NOIRONTE (678587, Sheet 14J). The 1st Battalion was directed to send a patrol to the 2d Battalion and notify it of the order to relieve the 1st Battalion inasmuch as the 2d Battalion was out of contact with regimental headquarters.

By 2205 hours no contact had been made with the 2d Battalion. Company "B" occupied the west edge of the high ground at PIRRY (745578,

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Sheet 14J), two platoons of Company "C" were in PELOUSEY with the 1st Battalion headquarters in POUILLEY LES VIGNES. Company "I" occupied FRAKOIS, with Company "L" on the high ground southwest of PELOUSEY and Company "K" still holding the road block southwest of CHAMADIN.

At 2255 hours a patrol from Company "A" contacted the 3d Battalion. The patrol received a report from the Maquis that the Germans had three batteries of four guns each on the north side of the church in VAUX LES PRES (685546, Sheet 14J). The Maquis had traced a telephone wire from VAUX LES PRES to CHAMPAGNEY (701569, Sheet 14J) where an observation post was located in the town church steeple. Three hundred Germans with six antitank guns were reported at CHAMPVANS (706568, Sheet 14J). At VILLERSBUZON (661535, Sheet 14J), MAZEROLLES LE SALIN (664550, Sheet 14J), VAUX LES PRES and CHAMPVANS, the Germans were reported milling around being harried from the rear by the Maquis and road blocks by the regiment.

During the night of 8-9 September, the 3d, 5th, and 7th Companies of the 325th German Infantry Regiment and the 3d Company of the 9th German Infantry Regiment were identified as being part of the enemy force opposing the regiment.

At 0030 hours on 9 September, the 2d Battalion advised that Company "E" was in the town of PIREY, Company "F" was moving to POUILLEY LES VIGNES and Company "G" was moving to PELOUSEY. The 3d Battalion reported no contact with the 142d Infantry nor the 36th Reconnaissance Troop moving north from the DOUBS River.

At 0430 hours on 9 September, the Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion to move into POUILLEY LES VIGNES with a force at PIREY and move north to BARBAND (729595, Sheet 14J) so that this area would be clear of the enemy for the artillery to move into it before daylight. Contact was to be made with the 3d Division at LISERREY SALINES (746606, Sheet 14J).

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had left PELOUSEY at 0320 hours after Company "G" took over the town and had advanced to a point one and one-half miles south of ELMAGNY (668631, Sheet 14J), while patrols probed into NOIRONTE and AUDEUX (675575, Sheet 14J). As the 1st Battalion moved nearer the L'OGNON River the 93d Armored Field Artillery was ordered to move into position near POUILLEY LES VIGNES to support the battalion. Company "A" of the 753d Tank Battalion was also ordered to take up concealed positions around the same town. After the 93d Armored Field Artillery arrived in position, the 131st Field Artillery Battalion displaced north and took up firing positions, whereupon the 93d Armored Field Artillery again moved to the vicinity

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of FRACHERE (712581, Sheet 14J). At daylight a cub plane was sent up to observe fire for the artillery. As the 1st Battalion approached CHAUCENNE (693600, Sheet 14 J) it ran into enemy fire and had to withdraw to high ground in an effort to work its way around to the north. The NOIRONTE patrol also encountered enemy fire while the AUDEUX patrol received fire from CHAMPAGNEY. The AUDEUX patrol withdrew but was sent back again.

At 0555 hours the 3d Battalion was ordered to contact the 142d Infantry and notify it of the position of the 1st Battalion working toward AUDEUX. Also, when the 3d Battalion sector was covered by the 142d Infantry, the battalion was to assemble in the vicinity of POUILLEY LES VIGNES as regimental reserve leaving a road block on Highway No. 73 until it was determined that no opposition would move into the regimental sector along that route.

At 0600 hours Company "E" left PIREY to move to AUXON DESSOUS (671617, Sheet 14J) through BARBAND. Company "F" moved from the high ground north and northeast of POUILLEY LES VIGNES to BARBAND while Company "G" remained in PELOUSEY and sent patrols into CHAUCENNE. The 2d Battalion remained in contact with the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Division in the vicinity of ECOLE (758589, Sheet 14J), but lost contact with the 1st Battalion during the night.

At 0800 hours on 9 September, the 1st Battalion reported that artillery fire on CHAUCENNE knocked out a German self-propelled gun and scattered the enemy troops. Three hundred Germans were reported in NOIRONTE and patrols were sent to the high ground east of CHAUCENNE between the two towns.

At 0845 hours the 3d Battalion commander, Major KERRIT R. HANSEN, 0379451, of Omaha, Nebraska, was ordered to assemble in the vicinity of POUILLEY LES VIGNES and attack astride the highway to RECOLOGNE to assist the 1st Battalion. When the 142d Infantry reached the highway from the south, the 3d Battalion was to move north of the highway and advance northwest.

At 0910 hours Company "E" was bypassing BARBAND on its way to AUXON DESSOUS, Company "F" was in BARBAND and had patrols to CHENE BENI (720597, Sheet 14J) while Company "G" in PELOUSEY sent patrols to LA MAGUYOTTE (698607, Sheet 14J). Company "E" had patrols to the east to maintain contact with the 15th Infantry Regiment while Company "G" sent patrols to the west to keep contact with the 1st Battalion.

At 1000 hours the 3d Battalion was ordered to proceed to NOIRONTE

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as rapidly as possible as the 1st Battalion was heavily engaged in CHAUCENNE. The tank destroyers with the 1st Battalion were attached to the 3d Battalion and the 3d was to take over the 1st Battalion objective. At 1120 hours the head of the 3d Battalion passed POUILLEY LES VIGNES headed toward RECOLOGNE. Company "F" and Company "G" continued to move north of CHENE BIENI while Company "E" continued on to AUXON DESSOUS temporarily out of contact with the 2d Battalion. Meanwhile, Company "B" had moved into NOIRONTE. The 3d Battalion was advised of the position of Company "B" and was instructed to continue on along the 1st Battalion flank until it reached the L'OGNON River and then swing north along the river. By 1155 hours Company "G" occupied LA MAGNYOTTE and Company "E" was in AUXON DESSOUS. All elements were moving forward with no opposition. The regimental command post moved into PELOUSEY at 1240 hours. At 1255 hours the VI Corps Commanding General arrived at the regimental command post to be apprised of the general situation and stated that the regiment might cross the L'OGNON River. At 1318 hours the 36th Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post and wanted to know why the battalions were not more advanced than they were. The Division Commander stated that he wanted the troops to move night and day until the enemy was contacted, then clear out the enemy and continue to move. The Germans should be captured and not scared away to create a situation where it would be necessary to fight the same ones again later on.

At 1325 hours the Reconnaissance Company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion reported that it had covered the area along the river in the regimental sector. All bridges were blown except one at GUSSEY SUR L'OGNON where a fire fight was going on. By 1330 hours Companies "E" and "F" were engaged with enemy forces at SAUVAGNEY (700645, Sheet 14J). Company "G" moved into MONCLEY but the bridge there was blown up. Company "G" was informed by the civilians in MONCLEY that the bridge at EMAGNY had been blown up at 1000 hours after horse-drawn artillery had moved to the north side of the river and headed for BOULOT (725675, Sheet 14J). Germans were observed digging in on the north bank of the L'OGNON River every twenty-five yards. Their positions were incomplete and most of the men were stripped to the waist and digging. 34 caliber machine guns were numerous across the river. A request was made to hurry an artillery forward observer to MONCLEY to direct artillery against the Germans before their positions became too deeply entrenched to drive them out.

At 1547 hours the Division Commander ordered the 3d Battalion to assemble in the vicinity of the BOIS DE GUSSEY (725635, Sheet 14J) as Division reserve. Orders were also issued for the 111th Engineer Reconnaissance officer attached to the regiment to look for a bridge

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site to cross the L'OGNON so that the entire regiment might advance to the north and northeast.

Company "C" entered EMAGNY at 1400 hours and received heavy artillery and mortar fire. Company "A" was in BELLEFONTAINE at 1600 hours and Company "B" occupied CHEVIGNEY SUR L'OGNON (648614, Sheet 14J). The bridge site at CUSSEY SUR L'OGNON continued to receive considerable enemy artillery and mortar fire. A German tank in BOULOT kept firing on the bridge site whenever troops tried to approach the area. Meanwhile patrols crossed the river and worked up and down it on both sides. The Division Commander ordered the 3d Battalion to coordinate with the 1st Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment located in CUSSEY SUR L'OGNON for crossing of the river at that point, but the Regimental Commander deemed it more advisable to cross the 2d Battalion spearheaded by Company "G". However the Division Commander could not be contacted and the Regimental Commander decided to put both the 2d and 3d Battalions across. At 1900 hours the bulk of Company "G" commanded by Captain (then 1st Lieutenant) DONALD T. SCHROEDER, 02187073, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, crossed the river via a treacherous underwater dam in the vicinity of MONCLEY. The movement was quickly accomplished and admirably executed. The 3d Battalion, meanwhile, continued to move towards CUSSEY SUR L'OGNON. At 1935 hours the Division Commander ordered the regiment to relieve the 30th Infantry Regiment elements in CUSSEY SUR L'OGNON, cross the river and seize the high ground in the vicinity of MONTBOILLON (710700, Sheet 14J). Any units of the regiment desired by the Regimental Commander were to be employed in this operation. The ground had to be taken before morning as the 143d Infantry was to pass through the 141st Infantry. Colonel STEELE advised Division headquarters that the 2d Battalion was already crossing at MONCLEY and the 3d Battalion was going to cross at CUSSEY SUR L'OGNON.

At 2014 hours the Assistant Division Commander ordered a night attack just as soon as the troops could assemble as a bridgehead had to be established for the 142d Infantry to pass through. Engineers were ordered to strengthen the bridge at CUSSEY SUR L'OGNON. At 2042 hours the regimental command post moved from PELOUSEY and opened at MONCLEY at 2055 hours. The bridge at EMAGNY was also ordered secured so that Engineers could work on it in preparation for the 142d Infantry crossing in the morning.

By 0025 hours on 10 September, both Company "F" and Company "G" were across the L'OGNON River and part of Company "E" had crossed. However, no elements of the 1st Battalion had been able to cross in the EMAGNY sector. At 0220 hours the 3d Battalion had crossed the river and entered the town of BOULOT meeting but slight resistance. The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, had sent a patrol to PIN L'EMAGNY and

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reported considerable enemy movement. By 0317 Hours the 3d Battalion had reached its objective on the high ground overlooking MONTBOILLON. At 0400 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion commander to personally go down to the river and get one company across. At 0545 hours the 2d Battalion reported that it had reached CHAMBORNAY LES PIN (699660, Sheet 14J) and was sending patrols to contact the 3d Battalion. At 0625 hours the 1st Battalion reported that it had crossed the river by wading without meeting opposition. The Regimental Commander ordered that the Engineers were to go ahead with the bridge and not make the troops cross the river by wading up to their necks as long as no enemy opposition had been encountered.

At 0715 hours the 3d Battalion reported Company "I" and Company "K" in MONTBOILLON and the last elements of Germans had moved through at 0400 hours. A column of approximately one thousand Germans had moved through the town from 2000 hours on 9 September to 0400 hours on 10 September according to civilian reports. At 0920 hours the Regimental S-3 informed Division headquarters that the bridge at EMAGNY had been completed, the 3d Battalion was in MONTBOILLON and the 2d Battalion was to the northwest of MONTBOILLON on the high ground. At 1030 hours orders were received to assemble the combat team in the vicinity of the BOIS DE CUSSEY (7262, Sheet 14J) as VI corps reserve.

All units were ordered to move to the assembly area but it was not until 1735 hours that they had closed into a bivouac area. At 1800 hours the Division Commander notified the Regimental Executive Officer that the 141st Infantry complete with all attachments was to move without delay and assemble north of OISELY ET GRACHEUX (715763, Sheet 14J). At 1950 hours Division headquarters advised that the regiment was to move north to FRETIGNY ET VELLOREILLE (720830, Sheet 14J), to GRANDVELLE ET PERRENOT (756853, Sheet 14J), to MAILLEY ET CHAZELOT (795885, Sheet 14J) to VESOUL (9887, Sheet 14J). The 143d Infantry was also to move to VESOUL on a parallel route to the left (west). The regiment was to shuttle all night under tactical circumstances as the road was only clear as far as FRETIGNY ET VELLOREILLE. Arrangements were made to completely motorize the 2d Battalion which was to move immediately. The 3d and 1st Battalions were to follow in that order by marching. At 2115 hours the regimental command post left MONCLEY and remained mobile until a temporary command post was set up in GRANDVELLE ET PERRENOT at 0530 hours. The I&R Platoon was sent forward to MAILLEY ET CHAZELOT and instructed to report by radio so the motor column would not close up on it. At 0600 hours on 11 September the 2d Battalion began moving out of GRANDVELLE ET PERRENOT.

The Division Commander informed the Regimental Commander at 0620 hours that the progress of the combat team was unsatisfactory. He stated that the regiment was fighting a disorganized enemy--it had

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taken but three prisoners when it should have had at least one hundred. The combat team armor was behind FRETIGNY and unless it was brought forward immediately, no armored support could be expected until after 1000 hours. The Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion to maintain motorized patrols on the flanks while the battalion itself held its place in the motor column. The tanks were ordered to move to the head of the 2d Battalion and push on to VESOUL as rapidly as possible. At 0720 hours the I&R Platoon radioed that it had received small arms fire in the vicinity of MAILLEY ET CHAZELOT and Infantry was being deployed to eliminate it. At 0835 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion to move through the 2d Battalion after the 2d Battalion had cleared MAILLEY ET CHAZELOT. The 3d Battalion was to send companies to both flanks if opposition was met. If the battalion became disorganized the 1st Battalion was to pass through it.

At 0900 hours the 2d Battalion cleared a small enemy force out of MAILLEY ET CHAZELOT and pushed north of the town. The 3d Battalion passed through the 2d Battalion and pressed forward encountering increasing light resistance. An enemy road block consisting of felled trees and a burning 3d Division jeep protected by a large German gun was found 2000 yards northwest of MAILLEY ET CHAZELOT. While the 3d Battalion deployed to eliminate the road block, the 1st Battalion moved forward to pass through the 3d Battalion.

At 1125 hours the Regimental Commander notified the 2d Battalion commander that the Division Commander wanted the column to advance rapidly down the road toward VESOUL. The 1st Battalion was moving out closely supported by tanks and tank destroyers and the 2d Battalion was to follow the armored units closely.

By 1222 hours the road block was cleared and approximately fifty Germans were being driven toward VESOUL. At 1410 hours the Division Chief of Staff ordered the regiment to push on to VESOUL but at 1600 hours the Division G-3 section ordered a combat patrol sent to the 3d Division to get the disposition of their units and what their intentions for attacking VESOUL were. At 1740 hours the Division Commander ordered Colonel STERLE to assemble his battalion commanders and prepare a plan for a coordinated attack on VESOUL in conjunction with the 143d Infantry. This was merely a warning order as final orders had to come from the VI Corps Commanding General. At 1820 hours the Regimental Commander advised all unit commanders in a staff meeting that the attack would be made from south of VESOUL while the 143d Infantry attacked from the north. The high ground south of the town would be taken and then units would move across the low ground approaching the town. The 1st Battalion was to attack on the left (west) and the 3d Battalion on the right (east) with the 2d Battalion prepared to

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support the attack on regimental order. The main attack effort was to be made by the 3d Battalion. The 3d Battalion machine guns were to be placed on CAMP ROMAIN (866959, Sheet 14J) to support the attack with overhead fire, but the machine guns were to be moved on battalion order. The 1st Battalion was to support the 3d Battalion with heavy fire and advance in its sector as rapidly as possible to maintain fire superiority. The 2d Battalion was to be prepared to press the attack in the 3d Battalion sector or fill in any gaps in the line. The 3d Battalion did not have to maintain contact with the 1st Battalion and if it desired, it could move to the right (east) to take advantage of better cover and the 2d Battalion would fill in the gap. The Cannon Company was ordered to support the 1st Battalion in its attack while the tanks, tank destroyers and Antitank Company remained under regimental control.

At 1850 hours the Division Commander ordered the regiment's right (east) company to be prepared to capture any enemy moving into VESOUL as the 30th Infantry was pushing up Highway No. 57 and driving a number of Germans before it. VI Corps wanted these Germans taken prisoner but it was necessary to be especially careful to keep from shooting any elements of the 30th Infantry. Company "E" was ordered to move down to NARVENNE (877970, Sheet 14J) on this mission.

The Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander at 1900 hours that the 3d Division would attack VESOUL while the 36th Division was to be prepared to assist it. All units were notified of this plan with the warning that the regimental plan would go into effect if the 36th Division was committed in the attack. At 2200 hours one battalion of the 143d Infantry was to push north and take the town of PUSEY (018847, Sheet 14H) while one platoon from another battalion was to push northwest to PORT SUR SAONE (783055, Sheet 14H). One platoon of the battalion taking PUSEY was to move to northwest and take the high ground overlooking VESOUL and fire a prearranged signal to advise that it had been taken.

At 2100 hours the Regimental Commander was called to the Division command post. He returned at 2215 hours with orders for the regiment to cross the flat ground south of VESOUL and be in position at 0600 hours on 12 September to start an attack at 0630 hours. The 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Division was to be on the right flank of the regiment. The previous regimental plan of attack was to go into effect. The tank destroyers were to go into position northwest of NOIDANS LES VESOUL (848947, Sheet 14J) to fire only on visible targets in VESOUL. The tanks were to go into position from the main highway northwest to NOIDANS LES VESOUL. The regimental forward command post was to be located on the nose of the hill south of QUINGEY (890963, Sheet 15J) while the 2d Battalion was to be in position on CAMP ROMAIN to assist

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in the attack. The 1st Battalion, attacking on the left (west) was to be on the southern bank of the LE DURGEON River at the edge of VESOUL at 0600 hours while the 3d Battalion on the right (east) was to be on the edge of the town at the same time. No artillery preparation was to be used but the artillery was instructed to fire on targets as they arose during the course of the attack. All units were to have extra allotments of hand grenades, antitank grenades, mortar and bazooka ammunition.

At 0405 hours on 12 September, Division G-3 notified regiment that the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, had reached its initial objective at PUSEY and sent a force to Hill 383. The Division Commander had ordered the bulk of the battalion to Hill 383 with only necessary elements remaining in PUSEY.

At 0415 hours all units of the regiment were alerted and moving to positions for the attack on VESOUL. All units were in position by 0630 hours when the attack was launched. The 3d Battalion encountered opposition as it moved out but forced entry into the southern edge of the town and began to fight from house to house. The 1st Battalion met considerable opposition along the railroad track running west into VESOUL and from enemy inside the town. Although Division headquarters stated that the 143d Infantry was definitely on Hill 383 to the north of VESOUL, regimental units continued to receive enemy fire from its southern slopes. The 1st Battalion commander was wounded as his battalion began to penetrate into VESOUL along the railroad track. Captain CLAUDE D. ROSCOE, 0367264, of Brownwood, Texas, took over command of the 1st Battalion.

At 0950 hours Company "C" was in the north end of VESOUL by the railroad and contacted Company "I" in that vicinity. Company "A" was in the vicinity of NOIDANS LES VESOUL where it was establishing weapons positions and putting in a road block. Company "B" which had entered the town was forced to withdraw under concentrated enemy fire to reorganize. The 1st Battalion kept insisting that it was receiving fire from Hill 383 and Division was checked repeatedly, but Division kept reiterating that the 143d Infantry held the hill. Meanwhile the 3d Battalion continued to inch its way through the town in house-to-house battles ferreting out snipers and machine gun positions. At 1330 hours Company "C" began entering the town followed by Company "A". Company "B" brought up the rear with one flank on the LE DURGEON River and the other on the railroad. The Germans began to retreat from VESOUL and all units began to press forward more rapidly. Contact was made within the town by the 1st and 3d Battalions and elements of the 3d Division.

At 1545 hours the Division Chief of Staff stated that the regiment probably would be ordered to continue pursuit of the enemy after VESOUL

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was cleared. It was pointed out that the regiment was in the least desirable position to continue the pursuit due to the bridge over the LE DURGEON River being blown, the dispersion of the regiment and other adverse factors. However, the Chief of Staff stated that the town of FLAGY would probably be the regimental objective. The 2d Battalion was alerted to move north mounted on tanks, tank destroyers and organic transportation. The 2d Battalion was to occupy a sector northeast of FLAGY, the 3d Battalion on the northwest and 1st Battalion on the south. The 131st Field Artillery was to take up positions east of FLAGY (892072, Sheet 15H). Road blocks were to be placed on the two roads leading north of FLAGY and the one road leading south from the town. The I&R Platoon was to reconnoiter to the railroad north of LA VILLEDIEU EN FONTENETTE (895150, Sheet 15H).

At 1730 hours the Regimental Commander informed his staff of a conversation he had with the Division Commander during the afternoon at the forward regimental command post wherein the Division Commander had stated that the 1st Battalion had not been in action during the day and had done no fighting; that only one and one-half companies of the entire regiment had been engaged; that both the 1st and 3rd Battalions had not been at the proper place at the appointed time. The Regimental Commander stated that both battalions had performed well, especially the 3d Battalion. Also, errors on location were forgivable since maps furnished the regiment were definitely erroneous.

At 2100 hours the 2d Battalion had closed into an area east of FLAGY whereupon the regimental command post moved into the town at 2130 hours. No resistance was encountered en route. The 1st Battalion closed into the FLAGY area at 2225 hours and the 3d Battalion arrived at 2315 hours.

At 2230 hours the Regimental Commander informed Division headquarters that the regiment would be prepared to attack by daylight either north or south. The 2d Battalion was to be prepared to make any attack directed with two rifle companies, the heavy weapons company, one platoon of tanks and one platoon of tank destroyers.

After VESOUL had been taken it was found that over 100 railroad cars had been captured--three of which were loaded with foodstuffs. Company "K" had destroyed five enemy trucks south of VESOUL while Company "M" mortars had knocked out an 88mm gun.

During the night of 12-13 September, the regimental area received very intense shelling from enemy artillery and self-propelled guns which concentrated on the town of FLAGY. At 0615 hours the Regimental Commander alerted all units to be ready to move. The woods north of FLAGY were extremely thick and it presented a considerable task to

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clear them. Whereas passage could undoubtedly be cleared on the main road, it would leave an enemy force of unknown size within the shelter of the woods to harass and cut off following units. An extensive road and trail network traversed the regimental area which permitted enemy infiltration. The regiment was already a spearhead for the VI Corps and could not afford to extend itself much farther until flanking units advanced to the north at least on a line with FLAGY.

The 2d Battalion was ordered to send patrols to LE VAL ST ELOI (887115, Sheet 15H) and the 3d Battalion was ordered to send patrols into NEUREY EN VAUX (900125, Sheet 15H). Both battalions had to clear road blocks from the roads leading into these two towns.

At 1000 hours the Assistant Division Commander advised that the 143d Infantry had moved up on the regiment's left (west) flank; that the 36th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the regiment; and that the 141st Field Artillery was prepared to furnish reinforced fires with the 131st Field Artillery if it was necessary.

At 1130 hours the Regimental Commander issued an attack order to the three battalion commanders. The 3d Battalion was to send Company "I" to VELLEFRIE (915080, Sheet 15H) and then to VILORY (924100, Sheet 15H). Company "K" was to clean up resistance in NEUREY EN VAUX and then withdraw. LA VILLENEUVE BELLENOYE ET LE MAIZE (938085, Sheet 15H) was also to be cleaned up after which the force was to withdraw to VELLEFRIE. Company "K" was to leave a road block south of NEUREY EN VAUX which was to be relieved by the 2d Battalion. After the road block was taken over, the 2d Battalion was to clear LE VAL ST ELOI and turn west and south to clear FORET COMMUNALE with two companies assembling the force in VAROGNE (902090, Sheet 15H) by nightfall. The 1st Battalion was to remain in position until the 143d Infantry cleared the area around BOUGNON (880060, Sheet 14H). One company of the 1st Battalion was to move to BELLENOYE (918060, Sheet 15H), hold the town, send patrols to contact the 3d Battalion and the 3d Division at COLOMBIER (910034, Sheet 15H). All units were warned not to become engaged in fire fights out of their sectors and they were all to be in assembly areas by 2000 hours on 13 September. The 1st Battalion was to be responsible for the sector from COLOMBIER to BELLENOYE to LA VILLENEUVE (exclusive of the town). The 3d Battalion was responsible for the area from LA VILLENEUVE to the VAROGNE-VELLEFRIE road to the 143d Infantry sector. All units were to move aggressively and clean up their areas as quickly as possible.

The 2d Battalion encountered a great deal of trouble in its sector due to the density of the woods, lack of observation and heavy small arms fire. Company "I" was sent a platoon of heavy machine guns to assist it in eliminating the road block on the FLAGY-LE VAL ST ELOI road.

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The 2d Battalion finally requested that it be allowed to enter the FORET COMMUNALE from the south rather than from the north due to its density and the necessary slow movement. This plan was accepted by the Regimental Commander.

Orders were changed for the 1st Battalion. The movement of the company to BELLENOYE was cancelled. Its mission was changed to clear the wooded areas southeast of FLAGY with contacting the 3d Division as optional. It was also to be prepared to reinforce the road block on the BOUGNON road in the event the 143d Infantry pushed any Germans that way.

At 1310 hours on 13 September, the 2d Battalion advised that it had troops beyond the enemy road block on the FLAGY-LE VAL ST ELOI road and an Engineer bull dozer was clearing away the felled trees which were a part of the road block. Company "F" advanced beyond the road block north into the woods with Company "G" on the left (west). The I&R Platoon, operating east of the regimental sector reported that the Germans were beginning to move east from BOUGNON and reinforcements were needed to stop them. The 1st Battalion was ordered to send a force to assist the I&R Platoon. Company "K" met resistance at VAROGNE but quickly overcame it and advanced rapidly into the town. The 3d Battalion was ordered to use all companies to clear its area. Company "A" reached the 1st Battalion objective--the road junction northwest of BELLENOYE at 1415 hours without opposition and sent patrols into the town of BELLENOYE and the wooded area to the west.

At 1432 hours the 3d Battalion reported that VAROGNE had been cleared and Company "K" was pressing to the north with Company "I" moving on VELLEFRIE and Company "L" on VILORY. By 1520 hours both Company "F" and Company "K" were converging on the Germans from the north. At 1618 hours the Regimental Commander ordered Company "G" to advance through the woods as that area had to be cleared before dark. Company "L" was in VELLEFRIE at 1700 hours but was receiving considerable enemy artillery fire. Company "K" continued to advance on LA VILLENEUVE. Company "F" reported that it had entered LE VAL ST ELOI at 1445 hours and received fire from enemy tanks. Supporting tank destroyers were called upon to eliminate the tanks. Artillery air observers reported the Germans retreating to COMFLANS SUR LANTERNE (900200,-Sheet 15H).

At 1830 hours the 3d Battalion was ordered to leave Company "I" and Company "L" in their present positions and establish road blocks. Company "K" was to move to VAROGNE with the 3d Battalion command post in VELLEFRIE. Company "K" was to patrol to the north and northwest. The 2d Battalion was ordered to maintain two road blocks north of LE VAL ST ELOI. Troops were to stay out of all towns as this was a serious

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defensive area and a constant alert had to be maintained. The 3d Battalion was ordered to send patrols into MAILLERONCOURT CHARETTE (943104, Sheet 15H), LES RAICHAINES (954099, Sheet 15H), and SAULX DE VESOUL (960070, Sheet 15H); while the 2d Battalion was to send patrols to LA VILLEDIEU EN FONTENETTE (895151, Sheet 15H) and MEURCOURT (922152, Sheet 15H). At 2015 hours the 1st Battalion reported that a patrol had been sent to SAULX DE VESOUL and reported no friendly troops in the town.

At 2115 hours the Division Commander advised that the right (east) boundary of the regiment had been extended to include SAULX DE VESOUL and CREVENEY (969060, Sheet 15H). Company "K" of the 15th Infantry Regiment was in SAULX DE VESOUL and one company was to be sent there immediately to take over the town. The 142d Infantry was to move by motor to that point during the night and proceed north by marching in the morning while the 143d Infantry bypassed the regiment on the left (west). When this occurred the regiment was to assemble in the vicinity of MAILLERONCOURT CHARETTE. VI Corps had ordered Division to assemble one regiment which was not to be committed except on Corps order. Company "B" was sent from the 1st Battalion to take over SAULX DE VESOUL from Company "K" of the 15th Infantry which town was found not to be completely cleared of the enemy as previously reported.

At 0010 hours on 14 September, the 3d Battalion reported that the 3d Division had a road block at MAILLERONCOURT CHARETTE which the 3d Division would hold until the regiment took it over in the morning.

During the night of 13-14 September, motorized patrols were made between battalions. The 143d Infantry was not in BOUGNON as reported when regimental patrols first entered the town, but later patrols made contact with Company "C" of the 111th Engineer (C) Battalion.

Company "B" reached SAULX DE VESOUL and bivouaced near the town as relief of Company "K" of the 15th Infantry was not effected until just before daylight at 0530 upon Division order.

During the night Infantry and reconnaissance patrols eliminated the last of the enemy road blocks in the regimental sector. All German road blocks were well-defended and difficult to approach.

At 0850 hours on 14 September the Assistant Division Commander ordered the regiment to clear the woods in the vicinity of MAILLERONCOURT CHARETTE with two companies while the remainder of the regiment went into an assembly area. The entire regiment was to remain on a one hour alert status. The 3d Battalion was ordered to police the woods with two companies and have its patrols back in the assembly area by 1300 hours.

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At 1926 hours the Division Commander ordered one company from the 1st Battalion and one Antitank Company platoon sent to PORT SUR SAONE to relieve the unit holding the bridge at that point. The remainder of the 1st Battalion was to be alerted to go to FAVERNEY (825145, Sheet 14H) with Cannon Company, one platoon of tanks, one platoon of tank destroyers and one platoon of Engineers. Company "A" was sent to PORT SUR SAONE, but the remainder of the 1st Battalion was taken off the alert at 2115 hours by the Division Commander. Company "A" arrived at PORT SUR SAONE at 2250 hours and went into position immediately.

The night of 14-15 September passed quietly with no activity in the regimental sector. Patrols made contact between units.

At 1315 hours on 15 September, the 1st Battalion was ordered to move to BREUREY LES FAVERNEY (846133, Sheet 14H) with Cannon Company, Antitank Company less one platoon, one platoon of tanks and one platoon of tank destroyers with the mission of holding all crossings over the LANterne and SAONE Rivers from MERSUAY (850162, Sheet 14H) through PORT SUR SAONE. The main strength of the battalion was to be concentrated in the MERSUAY-FAVERNEY-BREUREY LES FAVERNEY triangle. One platoon of Infantry with supporting heavy weapons was to be at both PORT SUR SAONE and AMONCOURT (796120, Sheet 14H).

At 1530 hours the Assistant Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post and stated that if and when French forces passed north of PORT SUR SAONE, the 1st Battalion force holding the bridge could be withdrawn. This same procedure applied to the bridge at AMONCOURT, but the bridge at FAVERNEY was to be held until further orders from Division. Also, if the 143d Infantry had not taken MERSUAY by the time the 1st Battalion elements arrived there, the 1st Battalion force was not to try and take the town, but just block it.

Company "A" notified regimental headquarters at 1840 hours that the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron force had been attacked at the bridge at AMONCOURT by an unknown number of Germans and had requested aid. Five French tanks, a patrol from Company "A" with a section of heavy machine guns and one platoon of antitank guns had been sent to assist them.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion had reached BREUREY LES FAVERNEY at 1520 hours and relieved elements of the 2d Battalion, 143d Infantry, in FAVERNEY at 1715 hours. Elements of the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry, were relieved 1500 yards southeast of MERSUAY at 1800 hours. French elements were found in PORT SUR SAONE and Company "A" was sent to the bridge north of AMONCOURT, arriving there at 2110 hours.

At 1120 hours on 16 September, Division headquarters advised that

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the 142d and 143d Infantry Regiments had taken LUXEUIL LES BAINS, whereupon the Regimental Commander alerted all units for a movement order.

At 1345 hours the 1st Battalion reported that a Company "B" patrol had found no enemy in MERSUAY and Company "B" was moving into the town.

The Regimental Commander was called to a meeting at the Division command post at 1930 hours and returned at 2245 hours with the information that the regiment might move in the morning at 0600 hours.

At 0005 hours on 17 September, instructions were issued for the movement of the regiment at 0600 hours on 17 September, with the mission of advancing to PLOMBIERES LES BAINS (077378, Sheet 15H). The order of march was the 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions in order. It was believed that the road would be clear of enemy to FOUGEROLLES (040285, Sheet 15H). The 1st Battalion was ordered to assemble with all of its attachments and move to LUXEUIL LES BAINS with the head of the column reaching the town at 0700 hours. There the battalion would pick up one platoon of Engineers and move to FOUGEROLLES where it would dismount and march to PLOMBIERES LES BAINS. The 2d Battalion was ordered to be prepared to move at 0730 hours and the 3d Battalion at 0830 hours.

At 0200 hours the Regimental S-3 inquired from Division headquarters as to whether or not FOUGEROLLES was clear of the enemy. Division did not know but stated that the 143d Infantry had a road block in the vicinity of GABIOTTE (0326, Sheet 15H) and a patrol had found an enemy road block approximately 800 yards southwest of FOUGEROLLES on the main highway at 1500 hours on 16 September. At 0545 hours the commander of the Reconnaissance Company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion reported that prisoners taken the previous day had stated that there were two battalions of Infantry with twenty-five heavy machine guns, twelve light machine guns, eight 81mm mortars, self-propelled guns and horse-drawn artillery protecting FOUGEROLLES.

At 0700 hours the regimental command post closed at MAILLERONCOURT CHARETTE and moved to the vicinity of GABIOTTE at 0945 hours. The 1st Battalion just ahead of the regimental command post began receiving heavy mortar fire. Company "C" continued to advance with Company "A" deploying to the left (west) and Company "B" to the right (east). At 1015 hours the Regimental Commander notified the 2d Battalion commander that the 1st Battalion was endeavoring to envelop the road block 1500 yards southwest of FOUGEROLLES and a reconnaissance force was endeavoring to locate a route for the 2d Battalion to move west and north to LES CHAVANNES (018288, Sheet 15H) and attack FOUGEROLLES from the north. At 1150 hours the 2d Battalion was ordered to march to LES CHAVANNES and thence north to LA RAMOUSE (045304, Sheet 15H). One company of the 2d Battalion was to clean up LA RAMOUSE while another company moved south

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to assist the 1st Battalion in clearing FOUGEROLLES. The other company was to continue to press to the north.

At 1225 hours Company "B" and "C" began to push across open ground south of FOUGEROLLES and encountered mortar and small arms fire. Company "A" also continued to push forward. The 117th Reconnaissance Squadron was fired on from LA MOTTE (023262, Sheet 15H) which lay on the approximate route of the 2d Battalion. The 2d Battalion was notified of this enemy action and also of the reported presence of 100 Germans in a swamp area 1000 yards east of FOUGEROLLES. The 142d Infantry advancing north on the regiment's right (east) flank was also encountering heavy enemy opposition.

The 3d Battalion commander was ordered to move to the high ground east of FOUGEROLLES over a route reconnoitered by the I&R platoon. The 2d Battalion would have time to reach its objective north of FOUGEROLLES by the time the 3d Battalion gained its objective. Then, both battalions were to make a coordinated attack on FOUGEROLLES. If tanks could be used, the 3d Battalion was to call for them.

At 1600 hours the 1st Battalion was receiving intense enemy mortar and artillery fire. Company "A" was approximately 800 meters from FOUGEROLLES receiving scattered small arms fire. Company "C" continued to advance fairly rapidly across the open ground south of the town. By 1750 hours Company "C" supported by tanks had entered FOUGEROLLES and was on the north side of the town with Company "B" moving into town. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions were notified that the town had been taken.

The Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander at 1850 hours that the 141st Infantry would hold FOUGEROLLES during the night and be prepared to attack CORBENAY (985290, Sheet 15H) west of FOUGEROLLES. The 2d Battalion was ordered to clear LES CHAVANNES in conjunction with one company of the 1st Battalion. After the town was cleared, the battalion was to face west and be prepared to attack CORBENAY in the morning. The 3d Battalion was to continue its attack to take the high ground east of FOUGEROLLES, which objective was taken at 1851 hours.

At 2010 hours Division headquarters notified regiment that prisoners taken by the 143d Infantry stated that CORBENAY had been vacated. Division ordered patrols to enter the town and contact the 143d Infantry. The 3d Battalion was instructed to contact the 142d Infantry on its left (west) flank and assist it if necessary. At 2255 hours Division headquarters called back to state the 143d Infantry would not contact the regimental patrol in CORBENAY as the town was mined and there were two battalions of Russians there which probably would with-

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draw during the night. A 2d Battalion patrol entered the edge of CORBENAY and found no enemy, returning at 0103 hours on 18 September. The 2d Battalion was ordered to attack the town at dawn. Company "F" was to attack from the southeast while Company "E" and Company "G" worked to the high ground northeast of the town.

Encountering but light resistance, the 2d Battalion entered CORBENAY at 0630 hours on 18 September. Prisoners stated that there had been a regiment in the town composed of one battalion of German recruits and two battalions of Russians. When artillery fire was placed on the town, the Germans with their officers got on trains and left. Mines and booby-traps were found in and around the town. Company "F" pushed west to ST LOUP SUR SEMOUSE (945280, Sheet 15H) to relieve forces of the 143d Infantry while one company of the 2d Battalion moved north into the woods above CORBENAY to clear them of any enemy. Company "B" also was ordered to clear the wooded section north of LES CHAVANNES. The 3d Battalion established and maintained road blocks west of FOUGEROLLES.

At 1245 hours the regimental command post was established in FOUGEROLLES. All units were alerted for a possible enemy counterattack during the night with constant vigilance at all road blocks. A limited number of men from the battalions were sent to LUXEUIL LES BAINS on pass and to secure hot showers during the afternoon and evening. The night of 18-19 September passed without enemy contact. Patrols were maintained between all units.

At 1100 hours on 19 September the Division G-3 issued a warning order on the probable movement of the regiment on 20 September. At 1155 hours the Commanding General of the Seventh Army and the Commanding General of the 36th Division visited the regimental command post to check the regimental dispositions. The regimental I&R Platoon and the Reconnaissance Company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion were sent to the north to reconnoiter routes for the probable movement of the regiment and secure an assembly area.

At 2135 hours the Regimental Commander held a meeting with all unit commanders wherein he advised that when reading maps in the new area to be traversed by the regiment it was absolutely necessary to give the letter of the grid zone referred to as the maps changed on the 48 degree latitude north of FLOMBIERES LES BAINS. The south grid was to be denoted by the letter "K" while the north grid was to be denoted by the letter "V". The 36th Division was to cross the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of REMIREMONT (K175440, Sheet 15H). The 141st Infantry was to assemble in the vicinity of RAON AUX BOIS (V094404, Sheet 15H) and upon Division order cross the MOSELLE River from the high ground east of JARMENIL (V470130, Sheet 15H). The 142d Infantry was to go

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into an assembly area three kilometers south of REMIREMONT and cross the river from a position north and east of the town. The 117th Reconnaissance Squadron was on the regiment's left (west) flank and had contacted but small groups of Germans. The enemy had assembled north and northeast of the Division assembly area with considerable artillery and many road blocks. The order of march was to be the 3d, 1st and 2d Battalions with all vehicles keeping a distance of 100 yards from one another due to probable enemy artillery fire. The 3d Battalion was to start moving at 0630 hours on 20 September, followed by the 1st Battalion at 0730 hours and the 2d Battalion at 0830 hours. All units were to detruck at RAON AUX BOIS or sooner if it was deemed necessary.

The 3d Battalion moved out at 0630 hours on 20 September and proceeded north without encountering enemy opposition. Reconnaissance elements reported that the assembly area was secured at 0810 hours. The regimental command post closed at FOUGEROLLES at 0700 hours and moved to RAON AUX BOIS where the command post opened at 0915 hours. While the troops were en route, a message was received from Division to change the location of the assembly area. However, the 3d Battalion had already closed into its area in the vicinity of RAON AUX BOIS, but the 1st and 2d Battalions moved into the newly designated area approximately one mile south of RAON AUX BOIS.

At 1045 hours the Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post to check the disposition of the units. The Division Commander stated that the 142d Infantry had sent a battalion to REMIREMONT based upon a reconnaissance report that proved to be false. The battalion encountered road blocks, small arms fire and enemy artillery concentrations on the PLOMBIERES LES BAINS-REMIREMONT road. If REMIREMONT is found to be firmly held, the 141st Infantry will cross the MOSELIE River to the north of the town and take the 142d Infantry objective. The crossing will be made in assault boats and the 142d Infantry will put in a bridge at REMIREMONT. The Division Commander was advised that civilians reported a ford near ELOYES (V160443, Sheet 15H) which had a rocky bottom, with water only waist deep and where the current was not too swift. The ford had a covered approach which permitted vehicles to move close by. The Division Commander ordered reconnaissance all along the river using the utmost caution to conceal movements so that the enemy would not be aware of any plans. If the Germans were found to be holding the high ground on the opposite bank of the river, artillery can be utilized to neutralize gun positions and smoke can be used to get across.

At 1130 hours the Regimental Commander held a meeting with all unit and staff commanders. Boundaries were issued for reconnaissance along the river with the 2d Battalion on the north, the 3d Battalion in the middle sector and the 1st Battalion on the south. The salient in

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the river by ELOYES was to be taken and secured by the 2d Battalion. The 1st Battalion, firing from positions on the hill mass, will build up firing positions along the railroad with machine guns, tanks and tank destroyers to neutralize enemy fire power south of ELOYES. When the portion of ELOYES west of the MOSELLE River was taken by the 2d Battalion, the battalion was to cross its troops via the ford and attack Hill 605 from the west and southwest. After the 3d Battalion crossed the river, the 1st Battalion was to cross, bypass Hill 605 to the south and east and secure the high ground north and northeast of the regimental objective. All crossings were to be well planned and smoke was to be used to screen the troops. Diversionary efforts were to be made to distract the enemy. All reconnaissance was to be made with the utmost secrecy and no vehicles were to be exposed to possible enemy observation. The diversionary effort was to be made by the 3d Battalion by sending half-squads to JARMENIL and ARCHETTES (V105478, Sheet 15H). Engineers were to accompany reconnaissance units to select suitable crossing sites. Reconnaissance reports were to be submitted by 1700 hours and all units were to move into a final assembly area after dark prepared to attack at dawn.

At 1726 hours the Regimental Commander returned from his reconnaissance and notified the Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, that chances were good for a plan to cross the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of ELOYES. This information was passed on to the VI Corps Commander by the Division Commander. At a meeting at 1756 hours with battalion and separate company commanders, the Regimental Commander stated that his reconnaissance disclosed no enemy activity in the vicinity of LONGUET (V140405, Sheet 15H) while excellent observation was available from high ground 1000 yards southwest of ELOYES. The Division Commander ordered the 141st Infantry to cross the river tonight and secure ELOYES and the high ground around it. The 143d Infantry was to pass through the regiment as soon as the bridgehead was secured.

At 2115 hours the Regimental Commander issued the attack order to cross the MOSELLE River. Company "F" had already moved out to advance to the ford (V161414, Sheet 15H) approximately 1500 yards northwest of LONGUET, with the mission of clearing LONGUET by one hour after daylight. The 2d Battalion was to clean up all enemy resistance on the west side of the river, secure crossings at ELOYES by one hour after daylight and then clear the town of ELOYES which will secure the bridgehead. FFI agents reported they had 150 men on Hill 783 due west of ELOYES and enemy artillery positions were in the area. FFI agents were to try and knock out the artillery pieces, if possible, after the 1st Battalion crossed the river. French guides were available for all units. Six battalions of artillery were prepared to support the attack and were available on call. The artillery would begin firing as soon as Company "F" got in position and continue to fire until 0100 hours on

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21 September. Three enemy tanks and many machine guns, mortars together with several batteries of artillery had been reported in ELOYES. The utmost quiet and stealth was to be emphasized to all troops so that the enemy would not know a crossing was being made. Engineers were to have all of their equipment in a defilade position near the river with bridging materials close at hand. Tanks and tank destroyers were to be on a fifteen minute alert status after 0500 hours on 21 September, inasmuch as they were to cross the river as soon as the bridge was in. The Reconnaissance Company of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion was to be the first to cross the bridge and reconnoiter to JARME-NIL and FAUCOMPIERRE (V207493, Sheet 15H). Radio silence was to be maintained until first contact was made with the enemy or upon reaching the first objective.

At 0030 hours on 21 September, Company "F" had reached a point approximately one mile from ST NABORD (K164472, Sheet 15H). The 2d Battalion had already left its assembly area at 0010 hours and the 1st Battalion was moving on the rear of the 3d Battalion column. The artillery was notified to start its firing mission. The 131st Field Artillery was to fire one round per gun per minute for fifteen minutes; the 155th Field Artillery was to fire one round per gun per minute for five minutes and then three batteries were to fire three volleys of five rounds every thirty minutes.

The troops were guided through the dense woods between RAON AUX BOIS and the MOSELLE River by the seventy year old Mayor of RAON AUX BOIS, Monsieur R. M. GRISELIN, who was one of the few men who could successfully locate a route through the forest and keep away from the roads and known trails where the Germans might discover the attempted river crossing. The night was cloudy and intermittent cold rain added to the difficulties of guiding the troops. Several times the personnel in the connecting files became lost and Monsieur GRISELIN found the straying troops and guided them back to the main route.

east!
1500
east

At 0500 hours on 21 September, the Regimental Commander ordered radio silence broken to determine the location of the 2d Battalion. At 0510 hours a report was received that Company "F" and Company "G" were in the section of ELOYES west of the MOSELLE River. Both the 1st and 3d Battalions had passed ST NABORD at 0500 hours heading for the fording site (500 yards west) of LONGURT. The river valley was obscured by fog as dawn approached. Small arms fire could be heard in the vicinity of ELOYES. Company "G" contacted enemy opposition at 0720 hours. At 0724 hours the 1st Battalion reported they had started the crossing of the river and were out of contact with the 3d Battalion. The 3d Battalion called for unobserved fire on enemy machine guns and small arms fire coming across the river in the vicinity of ST NABORD. At 0740 hours the 2d Battalion had occupied all of the town of ELOYES west of

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the river and Company "G" was engaging enemy forces situated on the east side of the river. The fog over the river began rising and the 2d Battalion began to receive heavy enemy artillery and self-propelled gun fire in addition to the fire of at least twelve German machine guns. The Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion commander not to cross his battalion over the river until the 1st Battalion was in position on the east side. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion was slowly advancing north on the east side of the river. The troops had forded the icy water of the river at a depth of from four to five feet. The first troops crossing had met no opposition but beginning at 0700 hours concentrated enemy small arms fire began. At 0914 hours the 1st Battalion called for additional mortar and grenade ammunition. The 3d Battalion was still on the west side of the river along the railroad track in the vicinity of LONGUET.

At 0944 hours the Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post and ordered the 3d Battalion to cross immediately inasmuch as the delay in establishing the bridgehead was delaying the advance of the entire Division. At 1025 hours the Executive Officer of the 3d Battalion, Captain ROBERT L. DAVEY, 01288017, of Zeigler, Illinois, reported that the 3d Battalion commander, Major KERMIT R. HANSEN, had attempted to cross the river with two platoons of Company "I" and the Battalion S-3, Captain ROY F. SENTILLES, 01300225, of Donnersville, Louisiana. This force attempted to cross south of the 1st Battalion fording site in an area where the ground on both sides of the river was devoid of cover for several hundred yards. The terrain on the east side of the river extended across open ground for three hundred yards up a gradual slope to the road paralleling the river. On the east side of the road a dense wood covered a high hill. At the edge of the forest and the road, the Germans had prepared machine gun positions. Allowing the first platoon to cross the river and start up the slope to the road, the Germans then opened up on the men with machine guns killing or capturing all of them. The second platoon was able to escape. From this action Major HANSEN was reported missing in action and Captain SENTILLES was killed. As a consequence the 3d Battalion moved north and began crossing at the 1st Battalion fording site at 1025 hours.

At 1040 hours the Division Commander ordered Colonel STEELE to come to the 3d Battalion to take personal command of the battalion since Major HANSEN was missing.

Due to the urgency of getting ammunition to the 1st Battalion, Engineers were ordered to get assault boats to the fording sites to carry it across and bring back the wounded to the west side.

At 1126 hours the 2d Battalion reported that the three bridges

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over the MOSELLE River in ELOYES had been blown. An underwater dam was still intact where the water was approximately three and one-half to four feet deep. However, the current was very fast at this point and the Germans were able to train small arms fire on the crossing site. No other fording site had been located. Civilians reported between three hundred and five hundred Germans in the town of which approximately thirty per cent were Germans and the remainder Russians and Poles.

At 1225 hours the Regimental Executive Officer ordered the 2d Battalion to remain in its present position as a bridge was to be put in at the 1st Battalion fording site. The 3d Battalion was instructed to hold its present sector while the 1st Battalion continued to advance north from a position 2000 yards southwest of ELOYES on the west side of the river. Heavy caliber enemy artillery shelling was received from positions southwest of REMIREMONT and smaller caliber artillery shelling came from northwest of ELOYES.

At 1420 hours the Division G-2 advised that the 3d Battalion of the 143d Infantry would cross the river at the 1st Battalion fording site at 1600 hours followed by the other two battalions. However, at 1620 hours the Division G-3 Section stated that the 143d Infantry had started across at 1530 hours. Two battalions were to cross while the other battalion remained on the east side in reserve. The 142d Infantry was to take REMIREMONT and then assemble while the 143d Infantry was to proceed north to take the previous regimental objective. A German headquarters was reported at LE THOLY (V268430, Sheet 15H) about ten kilometers from the river where 9000 Germans were concentrated, according to civilian reports. At 0115 hours on 22 September, Division G-3 Section advised that all battalions of the 143d Infantry were across the river with the 1st Battalion of the 143d Infantry having the mission of taking Hill 605 and then clearing ELOYES east of the river while the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was to take Hill 783 east of ELOYES.

During the night of 21-22 September, the enemy shelled all areas. The fog along the river valley made it difficult to locate German guns. At dawn an artillery cub plane was sent up in an effort to locate enemy gun positions through rifts in the fog. At 0612 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the I&R Platoon to cross the river and reconnoiter to the east to make enemy contact. The Regimental S-2 stated that the I&R Platoon was too small for such an action as foot patrols would be required and suggested the use of the Reconnaissance Company, 636th TD Battalion, in addition. At 0645 hours on 22 September, the 1st Battalion commander was notified to move south and take the high ground overlooking REMIREMONT from the east side of the river in conjunction with the 3d Battalion. Both the 1st and 3d Battalions began moving south

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without opposition. The 2d Battalion continued to receive small arms fire from the east side of the river as the 143d Infantry had difficulty in clearing ELOYES. At 0800 hours the 2d Battalion was attached to the 143d Infantry on division order. Division was notified that the 2d Battalion could not be moved out of its position during daylight except by infiltration inasmuch as it was exposed to direct enemy fire and observation.

The 3d Battalion ran into an enemy road block at 0800 hours across the river from ST NABORD and deployed to the wooded high ground east of the road. At 0945 hours Division advised that the bridge at the fording site was ready to carry vehicles. Because of the great number of vehicles to be crossed, all traffic was to be given a priority and strictly controlled. Antitank guns were the first priority within the regiment followed by the 1st and 3d Battalion organic vehicles and then Cannon Company. The I&R Platoon and the 636th TD Battalion Reconnaissance Company vehicles were to cross immediately behind the regimental Antitank Company and proceed on the original reconnaissance mission assigned them.

Both the 1st and 3d Battalions continued their advance although they were halted on occasions by snipers in the dense woods of the FORET DE FOSSARD. The 1st Battalion moved southeast through the woods while the 3d Battalion moved along the river valley and road, deploying into the woods when stopped by the numerous snipers. The regimental command post moved from LONGUET to ST NABORD at 1050 hours directly across the river from where the 3d Battalion was engaged in a fire fight.

Prisoners taken by the 1st Battalion stated that the Germans were using a trail from REMIREMONT to ST AME (K230450, Sheet 15H) as a supply route and at least seven mortar positions were set up in ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT (K1945, Sheet 15H). The artillery was called upon to place heavy concentrations on the trail and on ST ETIENNE. Enemy artillery, firing from the vicinity of ST AME, attempted to hit the newly erected bridge.

At 1417 hours the 3d Battalion reported that Company "K" had reached the battalion objective and Company "I" was cleaning the enemy out of the woods. Also, contact had been made with the 1st Battalion to the northeast. At 1423 hours the Division G-3 stated that a battalion of the 142d Infantry was half-way into REMIREMONT while the 143d Infantry was still attacking ELOYES. Both regiments were encountering fairly heavy resistance. At 1545 hours the Division Chief of Staff called and stated the Division Commander had ordered the regiment to push down the slopes of Hill 807 and block the road from REMIREMONT to ST AME. The Commander of the 143d Infantry advised that his regiment

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was making satisfactory progress in ELOYES and the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry, which was attached to the 143d Infantry had done very well.

The 1st Battalion was ordered to attack south just east of the summit of Hill 807 while the 3d Battalion moved behind the 1st Battalion and to the east of it to protect its flank.

At 1820 hours the Assistant Division Commander notified the Regimental Executive Officer that the 2d Battalion was to be released from the 143d Infantry and the battalion had already been ordered to come to the crossing site. This information was passed on to the Regimental Commander at the 3d Battalion who ordered the 2d Battalion entrucked and brought to the bridge where the troops would detruck, march across and be picked up by Cannon Company trucks which were on the east side of the river. One company of the 2d Battalion was to be attached to the 3d Battalion while the other two rifle companies went into regimental reserve.

At 1900 hours Company "K", then in ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT, was ordered to remain in position until relieved by a company from the 2d Battalion and then proceed to MEYVILLERS (K218446, Sheet 15H).

In addition to blocking the German escape road from REMIREMONT, the regiment was ordered to secure a bridge site in REMIREMONT from the east side of the MOSELLE River so that Engineers could work on a bridge. A patrol was ordered to cross the river and contact the 142d Infantry which still had not been able to clear REMIREMONT on the west side of the river. Isolated groups of Germans were still in the city.

At 0050 hours on 23 September, Division had released one company of the 2d Battalion from the 143d Infantry. This company was immediately ordered to cross to the east side of the river and proceed to the 3d Battalion. At 0600 hours on 23 September, the remainder of the 2d Battalion was released from attachment to the 143d Infantry and reverted to regimental control. Company "I" encountered small arms fire upon occupying the northern section of REMIREMONT on the east side of the river but cleaned out the enemy and occupied that section of town by 0800 hours. The bridge area was found to be heavily mined but free of small arms fire. Company "I" was then loaded onto tanks and sent to ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT to completely clear the town. The 1st Battalion reported that it had cut the REMIREMONT-ST AME road at 0908 hours and was awaiting orders. Contact was established between the 1st and 3d Battalions just east of ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT.

The Division Commander notified the Regimental Executive Officer at 1200 hours that the 142d Infantry was to move by truck and push forward, thus relieving some of the pressure on the regiment. The road

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block on the REMIREMONT-ST AME road was to be pushed as far east as possible. The Reconnaissance Company of the 636th TD Battalion reported that it had contacted the enemy in ST AME and was being fired upon by many German Infantry troops in the town. Enemy artillery and foot troops were observed moving from CLAIRIE (V222406, Sheet 15H) to VAGNEY (K268435, Sheet 15H). The regimental command post which had moved across the river the previous night to a location near the bridge, moved into a former French barracks at ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT at 1530 hours.

The REMIREMONT bridge was to have been completed at 0200 hours on 24 September, but it was not actually ready for traffic until 0603 hours. Heavy traffic was routed across the REMIREMONT bridge while the bridge north of ST NABORD was to be used only by jeeps.

At 0915 hours on 24 September, the Assistant Division Commander stated that the Division Commander wanted the 2d Battalion to close in to position in the vicinity of REMIREMONT while the regiment took ST AME and cleared the woods in that sector during the day. A patrol was sent through the woods in an effort to locate a road that would support tanks. The Regimental Commander ordered Company "K" to remain in MEYVILLERS while the attack on ST AME took place. At 1100 hours a meeting was held with all battalion commanders wherein the 1st Battalion, less one company, was ordered to advance on ST AME from the west, securing all the area in its zone and supporting the 2d Battalion to the north by a strong base of fire. Company "A" was to move via the secondary road running north of the REMIREMONT-ST AME Road, sending one platoon and an artillery forward observer to the high ground to the north of the road. The 2d Battalion was ordered to advance from the northwest towards ST AME. One platoon of Company "B" with a section of light machine guns and the artillery forward observer of the 3d Battalion was attached to the 2d Battalion with the mission of establishing an observation post overlooking the ST AME valley. Road blocks were to be established to the north and east by the Antitank Company after the 2d Battalion secured the town. Patrols were not to be sent across the MOSELOTTE River. The 2d Battalion was not to move out until the 1st Battalion contacted the enemy. A platoon of tanks and five tank destroyers were to join the 2d Battalion as soon as a route could be found for their advance. The Cannon Company was ordered to move to a position where it could support the 2d Battalion.

Company "C" moved out at 1245 hours and at 1400 hours was 2000 yards east of REMIREMONT. Company "A" had reached MEYVILLERS by this hour and was endeavoring to establish an observation post. Forward elements of the 2d Battalion were approximately 2000 yards northwest of the town by 1445 hours. Although an observation post had not been located by Company "A", both Company "A" and Company "C" were ordered

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to move out as the 2d Battalion was progressing rapidly. The 2d Battalion was notified to move on ST AME without waiting for the prearranged smoke signals from the Company "A" platoon sent to the high ground to observe artillery fire. Due to the extremely bad weather and poor visibility created by fog, it was doubtful that any signals could be seen by the 2d Battalion. At 1525 hours the 2d Battalion stated that Company "G" had taken the wrong road. Company "F" was approximately 1000 yards west of CLEURIE, but the location of Company "E" and Company "H" was not known at the battalion command post. The maps failed to disclose a number of roads in the area and units could easily go astray. However, both Company "G" and Company "A" were on the same road 1200 yards north of ST AME. Company "F" was out of radio contact and efforts were made to contact it by messenger as the company was advancing too fast in comparison with other units. To the south Company "C" entered GELLES (K212438, Sheet 15H) with supporting tanks. Enemy troops were noticed by Company "C" to the south across the MOSELOTTE River. An observation post was established by the Company "A" platoon but due to the fog the artillery observer's view was extremely limited. The 2d Battalion commander with Company "E" and Company "H" ran into an enemy road block in the vicinity of PUTIERES (K230469, Sheet 15H) and reported approximately a regiment of Germans in the sector. Company "F" also ran into enemy opposition to the north. The Regimental Commander had previously ordered Company "A" and Company "G" to proceed with the attack on ST AME, but upon receipt of the information from the 2d Battalion of encountering a sizeable enemy force, Company "G" was ordered to proceed north toward PUTIERES while the 1st Battalion converged on ST AME. Company "C" received heavy fire from enemy machine guns and self-propelled guns at 1820 hours as it advanced towards ST AME and moved to the north from the main road to secure better cover for its advance. Company "A" also deployed in an effort to get artillery observers forward to direct artillery fire on the town.

At 2000 hours on 24 September, the 2d Battalion commander reported that he was in PUTIERES. There was a road running northeast from the town which was not on the map on which the battalion was in contact with the enemy. A German patrol had infiltrated behind the battalion's position in the valley to the northwest. The battalion needed ammunition badly; also ambulances as a number of casualties had been incurred. Division was notified of the 2d Battalion's situation and the Division Commander stated that the 3d Battalion, which was then in Division reserve, could be utilized if needed. Jeeps with blood plasma and ammunition were hurriedly dispatched to the 2d Battalion command post with a platoon of Infantry from the 3d Battalion as a protecting force.

At 2023 hours the 1st Battalion commander requested the artillery to fire three rounds per gun per minute for thirty minutes on ST AME.

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When the fire lifted Companies "A" and "C" were to advance with Company "B" moving behind Company "C". The FFI reported 250 German Infantrymen, several 20mm guns and four artillery pieces had moved into ST AME around 2100 hours.

Information from prisoners taken indicated that the 169th German Infantry Regiment was in the ST AME- PUTIERES sector, having moved from MULHOUSE the previous day. The 3d Battalion was in PUTIERES with the remainder of the regiment in the vicinity of ST AME.

Due to the necessity of conserving ammunition, the Division Artillery Commander requested that the guns fire one round per minute for fifteen minutes and then three rounds per minute for five minutes. The Regimental Commander agreed to this proposal and the 1st Battalion was notified that the artillery concentration would begin at 0130 hours on 25 September. Immediately after the artillery fire lifted, the 1st Battalion began its attack. At 0245 hours the enemy was using many flares and firing self-propelled guns. However, both Company "A" and Company "C" had penetrated into the town where they succeeded in capturing the commanding officer, staff, and 185 men of the Combat Team ZANDER. Although the map portrayed ST AME as an extremely small village, it was considerably larger, stretching without depth for a distance of approximately one mile along the road. By 0300 hours Company "C" was within the first enemy barricades erected in the village. Company "A" was ordered to establish a road block east of ST AME at the road junction while Companies "B" and "C" dug in within the town. The 2d Battalion was ordered to hold its present position, build up supplies, evacuate wounded and send out patrols, one of which was to contact Company "A" at the road junction. Company "A" was receiving artillery fire at 0650 hours as it continued its advance toward the road junction.

At 0725 hours on (23) September Division G-3 stated that the mission for the regiment was to seize the high ground across the ST AME valley--2500 yards due east of PUTIERES. Across the valley there was a great deal of German activity noted as the fog lifted. Artillery and mortar fire was directed on enemy positions.

By 0830 hours Company "A" had reached the road junction on the road leading to PUTIERES and just west of the main road junction, despite increasing German artillery fire.

At 0908 hours the Assistant Division Commander notified the Regimental Commander that the VI Corps Commander wanted the high ground east of ST AME taken and road blocks established. The 3d Battalion was to be used for this operation. The 3d Battalion was immediately alerted in ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT where it had remained in Division reserve.

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By 1015 hours all road blocks had been cleared from the REMIREMONT-ST AME highway. Enemy troops were between Company "A" and Company "C". Inasmuch as Company "A" was endeavoring to reach the main road junction, Company "C" was ordered to clear out this enemy force. Company "B" was ordered to clear the edges of the woods north of ST AME. Meanwhile, both Companies "B" and "C" had forces in ST AME itself mopping up enemy opposition with supporting tanks.

At 1105 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion commander to have Company "A" hold the PUTIERES road junction and push out strong patrols to the north to contact Company "B" which was clearing the woods. Company "A" was to maintain contact with the 2d Battalion and push the Germans up the valley toward the 2d Battalion. Company "C" was to clear the area between the MOSELOTTE River and the main east-west highway, pushing east to LE SYNDICAT (K241451, Sheet 15H). Supporting tanks were to be split up among the companies. Squads of Infantry were to be left in ST AME to complete mopping up the town. It was necessary that the main road junction and the area around it be taken so that the 3d Battalion could proceed to the high ground east of the valley. Company "A" was to remain at the PUTIERES road junction until Company "C" was well beyond it. Then, Company "A" and Company "B" were to push north up the valley and the 3d Battalion would attack to cut the road north of the high ground on the east side of the valley. The 3d Battalion left ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT at 1115 hours with an assembly area designated north of ST AME.

At 1247 hours the Division Commander called to state that orders on the 3d Battalion were changed and the battalion would not attack as planned. The 3d Battalion, minus one reinforced company which was to remain under control of the regiment, was to move to the site of the original river crossing made by the 1st Battalion on 21 September, as Division reserve.

All units were notified that plans would have to be changed to conform with the latest Division directive. Company "C" was not to proceed to LE SYNDICAT as previously ordered. The 2d Battalion was to continue patrolling of the valley and move south to contact the 1st Battalion near the road junction just east of ST AME. The road and the commanding ground on each side of the road was to be cleared.

At 1300 hours the 142d Infantry units to the northwest of the regimental area were undergoing a counterattack. One of their road blocks was under fire from three sides. The regimental Cannon Company reported receiving small arms fire in its area where it was supporting the 2d Battalion. At 1337 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion to keep the road to its rear open in the event it was necessary to withdraw. Meanwhile it was to move south so as to relieve

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the 1st Battalion and secure the road block. Cannon Company was alerted to withdraw from its position due to the enemy action in the 142d Infantry area.

At 1405 hours the Division Chief of Staff notified the Regimental S-3 to have Company "L", which had remained under regimental control when the 3d Battalion went into Division reserve, to move into position just north of REMIREMONT. Also, the 2d Platoon of the 36th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the regiment for the purpose of contacting the 3d Division on the regiment's right (south) flank.

At 1545 hours the 1st Battalion still had not taken the main road junction east of ST AME. The road junction was heavily defended and attacking forces were subjected to intense 120mm mortar fire whenever they tried to move forward. The 2d Battalion was ordered to return via the route it had taken from the MOSELLE River to PUTIERES and come to ST AME along the REMIREMONT-ST AME highway to relieve the 1st Battalion.

At 1547 hours Cannon Company advised that a Maquis leader had arrived at its position and reported all Maquis in the woods either wounded or killed and the Germans pushing through the 142d Infantry road block to the north. The Regimental Commander ordered the Cannon Company guns to pull back but the men were to remain in position to kill or capture any Germans attempting to get through. The Division Commander was notified of the precarious position of the Cannon Company and he stated that a company would be sent to assist it immediately.

At 1618 hours the Division Commander ordered a road block put in by a company from the 2d Battalion approximately one and one-half miles southeast of ELOYES in the FORET DE FOSSARD (V183407, Sheet 15H). The Regimental Commander requested that Company "L" in the vicinity of REMIREMONT be used instead of one of the 2d Battalion companies. The Division Commander agreed to the use of Company "L". The 2d Battalion was ordered to leave one company at the designated road block until Company "L" could reach the position and relieve it.

The 142d Infantry advised that a company was being sent to assist the regimental Cannon Company. Also, a company from the 3d Battalion in Division reserve was being committed to re-establish the 142d Infantry supply route which was cut by enemy infiltration. Upon arrival of the 142d Infantry company, Cannon Company was ordered to move to the vicinity of ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT. At 1745 hours the Cannon Company advised that the 142d Infantry company still had not arrived and believed Germans were to the rear of the company. However, the 2d Battalion was in close proximity to Cannon Company and Company "E" was ordered to relieve Cannon Company so that it could go into position

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near the 1st Battalion sector. The trucks of the Cannon Company were to transport the remainder of the 2d Battalion to the 1st Battalion's area.

At 1855 hours the Regimental Commander notified the 2d Battalion commander that one platoon of Company "E" was to take over the Cannon Company road block, another platoon was to remain at the site where the road left the wooded area and a third platoon was to remain at the present Cannon Company command post. Company "G" was to move on Cannon Company trucks to REMIREMONT and Company "I" was to be brought back on the same vehicles to relieve Company "E". The remainder of the 2d Battalion was to move to the vicinity of the regimental command post in ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT and not relieve the 1st Battalion that night. The 2d Battalion was then to remain on an alert status for use by Division on short notice.

At 2045 hours Division Headquarters stated that the 15th Infantry of the 3d Division would move to the vicinity of ST AME on 26 September, and the commanding officer of the 15th Infantry would contact the regiment during the night to secure tactical dispositions.

Company "I" relieved Company "E" at 2150 hours and Cannon Company went into position in the vicinity of ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT. Company "I" was attached to the 142d Infantry by Division order.

The night of 25-26 September passed with little activity in the regimental sector. The 1st Battalion received artillery fire during the night. The 1st Battalion supporting tanks which were in the vicinity of Company "C" received heavy enemy artillery fire throughout the night and early morning.

At 0940 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Division Commander that the 15th Infantry would not close into an assembly area earlier than 1200 hours. Company "F" had been sent on a patrol to the north, accompanied by an artillery forward observer, into the wooded sector. The Division Commander stated that if the 15th Infantry could get its attack started toward LE THOLY, the 141st Infantry was to assemble and protect the Division right flank. A reconnaissance was to be made along the flank for possible roads. As soon as one battalion of the 15th Infantry was ready, it was to relieve the regimental 1st Battalion as quickly as possible. In the meantime, the 142d Infantry was to be contacted to obtain its complete situation.

At 1045 hours the Division Commander arrived at the regimental command post and was informed by the Regimental Commander that the 3d Division was moving into the area but it had received no instructions

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about relieving the regiment. The Division Commander contacted the Commanding General of the 3d Division upon receipt of this information and learned that the 3d Division had not planned on relieving the regiment but would do so during the afternoon. It was then arranged that the regimental 3d Battalion would relieve a battalion of the 142d Infantry, the 2d Battalion would go into Division reserve and the 1st Battalion would go into regimental reserve.

At 1752 hours on 26 September, the 1st Battalion reported that it had been relieved in ST AME and all units were withdrawing to ST ETIENNE LES REMIREMONT area for supporting tanks. The 3d Battalion completed the relief of the 3d Battalion, 142d Infantry, during the night of 26-27 September. The 3d Battalion remained in the vicinity of REMIREMONT as general security for the bridges while the 1st Battalion moved to the area vacated by the 3d Battalion.

At 1115 hours on 27 September, the regimental command post moved from ST ETIENNE LES Remiremont to a location 1000 yards northeast of ST NABORD on the east side of the MOSELLE River and in the vicinity of the original 1st Battalion crossing site. At 1530 hours the Division Chief of Staff stated that the 2d Battalion was to be taken off of its alert status and the 1st Battalion was to be put on the alert instead. The 3d Battalion was receiving enemy artillery, mortar and machine gun fire in its positions in the FORET DE FOSSARD. At 1750 hours the Regimental Commander of the 142d Infantry was asked whether or not his 3d Battalion could relieve the 141st Infantry 3d Battalion provided the Division Commander ordered a contemplated move of the entire regiment to the vicinity of DOCELLES (V167500, Sheet 15H), and he replied in the affirmative.

At 0100 hours on 28 September, the Regimental S-3 alerted all units for a movement. The 2d Battalion was ordered to be entrucked at 0730 hours and move north through EIOYES TO DOCELLES.

At 0845 hours the Division G-3 stated that the Division Commander believed an assembly area in the vicinity of XAMONTARUPT (V193487, Sheet 15H) would furnish better defilade inasmuch as DOCELLES had been receiving quite a bit of heavy caliber enemy shelling. The regimental command post closed at 0800 hours and moved to XAMONTARUPT where it opened at 1000 hours. The 2d Battalion arrived in the assembly area at 1030 hours.

The Regimental Commander was called to attend a meeting at the 143d Infantry command post with the Division Commander at 1400 hours. At 1515 hours the Regimental Commander returned to the command post and held a meeting with all unit commanders. The Commanding General of VI Corps had ordered the 36th Division to advance on BRUYERES

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(245565, Sheet 15G). The 141st and 143d Infantry Regiments were to make the attack with the 141st Infantry on the right (east) with a boundary from BRUYERES to BEAUMENIL (250450, Sheet 15G) to the high ground southwest of the latter town. The two high hills in this sector were to be taken by the 143d Infantry which was attacking one hill at the present time. The 143d Infantry was to advance two battalions along the high ground to the north and west of BRUYERES while its other battalion attacked along the high ground northwest of HOUX (V226495, Sheet 15H) in conjunction with the 141st Infantry attack across the valley and stream to the northeast. The 142d Infantry was to clear all enemy from the woods east of TENDON (V213474, Sheet 15H). The 142d Infantry was to furnish guides to lead patrols forward of its present position in order to reconnoiter behind its present line. The regiment was to attack across the narrowest point of the valley into the woods (V236483-V248475, Sheet 15H) with two battalions abreast. Artillery was to smoke the flanks to prevent enemy observation. A force of tanks, tank destroyers and Infantry was to be sent to REHAUPAL (V251471, Sheet 15H) and then to CHAMPDRAY (V268489, Sheet 15H) to protect the regiment's flank. The 3d Battalion was to be released from its positions in the FORET DE FOSSARD and brought forward during the night to be regimental reserve. Battalions were to advance along the high ground and keep away from the main roads. The boundary between battalions was to be the road between HOUX and HERPELMONT (V269520, Sheet 15H) with the 2d Battalion on the left (west) and the 1st Battalion on the right (east). The 2d Battalion was to move west and take LAVELINE (V232490, Sheet 15H) and then take HOUX from the east and northeast. The 1st Battalion was to first take a small group of houses across the valley and then move northeast along the ridge. The 2d Battalion was to move to this ridge after taking HOUX. The 1st Battalion was to assist in taking CHAMPDRAY and also HOUX if it became necessary. All reconnaissance was to be under cover so as not to give away any plans. An unknown number of enemy had been reported in HOUX and enemy had been seen digging in across the valley.

The 143d Infantry advised that Germans were filtering back and forth around ST JEAN DU MARCHE (V216500, Sheet 15H) and the hill northeast of the town. The hill was to be attacked by the 143d Infantry on the morning of 29 September.

At 1946 hours the Regimental Commander notified both the 1st and 2d Battalions that after the 2d Battalion had taken HOUX, it was to proceed northeast into the woods and on to MENEMONT (V250488, Sheet 15H). The 1st Battalion was to proceed east into the woods and thence to MENEMONT. Artillery fire was to be placed on HOUX, LAVELINE and the woods northeast of these towns. Before the assault, a heavy artillery concentration was to be placed on the objective for twenty minutes

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beginning at 0330 hours. Then for ten minutes a total of fifty-four guns were to fire. At the end of this time a white phosphorous concentration would be fired to indicate the end of the artillery preparation and the Infantry would begin the attack. The 2d Battalion was to place its heavy weapons in position in the vicinity of FAUCOMPIERRE (V209490, Sheet 15H). No troops were to cross the ROUX-LAVELINE line until the artillery concentrations were over.

At 2130 hours Division Headquarters advised that approximately 200 Germans were digging in positions west of LAVELINE; also that the 3d Battalion would not be released to the regiment until sometime on 29 September.

At 0200 hours a 1st Battalion patrol reported the capture of three prisoners at the bridge in ROUX. There were few Germans in the town but many in the surrounding woods and to the north. The bridge had been blown but a few boards remained in place that could be used by Infantry but which would not support vehicles. A number of horse-drawn vehicles could be heard in the woods to the north of the town.

At 0420 hours the 1st Battalion reported that part of the battalion was across the stream in ROUX and was receiving both friendly and enemy artillery fire. The 131st Field Artillery reported no friendly fire was directed in the 1st Battalion area. At 0435 hours the Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion commander to notify the 1st Battalion commander to call the attack off and pull back into an assembly area due to the troops being disorganized by the heavy artillery fire.

At 0610 hours the Division Commander stated that elements of the 142d Infantry and the 2d Battalion of the 143d Infantry would continue the attack on the northwest side of the DOCELLES-BRUYERES road. The 141st Infantry was to relieve the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 143d Infantry east of this road and carry on the attack in the afternoon. The stream running parallel to the JARMENIL-BRUYERES road was the boundary between the regiments. The regiment was to choose any axis of advance desired but the 2d Battalion was to relieve the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry, and the 1st Battalion relieve the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, as quickly as possible. The 1st Battalion withdrew through XAMONTARUPT and DOCELLES and then moved north on the BRUYERES road. The 2d Battalion, while withdrawing to XAMONTARUPT to follow the same route, was shelled heavily by the Germans and suffered numerous casualties.

At 1107 hours the Regimental Commander notified the 2d Battalion commander that the present plan was for the 1st and 2d Battalions to make a coordinated attack after relieving the 143d Infantry battalions.

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Armor and Infantry were to be sent to the left flank of the 2d Battalion in the valley to enfilade enemy fire. The 1st Battalion was to cross the valley behind armored units to the spur of the woods and get behind the town of ST JEAN DU MARCHE. At 1130 hours the 1st Battalion had relieved the 1st Battalion, 143d Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry, was in the process of being relieved by the 2d Battalion.

At 1500 hours the 1st Battalion had moved out in its attack. Company "E" and Company "G" were in position with Company "F" moving into ST JEAN DU MARCHE. The 2d Battalion believed it would be ready to move out in an attack within one-half hour.

At 1600 hours the 2d Battalion began to move north from ST JEAN DU MARCHE and encountered resistance on the northern outskirts of the town. Enemy self-propelled guns began firing at the forward elements of the 1st Battalion on the low ground northwest of ST JEAN DU MARCHE. Supporting armor was ordered to proceed to the assistance of both battalions. As the 1st Battalion progressed northeast to the high ground north of ST JEAN DU MARCHE, it encountered increasing heavy resistance and still had not been able to reach the high ground by 1820 hours. Company "F" in ST JEAN DU MARCHE was subjected to artillery. Heavy caliber mortar and self-propelled gun fire. Company "G" attempted to work to the northwest and thence northeast to get behind the enemy force holding up Company "F" but also ran into stiff opposition.

At 2018 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Division Commander that it might be possible to work the 2d Battalion into the edge of the woods by daylight but if not, the battalion was to pulled back and heavy artillery concentrations placed on the woods. The Division Commander stated that Company "K" was to assemble in the vicinity of XAMONTARUPT during the night but was not to be committed. Also, a road block was to be put in on the road to ROUX near the position of Company "I" which had previously relieved a company of the 142d Infantry in that sector.

During the night of 29-30 September, patrols from both the 1st and 2d Battalions worked to the north and northeast. Company "F" contacted enemy on the high ground to the northeast of ST JEAN DU MARCHE while Company "G" working around the southern slope of the high ground reported no enemy. The Antitank Company established the road block near ROUX as ordered by the Division Commander. At 0430 hours Company "E" and Company "G" moved out for the high ground. Also, Company "C" left the 1st Battalion area for the same ground. Company "G" moved north through the woods while Company "E" cleared the woods above ST JEAN DU MARCHE and maintained contact between Company "F" and Company "G". At 0720 hours on 30 September, the 1st Battalion reported Company "C" on the high ground mopping up enemy opposition with Company "A" starting for

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this position. By 0825 hours Company "A" had advanced 800 yards north and was sending patrols to the west and southwest. However, at 0900 hours the company encountered German machine gun and small arms fire. The Regimental Commander ordered both Company "A" and Company "C" to push to the west and hold their ground so that armor could move north through their positions. The FFI reported that two companies of Germans had left BRUYERES at 2300 hours on 29 September and had marched to PREY (220537, Sheet 15G) just to the north of the 1st Battalion's sector.

The 3d Battalion, less Company "L", was attached to the 142d Infantry at 1010 hours in order to relieve the 1st Battalion of that organization. The 3d Battalion was ordered into position on the edge of the woods north of Company "L".

All areas in the 1st and 2d Battalions were found to be heavily mined and all roads covered by road blocks. More mines were found than in any previous area in France in which the regiment had been in combat. At 1140 hours the Division Commander issued orders that as soon as the areas were cleared on which the regiment was now working, all companies were to organize the patrols sent to the high ground at MALANRUPT (230515, Sheet XXXV-18).

The Germans had more artillery than in any of the regiment's former combat areas and all units were subjected to shelling of varying intensity throughout the day and night.

At 1510 hours the Regimental Commander formed a special force composed of Company "B" and Company "G" which was to move from the high ground north of ST JEAN DU MARCH through the woods to a point just 500 yards west of MALANRUPT where the wooded sector narrowed. This force was to defend the surrounding area. The 1st Battalion was warned that the 143d Infantry attack might drive the enemy into its position. Therefore, the battalion was to watch the main road to the northeast which was the German escape route. By 1735 hours the 1st Battalion had worked Infantry and armor up to LE PANGES (211530, Sheet XXXV-18) which was the 143d Infantry attack objective. Upon seeing the 1st Battalion units in LE PANGES, the 143d Infantry decided not to attack the town and a contact force met at the bridge in town.

At 2007 hours the Regimental Commander notified the Division Commander that the regiment had reached the line ordered by Division. At the present time no contact was being made with the enemy but German artillery fire was falling throughout the area. The Division Commander stated that the line from HOUX to HERFELMONT would be the regimental boundary. He further stated that probably one battalion of the regiment would be ordered to attack while another battalion was in

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regimental reserve while the remaining battalion was in Division reserve. On the morning of 1 October, one battalion of the 143d Infantry was to go into position in the rear of the 1st Battalion. On the night of 1-2 October, another battalion of the 143d Infantry would move into position near the 3d Battalion.

Thus, the month of September 1944 closed with all units of the regiment committed south of BRUYERES against an enemy fighting a desperate and, at times, frenzied delaying action. Hilly terrain and inclement weather added to the difficulties of driving the Germans back to the RHINE River. It rained eleven (11) days out of the month and was cloudy ten (10) additional days. For the first time since landing on French soil, operations of the regiment were considerably slowed from their former tempo.

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Fighting strength on the line of the three battalions in officers and enlisted men during the month of September 1944 is as follows:

	1st Bn		2d Bn		3d Bn	
	Off's	EM	Off's	EM	Off's	EM
1 September -	28	617	27	657	28	662
2 " -	28	617	27	657	29	681
3 " -	28	647	27	657	28	659
4 " -	28	639	27	654	29	666
5 " -	28	642	27	656	29	665
6 " -	28	654	27	649	29	646
7 " -	28	664	27	649	29	652
8 " -	27	662	27	649	29	663
9 " -	27	638	27	650	27	664
10 " -	28	646	29	650	28	660
11 " -	27	649	29	680	27	668
12 " -	24	647	30	679	25	640
13 " -	23	658	30	661	28	632
14 " -	25	642	30	646	26	621
15 " -	25	642	30	637	27	620
16 " -	26	650	30	656	27	623
17 " -	24	644	30	656	27	624
18 " -	24	622	30	657	27	619
19 " -	24	630	30	655	27	619
20 " -	23	629	28	658	27	611
21 " -	24	624	30	659	24	584
22 " -	24	624	30	659	24	576
23 " -	23	626	29	662	24	585
24 " -	24	630	28	675	23	603
25 " -	24	618	27	646	25	608
26 " -	21	702	27	725	25	732
27 " -	23	707	24	743	26	727
28 " -	22	710	26	745	26	727
29 " -	20	704	27	730	24	713
30 September -	18	686	26	714	24	713

Two hundred and fifty-eight (258) enlisted men replacements were received on 25 September and joined units on 26 September. The replacements as a group rated very satisfactory and performed creditably in their first combat action with the enemy.

Officer replacements were unobtainable during the month. Three enlisted men were commissioned from the ranks within the regiment during the month.

S E C R E T

German prisoners of war taken by the regiment during the month of September 1944 are listed by days as follow:

1 September - 153	11 September - 66	21 September - 4
2 " - 63	12 " - 125	22 " - 17
3 " - 101	13 " - 84	23 " - 59
4 " - 7	14 " - 1	24 " - 0
5 " - 6	15 " - 0	25 " - 184
6 " - 2	16 " - 2	26 " - 14
7 " - 54	17 " - 26	27 " - 14
8 " - 41	18 " - 56	28 " - 0
9 " - 47	19 " - 0	29 " - 4
10 September - 36	20 September - 2	30 September - 78
TOTAL		-1644

Enemy war materiel captured and destroyed during the month of September 1944, was tabulated as follows:

Trucks (all types).....	21
88mm Guns (AT and AA types).....	5
Machine Guns.....	3
Rifles.....	200
Mortar Ammunition.....	300 rounds
Hand-grenades.....	1000
Antitank Rocket Launchers (Bazookas).....	5
Antitank Rocket Ammunition.....	5000 rounds
Railroad freight cars.....	100 (three loaded with foodstuffs)

As is usual in attack operations which cover many miles, the great majority of captured and destroyed enemy war materiel is bypassed due to tactical necessity. Similarly, no true estimate can be made of the number of enemy wounded and killed throughout the operations.

E N D

Report of Operations Written by:

Robert D. Dieterle

M/Sgt ROBERT D. DIETERLE, 16062508
Service Company, 141st Infantry
Regimental Sergeant Major

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T
HEADQUARTERS, 111ST INFANTRY
APO 36, U. S. ARMY.

MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 AUGUST THROUGH 31 AUGUST, 1944.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>OFFICERS</u>					
MC CIAM, Paul R.	2nd Lt	O-1300060	27 Aug/44	DOW (Co "F")	Upper Sandusky, O.
<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>					
CRISTAP, Herman O.	Pfc	44520139	28 Aug/44	KIA (Med Det)	Ringgold, Ga.
WILSON, Arthur G.	Sgt	42023946	25 Aug/44	IWA (Co "A")	Syracuse, N. Y.
KARSHITZ, Martin B.	Pfc	36833805	28 Aug/44	KIA (Co "B")	Rib Falls, Wisc.
DUNLAP, George H. IV	Pvt	34817527	17 Aug/44	DOW (Co "B")	Mobila, Ala.
COMER, James R.	Pvt	35549512	26 Aug/44	IWA (Co "D")	Decatur, Ind.
PHILLIPS, Willie B.	Pfc	38037153	31 Aug/44	IWA (B-3)	McKinney, Texas.
BOHRINGER, Robert	Pvt	36831856	31 Aug/44	IWA (Co "I")	Chicago, Ill.
CULLIGAN, Joseph J.	Pvt	32953477	31 Aug/44	IWA (Co "I")	Atlantic City, N.J.

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S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS, 141ST INFANTRY
APO 36, U. S. ARMY.

MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES

REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER, 1944.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>O F F I C E R S</u>					
URRIS, Sidney E.	Capt	0-1288083	5 Sept/44	LIA (Serv Co)	Springfield, Mo.
COSS, Harry E.	1st Lt	0-1288010	9 Sept/44	MIA (A-T Co)	Waynesburg, Pa.
REED, John C.	1st Lt	0-1306469	9 Sept/44	MIA (A-T Co)	Birmingham, Ala.
DAVIS, Glenn M.	2nd Lt	0-1299703	9 Sept/44	MIA (A-T Co)	Louisville, Ky.
BIRD, William A.	1st Col	0-280648	12 Sept/44	LWA (H-1)	Barberton, O.
AMICK, Elliott W.	1st Col	0-21153	17 Sept/44	SWA (H-1)	Roseville, Calif.
ARN, Robert M.	Capt	0-1289021	12 Sept/44	SWA (H-1)	Brownsville, W. Va.
IE VALLEY, Edward W.	1st Lt	0-1306435	12 Sept/44	LWA (Co "A")	Williamsville, NY
DAUGHTNEY, Ashburn J. Jr.	1st Lt	0-1296335	22 Sept/44	KIA (Co "A")	Richmond, Va.
SANCHEZ, Joe	2nd Lt	0-2055059	12 Sept/44	LIA (Co "A")	San Antonio, Tex.
MAKINS, Alfred E.	Capt	0-386784	29 Sept/44	MIA (Co "B")	Abeline, Kans.
STROM, Carl J.	1st Lt	0-1317576	17 Sept/44	LWA (Co "B")	Grand Rapids, Mich.
MEIER, Bernhardt J.	1st Lt	0-378498	17 Sept/44	LWA (Co "C")	Brooklyn, N. Y.
KERWIN, Walter J.	1st Lt	0-463930	25 Sept/44	LWA (H-2)	Washington, D. C.
SCHONBECK, Edwin H.	1st Lt	0-1030714	25 Sept/44	LWA (Co "F")	Junction City, Kans.
BIALOCK, Dennis F.	1st Lt	0-1294966	23 Sept/44	LWA (Co "H")	Alexandria, La.
HANSEN, Kermit R.	Major	0-379451	21 Sept/44	MIA (H-3)	Philadelphia, Pa.
SEWILLIS, Roy E.	Capt	0-1300225	21 Sept/44	KIA (H-3)	Donaldsonville, La.
HEUTACH, Frank J.	1st Lt	0-1312570	9 Sept/44	LWA (Co "I")	Coleman, Texas.
PETRO, Anthony D.	2nd Lt	0-1322948	21 Sept/44	MIA (Co "I")	Youngstown, O.
KODSKY, Edgar F.	1st Lt	0-336580	28 Sept/44	LWA (Co "I")	New Woodstock, NY
SCHIEDER, Frederick	2nd Lt	0-1031991	12 Sept/44	LWA (Co "I")	Altus, Okla.
PRESTGARD, Oran L.	2nd Lt	0-1052304	8 Sept/44	SWA (Co "I")	New York, N. Y.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPTEMBER THRU 30 SEPTEMBER/44.
HQ. 115TH INF. (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>U N L I S T E D M E N</u>					
<u>S E R V I C E C O M P A N Y</u>					
NEWMAN, Harvey R.	Pfc	20801286	22 Sept/44	IWA	San Antonio, Texas.
ADAMS, Floyd C.	Tec 5	38056384	5 Sept/44	LIA	Graford, Texas.
<u>F I R S T B A T T A L I O N H E A D Q U A R T E R S C O M P A N Y</u>					
DORSON, Fred	Pvt	36292680	25 Sept/44	SWA	Milwaukee, Wisc.
WEST, William T.	Pvt	32801107	25 Sept/44	IWA	Elmhurst, N. Y.
SEMPERED, William A.	Pfc	33582193	2 Sept/44	IWA	Ardmore, Pa.
<u>C O M P A N Y "A"</u>					
CASSIDY, George C., Jr.	Pvt	35881899	29 Sept/44	IWA	Norwood, Ohio.
BROCKE, Lomel N.	Pvt	34827894	29 Sept/44	IWA	Abbeyville, Ga.
BROCKE, Samuel M.	Pvt	33499838	29 Sept/44	IWA	Wicksburg, Pa.
DUFF, Joseph O.	Pvt	37584171	29 Sept/44	IWA	Seattle, Wash.
ROBOLD, Claude E.	S/Sgt	35114016	25 Sept/44	MIA	Mamoa, Ind.
MILLER, Ted R.	T/Sgt	39326103	25 Sept/44	MIA	Myrtle Point, Ore.
HEATS, Gordon E.	Sgt	36809731	25 Sept/44	SWA	Milwaukee, Wisc.
MCCAN, Glenn E.	Sgt	35173646	25 Sept/44	IWA	Barberton, Ohio.
AUSTIN, Donat E.	Pvt	31382218	25 Sept/44	IWA	Danston, Conn.
BERGEVINE, George C.	Pvt	31372185	25 Sept/44	IWA	Attleboro, Mass.
BABER, Herman J.	Pvt	34679117	25 Sept/44	IWA	Stanfield, N. C.
CLARK, Charles F.	Pfc	37539551	25 Sept/44	IWA	Kansas City, Kans.
TAMUNRO, Dominio R.	Sgt	35235824	25 Sept/44	IWA	Ravenna, Ohio.
SCOTT, Harry V.	Sgt	33733639	25 Sept/44	IWA	Baltimore, Md.
FIGURA, Edward	Pvt	35783033	21 Sept/44	KIA	Chicago, Ill.
CHAMBERLAIN, Raymond P.	Pvt	36784117	22 Sept/44	IWA	Chicago, Ill.
BRITCHER, Brooks A.	Pvt	33797420	21 Sept/44	IWA	Spring City, Pa.
SCHANTON, Charley	Pfc	38465478	18 Sept/44	MIA	Crowder, Okla.
HEPP, Charles K.	Sgt	33193086	18 Sept/44	MIA	Washington, D. C.
MC REESE, W. H.	Pfc	34675293	18 Sept/44	IWA	Columbia, Miss.
CONRADSEN, Lawrence P.	Pvt	32660530	18 Sept/44	IWA	Saratoga Springs, N. Y.
CRACK, Harry B. Jr.	Pvt	32957595	18 Sept/44	MIA	New York, N. Y.
COOKEY, Nathan P.	Pvt	38321191	18 Sept/44	MIA	New Orleans, La.
DOSSER, Weldon M.	S/Sgt	38050482	12 Sept/44	KIA	Houston, Texas.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT/44.
HQ, 111ST INF. (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>					
<u>REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS COMPANY</u>					
WHITEMORE, Norwood E.	Pvt	34545573	13 Sept/44	KIA	Jacksonville, Fla.
WILCOX, Byron L.	Pvt	37460631	13 Sept/44	KIA	Bayard, Nebr.
BEARD, Ammon C.	Cpl	33230604	13 Sept/44	INA	Highspire, Pa.
BEARE, James I. III	Pvt	13156524	13 Sept/44	INA	Franklin, Va.
WOOD, Charles A.	Sgt	35338129	12 Sept/44	INA	So. Whitley, Ind.
<u>CANNON COMPANY</u>					
DE AUSTIN, Erwin A.	Tec 5	37278809	13 Sept/44	INA	Marshall, Minn.
GARCIA, Jesse C.	Pvt	36644945	17 Sept/44	INA	Chicago, Ill.
WILLIAMSON, Roy L.	Pfc	35730171	26 Sept/44	INA	Owensboro, Ky.
VERIER, Dominio	Pfc	33268244	26 Sept/44	INA	Beaver Falls, Pa.
<u>ANTI-TANK COMPANY</u>					
CANTREY, Chelmer L.	Pfc	35266570	22 Sept/44	INA	Seth, W. Va.
SEITZ, Leo G.	Pfc	36548824	13 Sept/44	KIA	Hamtrack, Mich.
RYAN, Walter R.	Pfc	20848534	9 Sept/44	MIA	Gonzales, Texas.
CRITTON, Gilmer D.	Pfc	34592295	9 Sept/44	KIA	Draper, N. C.
CARDILL, Ross	Pfc	35268019	9 Sept/44	KIA	Dany, Ky.
JAMES, Charlie C.	S/Sgt	38056278	9 Sept/44	KIA	Vernon, Texas.
BOURNE, Steve S.	Pvt	35233690	8 Sept/44	INA	Steubenville, O.
CARDILL, Leo L.	Pfc	35268008	8 Sept/44	INA	Barton, Ky.
<u>MEDICAL DETACHMENT</u>					
FERRICK, Ernest J.	Tec 5	20803896	27 Sept/44	SWA	Red Rock, Texas.
BIRMAN, Raymond D.	Pvt	35914659	29 Sept/44	INA	No. Homestead, O.
CANTORIE, Harold G.	Pvt	33661076	30 Sept/44	INA	Appomattox, Va.
SWANSON, Donald	Pvt	37575552	23 Sept/44	INA	Minneapolis, Minn.
TALAGA, Alexander I.	Pvt	37705878	22 Sept/44	INA	Donora, Pa.
CASH, Rayno R.	Pvt	38481887	8 Sept/44	INA	New Orleans, La.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT 1944.
HQ, 111ST INF (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)</u>					
<u>COMPANY "A" (Cont'd)</u>					
TYRA, Arnold	Pfc	35267684	12 Sept/44	KIA	Hallenville, Ky.
COX, Reginaid L.	Pvt	35778575	12 Sept/44	DWA	Smithers, W. Va.
CLARK, Merland M.	Pfc	36453296	12 Sept/44	DWA	Hanover, Mich.
LINCOLN, Billy E.	Pvt	37516389	12 Sept/44	DWA	Kansas City, Kans.
HANNA, Eugene A.	Pvt	35558526	12 Sept/44	DWA	Defiance, Ohio.
MORGAN, Glenn E.	Sgt	35173646	5 Sept/44	MIA	Barberton, Ohio.
THOMPSON, John F.	Pfc	42041790	5 Sept/44	MIA	Mt. Vernon, N. Y.
COLARCO, Antonio J.	Pvt	39342857	8 Sept/44	MIA	Sacramento, Calif.
CRUMLINE, Harold B.	Pvt	33674205	9 Sept/44	MIA	Wrightsville, Pa.
CRISTIANO, Joseph A.	Pvt	42048517	9 Sept/44	MIA	New York, N. Y.
CALN, James W.	Pvt	33751468	9 Sept/44	MIA	Baltimore, Md.
CAVANAUGH, James J.	Pvt	39725478	9 Sept/44	MIA	Los Angeles, Calif.
FISHER, Delmar V.	Pfc	35770789	9 Sept/44	SWA	Yourcan, W. Va.
RUSO, Anthony	Sgt	42023903	9 Sept/44	SWA	Syracuse, N. Y.

<u>COMPANY "B"</u>					
DRYDEN, Robert L.	Pvt	35871566	29 Sept/44	MIA	Paris, Ky.
ALTRUI, Attilio A. A.	Pfc	31387341	29 Sept/44	MIA	Providence, R. I.
SCRA, Raymond E.	Pfc	16177224	29 Sept/44	MIA	Detroit, Mich.
FOUST, Carl E.	Pfc	34882604	29 Sept/44	MIA	Lake City, Ohio.
BRASHEAR, William G.	Pfc	32857151	29 Sept/44	MIA	Utica, N. Y.
ALLEN, Gene	Pfc	32850158	29 Sept/44	MIA	Malone, N. Y.
HOLLIS, Richard H.	Pfc	36877700	29 Sept/44	MIA	Lansing, Mich.
HUFFMAN, John F.	Pvt	35737408	29 Sept/44	MIA	McRobert, Ky.
FURFISH, Charles A. W.	Pvt	31421297	29 Sept/44	MIA	Yarmouth, Mass.
BRODERICK, Allan J.	Pvt	39216928	29 Sept/44	MIA	Sumner, Wash.
BARIETT, Carl C.	Pvt	38405935	29 Sept/44	MIA	Ardmore, Okla.
BATIER, Adolphus E.	Pvt	34889137	29 Sept/44	MIA	Crossville, Tenn.
Francozek, Frank	Pvt	36877589	29 Sept/44	MIA	Detroit, Mich.
HALL, Eugene H.	Pvt	37539533	29 Sept/44	MIA	Macon, Mo.
CAPECCL, Domenic	Pfc	31119945	29 Sept/44	MIA	Boston, Mass.
OLIVARES, Gustavo Z.	Pfc	38252024	29 Sept/44	DWA	Taylor, Texas.
PICKETT, Albert T. Jr.	T/Sgt	35789459	29 Sept/44	DWA	Cornith, Ky.
ESLSEN, Frederick E.	Pfc	36577210	29 Sept/44	DWA	Romulus, Mich.
DIGGS, Glen W.	Pvt	36276082	29 Sept/44	DWA	Pontiac, Mich.
DUNCAN, James T.	Pfc	37539919	29 Sept/44	MIA	Lebanon, Mo.
STRICKLAND, Herbert B	Sr Pfc	34875442	25 Sept/44	MIA	Vicksburg, Miss.
STATION, Clay E.	Pvt	35878349	25 Sept/44	DWA	Middletown, Ohio.
BUE, Clois M.	Pfc	37539923	21 Sept/44	SWA	Lebanon, Mo.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT 1944.
HQ, 11ST INF (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)</u>					
<u>COMPANY "B" (Cont'd)</u>					
BAUGH, Egmont W.	Pvt	42019717	17 Sept/44	LWA	Newark, N. J.
ELAM, Joseph V.	Sgt	35772284	17 Sept/44	LWA	Blue Stone, Ky.
WOODWARD, Elmer S.	Pfc	32555578	17 Sept/44	LWA	Baltimore, Md.
BEARE, Jack R.	Pvt	17001729	15 Sept/44	MIA	Swaleth, Minn.
BUCHAN, Stephen	Pvt	35765251	13 Sept/44	MIA	Coral, Pa.
CHURCH, Russell P.	Pfc	35772526	13 Sept/44	MIA	Slavin, Ky.
COMPTON, Joe H.	Pfc	351143538	13 Sept/44	MIA	Bluffton, Ind.
HERMAN, William I.	Pfc	12173185	13 Sept/44	MIA	Newburg, N. Y.
CAMP, Ernest E.	Pvt	34814690	13 Sept/44	MIA	Endlisy, Ala.
CLARK, Ernest L.	Pvt	20524344	13 Sept/44	MIA	Barbarville, Ky.
LA COGNATA, John E.	Pvt	36768249	13 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
CHAMBERS, William A.	Pvt	37584377	12 Sept/44	LWA	Auburn, Wash.
HENKIE, Lewis E.	Pfc	37510131	12 Sept/44	LWA	Birlington, Kans.
AGURKIS, John S.	Pfc	33603916	12 Sept/44	LWA	Wilkes Barre, Pa.
JATIEZ, Julio	Pvt	38453690	12 Sept/44	LWA	Wearning, Texas.
SIMS, Harry G.	Pvt	35807456	11 Sept/44	MIA	Lancaster, Ky.
CROWLEY, Wilber	Pvt	34812806	12 Sept/44	MIA	Kauston, Ala.
MIRACIE, Douglas	Pvt	35267718	12 Sept/44	SWA	Fineville, Ky.
HEATH, Cloyd E.	Pvt	36895574	12 Sept/44	LWA	Ithaca, Mich.
BENSBY, William R.	Pvt	35777498	12 Sept/44	LWA	Delbarton, W. Va.
BLOOMFIELD, Eugene	Pvt	35267844	12 Sept/44	LWA	Ruggles, Ky.
EDMISTON, Harmon	Pfc	35266970	11 Sept/44	LWA	McAsbrun, Ky.
HARPER, Harold P.	Pvt	33502020	12 Sept/44	LWA	Louisburg, Pa.
CHERHOLSER, Fred B.	Pvt	6860898	12 Sept/44	LWA	Charence, Iowa.
CASE, Virgil E.	Pfc	37510007	9 Sept/44	LWA	Independence, Mo.
PERI, William	Pfc	35548853	2 Sept/44	MIA	Ft. Wayne, Ind.
VAUGHT, Leonard K.	Pvt	38452315	1 Sept/44	MIA	Sheridan, Texas.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>COMPANY "C"</u>					
BUIYN, John	Pvt	42010624	30 Sept/44	MIA	Clifton, N. J.
BONAFIDE, Salvatore P.	Pvt	32597505	25 Sept/44	MIA	East Paterson, N. J.
MARTIN, James H.	Pvt	35877203	21 Sept/44	MIA	Corbin, Ky.
KANCZYNSKI, Edward A.	Pfc	36312719	21 Sept/44	MIA	Milwaukee, Wisc.
HIE, Paul F.	Pfc	36758929	21 Sept/44	MIA	Clearfield, Pa.
CLAYSON, Charles M.	S/Sgt	15059663	25 Sept/44	LWA	Rochester, N. Y.
MAYOR, Robert	Sgt	35267542	25 Sept/44	LWA	Cocoa, N. Va.
EAYS, Stanley	S/Sgt	35267254	21 Sept/44	LWA	Lest Creek, Ky.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT, 1944.
HQ, 141ST INF. (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)</u>					
<u>COMPANY "C" (Cont'd)</u>					
WILBANKS, Ernest H.	Pfc	34827481	16 Sept/44	MIA	Clarksville, Ga.
ELIE, Paul F.	Pfc	33758929	16 Sept/44	MIA	Clearfield, Pa.
STURGIS, Wilbur H.	Pfc	34631677	17 Sept/44	KIA	Crystal Springs, Miss.
REDDISH, Carl M.	Sgt	35008111	17 Sept/44	KIA	Cleveland, O.
BRINK, Robert M.	Pvt	15399573	17 Sept/44	KIA	Ashtabula, O.
MACY, Victor H.	Pvt	32958536	17 Sept/44	IWA	Wilmington, Del.
ROSENBERGER, Robert J.	Pfc	35801158	17 Sept/44	IWA	Halford, O.
DAVIS, Jesse D.	Pvt	35776624	17 Sept/44	IWA	Foca, W. Va.
MARES, Saturnino.	Sgt	38025747	17 Sept/44	IWA	San Benito, Tex.
QUINTAN, Edward A.	Pvt	32998062	17 Sept/44	IWA	Elmhurst, N. Y.
MARTIN, John J.	S/Sgt	32678242	17 Sept/44	IWA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
SMREKAR, Clarence L.	Pfc	35061401	17 Sept/44	IWA	Cleveland, O.
FOX, James R.	Pvt	33701219	17 Sept/44	IWA	Waynesburg, Pa.
KRATOCHWILL, John A.	Pvt	37581445	17 Sept/44	IWA	St. Paul, Minn.
BSTZ, Bernard G.	Pvt	36880226	11 Sept/44	MIA	Augusta, Mich.
SMITH, Paul L.	Pfc	33666871	11 Sept/44	MIA	Pittsburg, Pa.
GUNDY, Earl J.	Pvt	35283751	15 Sept/44	IWA	Etters, Pa.
KRHOE, John P.	Pfc	36876614	14 Sept/44	IWA	Detroit, Mich.
EDWARDS, James J.	Pvt	35147606	10 Sept/44	MIA	Indianapolis, Ind.
LOVE, Dean B.	Pvt	37533383	10 Sept/44	MIA	Wisdom, Mo.
DOBBS, Gordon	Pvt	36577469	12 Sept/44	IWA	Grand Rapids, Mich.
IBSHERIA, John A.	Pvt	36823714	9 Sept/44	IWA	Lake Hudson, Mich.
SUPINSKI, Joseph G.	Pfc	35060974	9 Sept/44	IWA	Paynesville, Ohio.
BURNSIDE, Roger B.	Sgt	35629795	9 Sept/44	IWA	Prava, Ohio.
LARSON, Harry E.	Pfc	37677208	9 Sept/44	IWA	Hubbard, Iowa.
BROWN, Fred E.	Sgt	35267351	9 Sept/44	IWA	Subank, Ky.
WAGNER, Clara G.	Pvt	35912454	9 Sept/44	IWA	Naracis, Ohio.
BURGH, Harry C.	Pfc	33454725	9 Sept/44	IWA	Washington, D. C.
HOSICK, Wayne L.	Pfc	37479669	9 Sept/44	IWA	Gozaad, Neb.
GILLMORE, Roy	Pfc	38450139	9 Sept/44	IWA	Truman, Ark.
SNIDOW, Harvey M.	Pfc	37525321	9 Sept/44	IWA	Trenton, Mo.
HURLBUT, Leonard E.	Pvt	31254365	9 Sept/44	IWA	St. Albans, Vt.
OSBORN, Louis D.	Pfc	35267913	9 Sept/44	IWA	Olway, Ohio.
CEDAR, Paul B.	Pvt	31374879	9 Sept/44	IWA	New Haven, Conn.
HARRISON, George B.	Sgt	35267331	9 Sept/44	IWA	Blissman, Ky.
HAMMON, Leroy C.	Pvt	33732644	9 Sept/44	IWA	Baltimore, Md.
STEVI, Tony	Pfc	32880936	9 Sept/44	IWA	New York, N. Y.
MARINO, Anthony W.	Pvt	42014664	9 Sept/44	IWA	Jersey City, N. J.
RICHARDSON, Robert	Pvt	36442426	2 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT, 1944.
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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOMECITY AND STATE</u>
<u>ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)</u>					
<u>COMPANY "D"</u>					
DEVERS, Leonard O.	Pvt	36785634	26 Sept/44	DVA	Chicago, Ill.
DIPPI, William	Pvt	20227795	24 Sept/44	DVA	Laurelton, N. Y.
STEWART, Sebert C.	Cpl	35267245	21 Sept/44	DVA	Nowlton, Ky.
ANDERSON, Belvin E.	Pfc	33525623	21 Sept/44	DVA	Amelia, Va.
CHICK, Harold M.	Pvt	42041563	17 Sept/44	DVA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
BARLOW, Thomas D., Jr.	Pvt	39145601	9 Sept/44	DVA	Sebastopol, Calif.
<u>SECOND BATTALION HEADQUARTERS COMPANY</u>					
WALKER, Vernon E.	T/Sgt	2030141	25 Sept/44	DVA	San Antonio, Texas.
STATCE, Ralph D.	Sgt	20302950	19 Sept/44	LIA	LaGuina, Texas.
BOGGS, Gerald P.	Pfc	35731835	3 Sept/44	LIA	Evansville, Ind.
<u>COMPANY "E"</u>					
DRAGOVICH, Sam E.	Pvt	33703001	29 Sept/44	DVA	Ramsburg, Pa.
DE LEON, Guillermo L.	S/Sgt	33025577	29 Sept/44	DVA	Uvalde, Texas.
CASTELLANE, William A.	Pfc	32897815	30 Sept/44	KIA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
HAGLUND, Robert E.	Pfc	31030418	30 Sept/44	KIA	No. Easton, Mass.
EFFINITE, Patsy J.	Pvt	33707847	29 Sept/44	DVA	New Castle, Pa.
MATHEIS, James J.	Pfc	32919884	29 Sept/44	DVA	Gerfield, N. J.
DARKINS, Thomas C.	Pfc	33736031	23 Sept/44	KIA	Centerville, Md.
SHAFER, Eugene V.	Sgt	35695743	25 Sept/44	DVA	Havana, Ill.
DAVIS, William G.	Pvt	35778647	24 Sept/44	DVA	Huntington, W. Va.
ARASTONE, Marvin J.	Pvt	35800773	24 Sept/44	DVA	Independence, Ky.
BROOKS, Kenneth	Pfc	33682549	21 Sept/44	DVA	Geneva, Pa.
ANDERSON, Victor H.	Pfc	31380475	21 Sept/44	DVA	Worcester, Mass.
TESSITORE, Donald E.	Pfc	32749252	21 Sept/44	DVA	Shavones, N. Y.
FOUNDER, Charles C.	Pvt	37629210	21 Sept/44	DVA	Lukon, Mo.
DOVICH, George Jr.	Pvt	33703016	21 Sept/44	DVA	Greensburg, Pa.
COEN, Joseph	Pfc	33777087	21 Sept/44	DVA	Tranton, N. J.
JAROS, John E.	Pfc	33113810	21 Sept/44	DVA	Kondode, Pa.
GRECH, Ralph E.	Pfc	35775738	11 Sept/44	KIA	Chesapeake, W. Va.
KREINER, John	Pvt	33382442	10 Sept/44	KIA	Baltimore, Md.
MORGAN, Edwin J.	Pfc	35776264	10 Sept/44	KIA	Huntington, W. Va.
GARIVAY, Louis R.	Sgt	38035682	11 Sept/44	DVA	Dallas, Texas.
HUTTS, Paul J.	Pfc	35148067	11 Sept/44	LIA	Covington, Ind.
EUGGINS, Herman C.	Pvt	34848539	10 Sept/44	DVA	Nichols, S. C.
FAULKNER, Harvin L.	Pvt	35591209	11 Sept/44	DVA	Keota, Okla.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT, 1944.
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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOMR CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>UNLISTED MEN</u>					
<u>COMPANY "E" (Cont'd)</u>					
WEBB, William E.	Pfc	34514349	10 Sept/44	IWA	Guin, Ala.
CARPER, James L.	Pfc	33048067	10 Sept/44	IWA	Cliffside, Va.
MC CAIN, Emerson B.	Pvt	39721470	8 Sept/44	IWA	San Francisco, Calif.
<u>COMPANY "F"</u>					
WOOTEN, Forest S.	Pvt	11123809	28 Sept/44	MIA	Gastonia, N. C.
CHAPPELLE, Earl J.	Pvt	36859549	29 Sept/44	MIA	Dearborn, Mich.
DZENOWSKI, Pete	Pvt	20802512	29 Sept/44	MIA	Lockhart, Texas.
COLLINS, Edwin D.	Pvt	36859405	29 Sept/44	MIA	Lansing, Mich.
THOMAS, Francis J.	Pvt	36483199	29 Sept/44	MIA	E. St. Louis, Ill.
BADOWSKI, Julius P.	Pvt	36765641	29 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
CIZAREK, Paul P.	Pfc	36285682	29 Sept/44	MIA	Milwaukee, Wisc.
MISHNER, Louis G.	Pfc	35048652	29 Sept/44	MIA	Mantua, Ohio.
SEYMANSKI, Frank J.	Pvt	35784127	29 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
DEVINE, Robin	Pvt	42062571	30 Sept/44	IWA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
GRIZZIE, McKinley B.	Pvt	35775782	30 Sept/44	IWA	Marcel, Ky.
LYNN, Edward J.	S/Sgt	32911121	30 Sept/44	IWA	Bloomfield, N. J.
AIKEN, Howard M.	Pfc	35295232	25 Sept/44	MIA	Cambridge, O.
WEIDNER, Raymond T.	S/Sgt	33621696	25 Sept/44	MIA	Oley, Pa.
BROWN, Wilfred L.	1st Sgt	6895869	25 Sept/44	SWA	Syracuse, N. Y.
WALANGA, Edward J.	Pvt	36695803	25 Sept/44	IWA	Chicago, Ill.
WILLIAMS, Gilbert T.	S/Sgt	16054284	25 Sept/44	IWA	Princetonville, Ill.
RICH, Paul J. Jr.	Pvt	35294347	25 Sept/44	IWA	Toledo, Ohio.
SPRARS, Iain F.	Pvt	34875538	25 Sept/44	IWA	Philadelphia, Pa.
THEONIC, Joseph T.	T/Sgt	33230565	23 Sept/44	IWA	Steelton, Pa.
HOLLADAY, William A.	Pvt	35878116	23 Sept/44	IWA	Burlington, Ky.
DIETER, Martin W.	S/Sgt	32633611	23 Sept/44	IWA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
KETTMAN, John M.	Pfc	36690625	23 Sept/44	IWA	Streeter, Ill.
WOOTEN, Forest S.	Pvt	11123809	21 Sept/44	MIA	Gastonia, N. C.
LEWISTREET, Edward	Pvt	35919315	13 Sept/44	IWA	CLEVELAND, OHIO.
DIERNIS, Julius G.	Pfc	33703068	13 Sept/44	IWA	W. Moreland City, Pa.
GOODMAN, Howard	Pvt	34884738	13 Sept/44	IWA	Marriestown, Tenn.
<u>COMPANY "G"</u>					
MASTERMONICO, Frank A.	Pfc	33425747	29 Sept/44	MIA	Pittsburg, Pa.
COPPOLA, Modestino S.	Pvt	42016616	29 Sept/44	MIA	Newark, N. J.
SMITH, James R.	Pvt	35651193	28 Sept/44	MIA	Rush, Ky.
REED, Charlie M.	Pvt	34813258	30 Sept/44	MIA	Tuscom, Ala.
BRANDT, Theodore O.	Pvt	36834718	29 Sept/44	MIA	Baltimore, Md.

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RE, 11ST INF. (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HQS CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)</u>					
<u>COMPANY "G" (Cont'd)</u>					
GARY, Michael P.	Pfc	35876769	29 Sept/44	SWA	Detroit, Mich.
LUND, Harry W.	S/Sgt	36648301	29 Sept/44	DNA	Rockford, Ill.
BRISON, John B., Jr.	S/Sgt	34607100	29 Sept/44	DNA	Gastonia, N. C.
BIEVINS, Fressie H.	Pfc	35772808	29 Sept/44	DNA	Safia, N. Va.
CORRY, John A.	Pvt	12226602	29 Sept/44	LNA	New York, N. Y.
HICKENBOTTOM, Frank B.	Pvt	33574110	29 Sept/44	LNA	Myers, Pa.
SAVINO, Angelo J.	Cpl	32612576	29 Sept/44	DNA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
CHAPMAN, Clarence F.	Pvt	35778513	29 Sept/44	DNA	Pt. Pleasant, W. Va.
MILLER, Barry J.	Pvt	32943250	29 Sept/44	LIA	New York, N. Y.
MANGIS, John J.	Pvt	32955990	29 Sept/44	LIA	Trenton, N. J.
SHAFFER, Gordon R.	Pvt	33576380	25 Sept/44	MIA	Lockhaven, Pa.
GENAW, Eugene M.	Pvt	36878411	25 Sept/44	MIA	Port Huron, Mich.
SPIEGEL, Abraham	S/Sgt	32995093	13 Sept/44	DNA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
CIANCIMINO, Anthony J.	Pvt	42047186	13 Sept/44	DNA	Myack, N. Y.
LITTELL, Eugene J.	Pvt	39216595	13 Sept/44	DNA	San Diego, Calif.
WILSON, Kenneth B.	Pvt	35767224	13 Sept/44	DNA	Litchfield, Ill.
VAISTROM, Harold L.	Pvt	39282470	13 Sept/44	DNA	Encanta, Calif.
CASCIO, Joseph R.	Pvt	35829428	13 Sept/44	LIA	Milwaukee, Wisc.
<u>COMPANY "H"</u>					
DEILA GALIA, Vincent J.	Pfc	3222430	22 Sept/44	DNA	Bronx, N. Y.
ERRICO, Patsy W.	Sgt	32633522	25 Sept/44	MIA	Mt. Vernon, N. Y.
WATTS, Lewis A., Jr.	Pvt	35642241	25 Sept/44	SWA	Norfolk, Va.
DONATI, John P.	Pvt	31445105	25 Sept/44	DNA	Pawtucket, R. I.
HART, Fred H.	Pvt	35702302	25 Sept/44	LIA	Pittsburg, Pa.
SCHICKLER, Frank J.	1st Sgt	15073107	23 Sept/44	DNA	Baltimore, Md.
BEDFORD, William R.	Pfc	33465659	23 Sept/44	DNA	Kremlin, Pa.
BETSILL, Douglas R.	S/Sgt	33025470	22 Sept/44	DNA	Dade, Texas.
DE RIET, Everett L.	S/Sgt	36545228	13 Sept/44	MIA	Detroit, Mich.
ROUSH, William H.	Pvt	35758873	13 Sept/44	SWA	Charleston, W. Va.
CAMELLINO, Dominic M.	Pvt	36612032	13 Sept/44	DNA	Roundout, Ill.
CAFAGNO, Nicholas A.	Pvt	39770424	13 Sept/44	LIA	Los Angeles, Calif.
EASTERLY, Charles J. Jr.	S/Sgt	34545352	10 Sept/44	LIA	LaBelle, Fla.
<u>THIRD BATTALION HEADQUARTERS COMPANY</u>					
BROWN, Aronis	Pfc	32222251	30 Sept/44	MIA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
HINDS, Cornelius J.	Pvt	33431156	30 Sept/44	LNA	Pittsburg, Pa.
KOTTING, August	Pfc	3221653	30 Sept/44	DNA	Astoria, N. Y.

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOM. CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)</u>					
<u>THIRD BATTALION HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (Cont'd)</u>					
ANDREWS, Raymond H.	Pfc	20803324	30 Sept/44	MIA	Gonzales, Texas.
KINISBY, James E.	Tec 5	35023540	30 Sept/44	MIA	Wocaster, Ohio.
PICRIO, Samuel J.	Pvt	32222404	29 Sept/44	MIA	Bronx, N. Y.
BISBY, William S.	Sgt	32221452	27 Sept/44	MIA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
DE LOS SANTOS, Candido	T/Sgt	38936354	23 Sept/44	MIA	Eastland, Texas.
ALLENBERGER, Thomas P.	Pvt	32221491	22 Sept/44	MIA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
AMERY, Eugene J.	Pvt	15502111	21 Sept/44	MIA	Toldeo, G.
WEEK, James B.	S/Sgt	34515865	22 Sept/44	MIA	Marcusfield, N. C.
DUKE, Albert P.	Sgt	34521171	22 Sept/44	MIA	Greenlane, Pa.
WATSON, Tenly D.	Cpl	37525199	13 Sept/44	MIA	Grant Bend, Kans.

COMPANY "1"

ANDERSON, James B.	Pvt	31885048	30 Sept/44	MIA	Delano, G.
SEBASTIAN, Kenneth A.	Pvt	32904668	28 Sept/44	MIA	Long Island, N. Y.
ANDERSON, Edward A.	Pfc	31307911	28 Sept/44	MIA	East Boston, Mass
ANDERSON, Joseph A.	Pfc	32911492	28 Sept/44	MIA	Backensack, E. J.
ANDERSON, Ernest E.	Pfc	32755830	27 Sept/44	MIA	B. Beach, N. J.
ANDERSON, Robert W.	Pvt	31575097	27 Sept/44	MIA	Hamford, Conn.
ANDERSON, Allen J.	Pvt	33650001	27 Sept/44	MIA	Buchanan, Va.
ANDERSON, Frank L.	Pfc	14129463	27 Sept/44	MIA	Mccon, Gr.
ANDERSON, Walter J.	Sgt	33698157	27 Sept/44	MIA	Poland Mines, Pa.
ANDERSON, Arthur C.	Pvt	36761395	28 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
ANDERSON, Robert H.	Pvt	36774758	28 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
ANDERSON, William E.	Pvt	35226616	27 Sept/44	MIA	Columbus, O.
ANDERSON, John J.	Pfc	32919461	21 Sept/44	MIA	Elizabeth, N. J.
ANDERSON, Frank E.	Pvt	39721008	21 Sept/44	MIA	Hunting Beach, Calif.
ANDERSON, Clifford Jr.	Pvt	33945110	21 Sept/44	MIA	Brook, Va.
ANDERSON, Herbert E.	Pvt	39216401	21 Sept/44	MIA	Tacoma, Wash.
ANDERSON, Louis W.	Pvt	39145332	22 Sept/44	MIA	Barckleburg, Calif.
ANDERSON, Harry	Pvt	36530910	21 Sept/44	MIA	Matcon, Ill.
ANDERSON, Harold P.	Pvt	32461077	21 Sept/44	MIA	New York, N. Y.
ANDERSON, Walter J.	Pvt	36684737	21 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
ANDERSON, Leonard C.	Pfc	36587240	21 Sept/44	MIA	Detroit, Mich.
ANDERSON, Mike M.	Sgt	39548715	21 Sept/44	MIA	Los Angeles, Calif.
ANDERSON, John C.	S/Sgt	37526746	21 Sept/44	MIA	Urica, Kans.
ANDERSON, Leo J.	S/Sgt	31268906	21 Sept/44	MIA	Berlin, N. H.
ANDERSON, Louis	Sgt	35603550	21 Sept/44	MIA	Sayuga Falls, O.
ANDERSON, Charles R.	Pfc	39909824	21 Sept/44	MIA	Footello, Idaho.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT, 1944
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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)</u>					
<u>COMPANY "I" (Cont'd)</u>					
MOORE, George C.	Pfc	56612331	21 Sept/44	MIA	Lawrenceville, Ill.
RUBER, Charles E.	Pfc	13150995	21 Sept/44	MIA	Philadelphia, Pa.
WILEY, Raymond L.	Pfc	55700979	21 Sept/44	MIA	Glasgow, Ky.
DAMEIS, Ernest I.	Pvt	56783103	21 Sept/44	MIA	Pocahontas, Ill.
FITZGERAD, St. Elmo	Pvt	54238650	21 Sept/44	MIA	Nashville, Tenn.
FOKINS, Rex E.	Pvt	55895145	21 Sept/44	MIA	Indianapolis, Ind.
KERNEY, Alfred L.	Pvt	55661126	21 Sept/44	MIA	Harrisburg, Va.
KRAUS, Joseph F. Jr.	Pvt	42015310	21 Sept/44	MIA	Passaic, N. J.
FRAUSE, Earl E.	Pvt	56699394	21 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
KURN, Edward W.	Pvt	52935651	21 Sept/44	MIA	Rochester, N. Y.
PURDY, Wallace R.	Pvt	31331994	21 Sept/44	MIA	Stamford, Conn.
MILNER, Gilbert L.	Pfc	55048624	21 Sept/44	MIA	Kadisho, O.
DE CORE, Andrew	Pvt	56750903	21 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
GRIEL, Lawrence W.	S/Sgt	42021491	21 Sept/44	MIA	Buffalo, N. Y.
KOVACH, James	Pvt	35219640	21 Sept/44	MIA	Barton, O.
EMBERG, Arthur F.	Pvt	32776967	21 Sept/44	MIA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
CRANFORD, Elmer	Sgt	35765530	21 Sept/44	MIA	Columbus, O.
IESHER, Gerald W.	Pfc	15177432	22 Sept/44	MIA	Shippensburg, Pa.
TEURMAN, Lester R. E.	S/Sgt	34498935	13 Sept/44	MIA	Kron, Ohio.
LUCHE, Manuel	Pvt	11151448	12 Sept/44	MIA	New Bedford, Mass.
BACAN, Joan F.	Pvt	39533239	12 Sept/44	MIA	Portland, Ore.
WYKES, Joseph A.	Pfc	52911482	12 Sept/44	MIA	Madison, N. J.
HILL, Lawrence E.	Pvt	37033041	12 Sept/44	MIA	Lincoln, Neb.
BARRETT, William G.	Pfc	31370759	12 Sept/44	MIA	Dodham, Mass.
EDGEMORTH, Thomas G.	Pfc	56655867	12 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
WARE, James T.	Pfc	34631544	12 Sept/44	MIA	Madison, Miss.
MORRISSEY, Richard G.	Pvt	51405632	12 Sept/44	MIA	Stamford, Conn.
HENRY, Earl D.	Pvt	37540571	11 Sept/44	MIA	Madison, Ohio.
<u>COMPANY "I" (Cont'd)</u>					
<u>COMPANY "K"</u>					
LIBERIO, Joseph C.	Pfc	56680595	30 Sept/44	MIA	Chicago, Ill.
MACSCHNE, Burr	Pfc	52939306	30 Sept/44	MIA	Pomfret, N. Y.
MACOWIC, Joseph A.	Pvt	33149447	28 Sept/44	MIA	JOHNSTOWN, Pa.
RUSSELL, Walter H.	Pfc	56977424	22 Sept/44	MIA	DETROIT, Mich.
GARDNER, William X.	Pfc	34700908	22 Sept/44	MIA	Butler, Pa.
FISHER, Earl	S/Sgt	35641263	21 Sept/44	MIA	Simonsville, W. Va.
TORTOGTO, Louis J.	Pvt	33524001	21 Sept/44	MIA	Philadelphia, Pa.
CHAPY, Robert M.	Pfc	44009445	19 Sept/44	MIA	Smy, N. C.
TALBENT, James S.	Sgt	34577174	13 Sept/44	MIA	Dicktown, Ohio.

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NAME	RANK	ASN	DATE OF CASUALTY	TYPE OF CASUALTY	HOMECITY AND STATE
ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)					
COMPANY "K" (Cont'd)					
BLACKWELL, James F.	Pvt	35052218	13 Sept/44	SWA	Bogalusa, La.
LA GATTUTA, Vito	Pfc	32637470	13 Sept/44	SWA	Bronx, N. Y.
GIDIC, Steve	Pvt	6360018	13 Sept/44	INA	Joliet, Ill.
MC LAUGHEY, Roy H.	Pvt	36778711	13 Sept/44	INA	Chicago, Ill.
GORR, William P.	Pvt	39922708	13 Sept/44	INA	Ogden, Utah.
PHILLIPS, Robert F.	Pfc	34423547	13 Sept/44	INA	Waukegan, Mich.
SCOTTI, Alfred M.	Sgt	32973190	13 Sept/44	INA	Rockville Center, N. Y.
WOLTMAN, John P. Jr.	Pfc	35549531	13 Sept/44	INA	So Bend, Ind.
TUHERT, Irtle B.	Pfc	34037537	13 Sept/44	INA	Elkin, N. C.
GARNER, Alfred E.	Pvt	35546299	9 Sept/44	MIA	Jeffress, Va.
JONES, Milton J.	Pvt	34818557	9 Sept/44	MIA	Haleyville, Ala.
AERASIM, Joseph H.	Pvt	33610815	9 Sept/44	INA	Dickson, Pa.
FERRARI, Dominic D.	Sgt	32343775	2 Sept/44	LIA	Bronx, N. Y.
COMPANY "L"					
CARTER, Warren L.	Pfc	34631010	30 Sept/44	INA	Bisbol, Miss.
MURRAY, Alvie	Pfc	3428925	30 Sept/44	INA	Cranford, Tenn.
DAITON, Arthur W.	Pvt	34897903	26 Sept/44	MIA	Black Mountain, N. C.
GERATHOUSE, Charles Jr.	Pfc	35758156	28 Sept/44	SWA	Zoar, W. Va.
VOITNER, Charles J.	Pvt	36247392	28 Sept/44	INA	Cudahy, Wisc.
GOSIE, Thaddeus W.	Pfc	36875295	28 Sept/44	INA	Hamtrach, Mich.
CROSS, Jasper C.	Pvt	34921032	27 Sept/44	LIA	Bluff City, O.
SADLER, Robert A.	Pfc	31353264	23 Sept/44	MIA	Lynn, Mass.
CLINTON, James S.	Pfc	32008876	22 Sept/44	MIA	Bronx, N. Y.
HARKERD, Elmer W.	Pfc	35173704	22 Sept/44	MIA	Girard, O.
BEATTY, Clay A.	S/Sgt	37472569	22 Sept/44	INA	Greeley, Iowa.
PHILLIPS, Roy W.	Pfc	34714634	22 Sept/44	INA	Nashville, Tenn.
WILLERT, Eldon B.	Pfc	34478559	22 Sept/44	INA	Lincoln, Ill.
JONES, Gordon L.	Pvt	37706905	22 Sept/44	INA	Denver, Colo.
FISCHETTI, John P.	Pfc	32906506	13 Sept/44	INA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
GOEY, Clifton C.	Pvt	35900423	11 Sept/44	SWA	Bombay, Ind.
GAINES, Odell	Pvt	36589441	12 Sept/44	INA	Hominy, Okla.
KATHOG, Harry	Pvt	34796618	12 Sept/44	INA	Hamden, Conn.
GUNNELS, James A.	Pvt	34831069	12 Sept/44	INA	Dorsey House, Ga.
BIUM, Forbert	Pfc	32009321	12 Sept/44	INA	Yonkers, N. Y.
JACKSON, Earl E.	Pvt	39925268	8 Sept/44	MIA	Ogden, Utah.
LOWIE, J. C.	Pvt	38039205	8 Sept/44	MIA	Gainesville, Texas.
SICAN, Devitt T.	Pvt	34614606	8 Sept/44	MIA	Geneva, Ala.
MORCE, James E.	Pfc	33554234	8 Sept/44	MIA	Fairmont, W. Va.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT, 1944
Co. 1st Inf (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>HOME CITY AND STATE</u>
<u>ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)</u>					
<u>COMPANY "L" (Cont'd)</u>					
BREYER, Arvel R.	Pvt	37629838	8 Sept/44	SWA	Hannibal, Mo.
BLAFIELD, Richard W.	Pvt	42071975	2 Sept/44	SWA	Port Richmond, N. Y.
TASSET, Edward F. Jr	Pfc	37703439	8 Sept/44	SWA	Denver, Colo.
DUNHAM, Howard O.	Pvt	35778745	8 Sept/44	LTA	Blakely, W. Va.
MAIRKRE, Clarence W.	Pvt	34819700	8 Sept/44	LTA	Birmingham, Ala.
INGALLS, Lyndon W.	Pvt	33613585	8 Sept/44	LTA	Dickson, Pa.
ORRISON, John D.	Pvt	16040412	8 Sept/44	LTA	Centralia, Ill.
NEEDS, Wilford B.	Pvt	32980359	8 Sept/44	LTA	New York, N. Y.
KAHKE, Donald L.	Pvt	36785114	8 Sept/44	LTA	Los Angeles, Calif.
MOSES, Graydon F.	Pvt	31291837	8 Sept/44	LTA	Attleboro, Mass.
BARZELIS, Stanley F.	Pvt	31252302	8 Sept/44	LTA	Hartford, Conn.
MARTINEZ, Cesario	S/Sgt	38065525	8 Sept/44	LTA	Somora, Texas.
CARTWRIGHT, Tommy J.	Sgt	38112629	8 Sept/44	LTA	Drumright, Okla.
HALL, William L.	T/Sgt	38076316	8 Sept/44	LTA	Iowapark, Texas.
CZERCZ, Joseph C.	Sgt	35619437	8 Sept/44	LTA	Lonsdale, Pa.
MILLER, Lewis W.	Sgt	35091240	5 Sept/44	LTA	Indianapolis, Ind.
<u>COMPANY "M"</u>					
COLLINS, Leonard J.	Pfc	34580235	30 Sept/44	SIA	Denville, Ala.
NEWMAN, Roy G.	Cpl	20803795	30 Sept/44	SIA	San Benito, Texas.
ANDERSON, Frank C.	Pvt	42082039	27 Sept/44	LTA	Holloway, Terrace, Del.
CALI, Robert E.	Pvt	35763451	21 Sept/44	LTA	Wairton, W. Va.
BERRYMAN, Gilbert	Pvt	35871545	22 Sept/44	LTA	Mt. Sterling, Ky.
BOYD, Carlos H.	Pvt	35726544	22 Sept/44	SWA	Madisonville, Ky.
DORISH, Charles W.	Pvt	33345770	21 Sept/44	SWA	Pringle, Pa.
RIENDEAU, Emile J.	Pvt	31145151	22 Sept/44	LTA	Woonsocket, R. I.
DORISH, Charles W.	Pvt	33345770	13 Sept/44	LTA	Pringle, Pa.
WATSON, Charles C.	Cpl	3222796	12 Sept/44	SWA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
KEEMS, Earl J.	Pfc	36762497	13 Sept/44	LTA	Chicago, Ill.
BEAN, Harry F.	Pfc	33610478	13 Sept/44	LTA	Hoxon, Pa.
DULANEY, Doss A.	S/Sgt	20803750	17 Sept/44	LTA	Harlingen, Texas.
ERENSA, Peter	Sgt	32131672	13 Sept/44	LTA	Yonkers, N. Y.
YOUNG, Samuel L.	S/Sgt	20803739	12 Sept/44	LTA	San Benito, Texas.
BYOWITZ, Ira	Pvt	32885521	12 Sept/44	LTA	Brooklyn, N. Y.
AUT, Howard P.	Cpl	37703046	12 Sept/44	LTA	Denver, Colo.
CORRIL, James O.	Sgt	35173952	9 Sept/44	LTA	Strasburg, Ohio.

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT, 1944
EC, 11ST INF (Cont'd)

CONSOLIDATED CASUALTY REPORT

<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	2	31	33
DDM	0	0	0
LIA	2	16	18
SIA	0	3	3
DIA	0	0	0
IFA	10	222	232
SFA	3	22	25
MIA	6	115	121
POW	0	0	0
 TOTALS	 23	 409	 432

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HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO # 36 - U.S. ARMY

27 September 1944

SUBJECT : Commendation

TO : Clyde E. Steele, Colonel, Commanding Officer, 141st
Infantry Regiment, 36th Inf Div, APO # 36, U.S. Army.

1. The crossing of the Moselle River on 21 September 1944 by the 141st Infantry was a splendid accomplishment. I am particularly desirous that the officers and enlisted men of your regiment know that their efforts, which involved a great deal of hardship and danger in crossing the formidable obstacle of the Moselle River in the darkness by wading, secured for us a bridgehead which made it possible for this division to be the first of the Corps to cross.

2. We completely out-witted the enemy who had expected to be able to make a stand on the river. I would appreciate it if you would make sure that all ranks of your regiment are told of the fact that their efforts contributed so much to this specific operation.

/s/ John E. Dahquist

JOHN E. DAHQWIST
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

1st Ind.

CES:rwv

Hq, 141st Inf, APO 36, U. S. Army, 30 September 1944

To: All Units, 141st Infantry

1. I am extremely proud to pass on this commendation of the Division Commander to all officers and men who participated in this operation, in recognition of their splendid execution of this difficult task.

HEADQUARTERS, 11037 INDIAN
AVENUE 36, U. S. ARMY

21 October 1971

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS TO MEMBERS OF THE U.S. ARMY PUBLISHED TO GENERAL ORDERS
DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1944.

NAME	RANK	ASN	GRST	BSF	ARMED OR SILVER STAR	DATE OF DEED	GO NO.	GO DATE	ISSUED BY
BEGANSKI, Roy W.	1st Lt	O-1306530	2nd Dn	Hq Co	Chicago, Ill.	1 June/44	365	20 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
BURCH, Edward R.	2nd Lt	O-1294428	Co Wp	Auburn, Calif.		9 Sept/43	241	16 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
BURKE, Richard	Cpl	37450781	Regt 1	Hq Co	St. James, Minn.	30 Aug/44	365	30 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
BEANE, Irv, James I.	Pvt	13156524	Regt 1	Hq Co	Franklin, Va.	30 Aug/44	365	30 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
CHAMBERS, Robert	Pfc	17067757	Co Wp			31 May/44	352	19 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
COULTER, Robert L.	S/Sgt	365734183	Co Wp	Glenwood Springs, Colo		28 May/44	352	19 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
KALINOFF, Charles G.	Pfc	36579559	Co Wp	Litherville, Ill.		31 May/44	352	19 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
WISD, Preston R.	Pfc	36579522	Co Wp	Detroit, Mich.		3 June/44	352	19 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
WIDMANN, Raymond W.	Sgt	33624695	Co Wp	Readville, Pa.		28 May/44	341	16 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
KOSIEN, Joseph	Pfc	36877051	Co Wp	Oley, Pa.		13 June/44	341	16 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
MAKYNAS, Walter F.	Pvt	35744301	Regt 1	Hq Co	Detroit, Mich.	28 May/44	341	16 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
MURFELL, Sterling D.	Pvt	20803704	Regt 1	Hq Co	Wheeling, W. Va.	1 June/44	340	15 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div

BOARD OF OAK LEAF OLIVE IN THE OF END SIVER SPAR

MC GOW, Marie A.			
Jan 5	33195179	C-1 Bn Hq Co Carlyle, Pa.	27 May /44
		<u>AWARD OF BRONZE STAR MEDAL.</u>	
Sub, Russell D. Linn, Walter J.			
Pvt Pvt	36876703 3319503	Co "A" Plymouth, Mich.	11 June /44
			564
			30 Oct /44
			NO 244
			Inf Div

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1st Ind - (Commendation Hq 36th Inf Div) - 27 Sept 44 (Cont'd):

2. You have demonstrated the Esprit de Corps and teamwork that will surmount all difficulties.

3. I feel myself very fortunate to have been associated with you in this achievement, and trust that continued success will crown our efforts.

4. I thank each and everyone of you for your personal contribution.



C. E. STANGLE
Colonel, 141st Inf.
COMMANDING

SECRET

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS TO MEMBERS OF THE DIST INFANTRY, PUBLISHED IN GENERAL ORDERS DURING THE MONTH OF SEP/44. (Cont'd)

NAME	RANK	ASST	ORGN	COF	DATE OF DEED	GO NO.	GO DATE	ISSUED BY
AWARD OF BRONZE STAR MEDAL (Cont'd)								
FOARD, Herbert W.	Pvt	33390073	Co "H"	Baltimore, Md.	26 May /44	344	30 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
MC GOWAN, Douglas S.	Pfc	34642001	Co "H"	Columbia, S. C.	23 May /44	350	26 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
TRACHT, Joseph T.	T/Sgt	35230655	Co "H"	Shelton, Pa.	16 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
LAWRENCE, Albridge E.	T/Sgt	20002709	Co "H"	San Benito, Texas.	1 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
STRUBER, William F.	S/Sgt	31147402	Co "H"	Shelton, Conn.	3 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
BIERS, P. C. (JO)	S/Sgt	7083765	Co "H"	Chicomauga, N. C.	10 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
MARTIN, Anthony E.	S/Sgt	32222000	Co "H"	Brooklyn, N. Y.	28 May /44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
PENDERGRASS, Charles E.	Sgt	20803798	Co "H"	San Benito, Texas.	1 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
SIMONS, Cecil L.	Sgt	33651245	Co "H"	Norfolk, Va.	17 Feb /44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
LEBKA, Cecil L.	Pfc	35143331	Co "H"	Cassins, Ind.	28 May /44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
DOVER, Jonathan L.	Pfc	36482681	Co "H"	Penlo, Ill.	11 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
MALBERT, Arthur G.	Pfc	35770794	Co "H"	Red House, W. Va.	26 May /44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
DYE, James W.	Pfc	34713049	Co "H"	Elora, Tenn.	26 May /44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
CRISP, Porter C.	Pfc	34431163	Co "H"	Steasock, N. C.	28 May /44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
HILL, James E.	Pfc	34972309	Co "H"	Port Gibson, Miss.	4 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
WYNN, Julius E.	Pfc	34619729	Co "H"	Camden, S. C.	3 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
PERRAULT, Malcolm L.	S/Sgt	1425282	2nd Bn	Hq Co Washington, D. C.	10 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
WHITEN, Thomas M.	S/Sgt	34650617	Co "H"	Houston, Texas.	28 May /44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
KOPPE, Fred	Pfc	37481109	Co "H"	Richland, Mo.	28 May /44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
TAYLOR, William H.	Pvt	20802664	Co "H"	Kellam, Texas.	28 May /44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
KEFFERNAN, Frank J.	S/Sgt	6853224	Co "H"	Philadelphia, Pa.	1 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
MURSON, Dudley W.	S/Sgt	34606137	Co "H"	Newton, N. C.	1 June/44	346	17 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
AWARD OF OAK LEAF CLUSTER IN LIEU OF 2ND BRONZE STAR MEDAL								
JANORA, Gerald	Col	32342841	2nd Bn	Hq Co Brooklyn, N. Y.	2 June/44	340	26 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
TAYLOR, George H.	S/Sgt	33272732	2nd Bn	Hq Co Spotswood, Va.	2 June/44	345	9 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div
CHAPMAN, Aaron K.	Pvt	34034902	2nd Bn	Hq Co Dallas, Texas.	2 June/44	345	9 Sept/44	Hq 36th Inf Div

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NAME	RANK	DATE	REMARKS
AND			

AWARDS AND DESIGNATIONS TO MEMBERS OF THE U.S. ARMY, PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL GAZETTES SINCE THE BIRTH OF THE U.S. ARMY (CONT'D)

NAME	RANK	ASN	ORGR	REF	DATE OF DEPT	GO NO.	GO DATE	ISSUED BY
PAUL, Monroe S.	Sgt	2120/8664	Co "H"	Simpleville, S. D.	21 Jan /14	375	25 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
POWELL, Herman	Pvt	2150/1280	1st Bn Hq Co	Raytown, Ala.	24 May /14	371	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
CONSTOCK, James A.	Pvt	3251/0664	1st Bn Hq Co	Brookrock, Pa.	21 May /14	371	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
COCHRAN, Domenick J.	Pvt	4203/6141	1st Bn Hq Co	Brooklyn, N. Y.	21 May /14	371	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
HERZOG, Harold H.	Tro 5	2519/278	1st Bn Hq Co	Six Lakes, Mich.	21 May /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
MCW, Leonard J.	Pvt	3405/6199	1st Bn Hq Co	Edwardsville, Pa.	21 May /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
KATZEL, Wilbert W.	Pvt	3576/0503	1st Bn Hq Co	Farmington, N. Y.	21 May /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WINTON, George R.	Pvt	3265/2457	1st Bn Hq Co	Dayville, N. Y.	21 May /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WICKSON, Fred	Pvt	3429/2680	1st Bn Hq Co	Malwaukee, Wisc.	21 May /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
HARR, Kenneth H.	Pvt	3520/2918	1st Bn Hq Co	Holidays Cove, N. Y.	21 May /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WAGGALL, William A.	Pvt	3766/2916	1st Bn Hq Co	Jaymouth, Ia.	21 May /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WILLIAMS, Hubert	Pvt	2001/0319	3rd Bn Hq Co	Laford, Texas.	9 Sept /13	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
PHILLIPS, Willie H.	Pvt	3803/1153	3rd Bn Hq Co	McKinney, Texas.	9 Sept /13	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
TRAVIS, William C.	Pvt	3924/4033	3rd Bn Hq Co	W. W. Davisville, N. Y.	9 Sept /13	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WENTON, Roy G.	Cpl	2992/2095	Co "H"	San Benito, Texas.	1 Nov /13	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WENSTAY, John D.	Cpl	1509/2065	Co "H"	Huddlesboro, Ky.	9 Sept /13	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WAT, Cleo W.	Tro 5	3003/3076	Regt Hq Co	Pickwick, Texas.	21 May /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WILCOX, Donald W.	Pvt	3634/1160	Co "H"	Chicago, Ill.	10 Jan /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WILSON, Kenneth	Pvt	3687/3960	Co "H"	Benton Harbor, Mich.	26 May /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WATKINS, Ben	Pvt	3726/8067	2nd Bn Hq Co	Pikeville, Ky.	2 June /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div
WALKER, Nellie D.	Pvt	3917/5510	2nd Bn Hq Co	Marshall, Arkan.	3 June /14	370	19 Sept /14	Hq 36th Inf Div

S E C R E T

MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT 1944 TO 30 SEPT, 1944
HQ, 141ST INF (Cent'd)

COMMANDING OFFICERS OF UNITS OF THE 141ST INFANTRY FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT 1944 TO 30 SEPT/44.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>PERIOD TO</u>
STEARNS, C. E.	Colonel	0-16159	Regt1 Sq	1 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
GOMD, Edwin P.	Capt	0-36604	Regt1 Sq Co	1 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
BOSS, Harry E.	1st Lt	0-1258010	Anti-Tank Co	1 Sept/44	8 Sept/44
TESOR, Phillip A.	1st Lt	0-1299963	Anti-Tank Co	9 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
ALBERSING, Leroy W.	1st Lt	0-1291398	Cannon Co	1 Sept/44	1 Sept/44
O'HEARY, Michael A.	Capt	0-1291505	Cannon Co	2 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
COMBES, Gregory A.	Capt	0-1289049	Service Co	1 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
PARSONS, William W.	Major	0-404773	Medical Det	1 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
BIRD, William A.	Lt Col	0-280648	1st Bn Hq	1 Sept/44	12 Sept/44
AMICK, Elliott W.	Lt Col	0-21153	1st Bn Hq	13 Sept/44	12 Sept/44
STICHLER, Victor B.	Lt Col	0-20795	1st Bn Hq	19 Sept/44	27 Sept/44
ROSCOE, Claude D.	Capt	0-367264	1st Bn Hq	28 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
DAUGHERTY, Ashburn J. Jr.	1st Lt	0-1296355	Company "A"	1 Sept/44	22 Sept/44
HUGHES, Martin J. Jr.	2nd Lt	0-1030984	Company "A"	25 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
STROM, Carl J.	1st Lt	0-1317576	Company "B"	1 Sept/44	27 Sept/44
WATKINS, Alfred E.	Capt	0-386764	Company "B"	28 Sept/44	28 Sept/44
HUBERT, Harry G., Jr.	1st Lt	0-1031564	Company "B"	29 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
EVERETT, William E.	1st Lt	0-1316736	Company "C"	1 Sept/44	6 Sept/44
MEIER, Bernhard J.	1st Lt	0-378498	Company "C"	7 Sept/44	23 Sept/44
HANKINS, William A., Jr.	Capt	0-1303883	Company "C"	29 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
HANKINS, William A., Jr.	Capt	0-1303883	Company "D"	1 Sept/44	25 Sept/44
HAYNES, Chester E.	1st Lt	0-1308640	Company "D"	29 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
CRITCHFIELD, James H.	Lt Col	0-22656	2nd Bn Hq	1 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
KERRIN, Walter J.	1st Lt	0-163930	2nd Bn Hq Co	1 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
PARKER, Reuben D.	1st Lt	0-1295635	Company "E"	1 Sept/44	30 Sept/44
HOUGH, Parkhurst E.	Capt	0-1288056	Company "F"	1 Sept/44	14 Sept/44
SCHNEIDER, Edwin E.	1st Lt	0-1030714	Company "F"	15 Sept/44	23 Sept/44
MC PADDEN, Billy C.	1st Lt	0-1513276	Company "F"	24 Sept/44	30 Sept/44

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MONTHLY REPORT OF BATTLE CASUALTIES--REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT, 1944
Hq, 11ST INF (Cont'd)

COMMANDING OFFICERS OF UNITS OF THE 11ST INFANTRY FOR THE PERIOD 1 SEPT THRU 30 SEPT/44 (Cont'd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u> <u>FROM</u> <u>TO</u>
SCHROEDER, Donald T.	1st Lt	O-1287073	Company "F"	1 Sept/44 30 Sept/44
DAVIS, James F.	Capt	O-306423	Company "H"	1 Sept/44 30 Sept/44
MITT, Herbert B.	Major	O-404168	3rd Bn Hq	1 Sept/44 3 Sept/44
HARRIS, Earmit R.	Major	O-379451	3rd Bn Hq	4 Sept/44 21 Sept/44
DAVEY, Robert L.	Capt	O-1288017	3rd Bn Hq	22 Sept/44 30 Sept/44
GALVIN, Robert J.	Capt	O-322175	3rd Bn Hq Co	1 Sept/44 30 Sept/44
SEITZLES, Roy F.	Capt	O-1300225	Company "I"	1 Sept/44 14 Sept/44
ADAMS, William H.	1st Lt	O-422159	Company "I"	15 Sept/44 28 Sept/44
SARFORD, Eugene	2nd Lt	O-2055058	Company "I"	29 Sept/44 30 Sept/44
BOED, Stanley K.	1st Lt	O-377878	Company "K"	1 Sept/44 30 Sept/44
WILLIAMS, Joseph W.	1st Lt	O-1307905	Company "L"	1 Sept/44 30 Sept/44
ABBOTT, Abbott D.	1st Lt	O-1309153	Company "M"	1 Sept/44 22 Sept/44
HANENMEISTER, Louis J.	1st Lt	O-1287003	Company "M"	23 Sept/44 30 Sept/44

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Headquarters 141st R.C.T.

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CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: **CANCELLED**
 BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
 DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

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HEADQUARTERS 141ST INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO 36, U. S. ARMY

30 November 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Regimental History for Month of
October 1944, and Conclusions of Operations

TO : Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO 36,
U. S. Army

1. Inclosed is the regimental history of the 141st Infantry for
the month of October 1944.

2. Conclusions based upon operations during this period are as
follows:

a. The outstanding lesson of the month's combat was the
maintenance of flank protection when progressing through a thickly
wooded, mountainous area. The situation confronting the regiment in
the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMP was to push reconnaissance in force
toward the regimental objective near VANEMONT and LA HOUSIERE from
the vicinity of BIFFONTAINE. This was done after the regiment passed
through the 442d Infantry Regiment northeast of BIFFONTAINE. Hostile
positions were known to exist on LE COURS MT south of BIFFONTAINE,
which lay across an open valley, as well as in the woods themselves.
A battalion pushed down the long, rough hill mass toward its objective
and while it took local security measures as it progressed, it could
not drop off flank protection at all vulnerable points along its route
without seriously diminishing its attacking strength. Several strong
points were overcome and rapid progress made. However, hostile forces
counter-attacking from the south and east overran the battalion com-
mand post and cut off the battalion two thousand yards from other
friendly forces in positions northeast of BIFFONTAINE. An immediate
build up of strong positions along the line held by the enemy and a
strong road block behind the 1st Battalion, heavily mined over an
extensive area, isolated the 1st Battalion for a week until very
strong forces were massed to fight through to its relief.

b. Air drops proved valuable in supplying the cut off force

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with food, ammunition and medical supplies.

2. c. A radio infiltrated behind the German lines by French Forces of the Interior personnel and operated from vantage points proved of great value. Some fifty to sixty (50-60) German artillery positions were pin-pointed and our counter-battery fire adjusted with deadly effect. Troop movements were also reported as well as the location of hostile command posts and installations. This radio was maintained for about three (3) weeks until evacuation of civilians from the area made it impossible for the FFI personnel to continue operations.

d. Germans used very heavy charges with time mechanism for destroying roads in defiles. One such mine was discovered as a result of civilian information which comprised seven 200 pound aerial bombs set to explode eleven (11) days and seven and one-half (7½) hours after arming. These were buried six (6) feet deep beneath the shoulder of the road and were covered with four (4) feet of large stones.

e. Mine sweeping on snow covered roads proved most difficult and hazardous. In deep snow the detectors would not react and several tank dozer blades were destroyed when ploughing the snow after mine sweepers had passed. Ramp mines are believed to be rendered ineffective while frozen in ice inasmuch as some were located after snow had been cleared and road used by vehicles prior to thawing weather. Where roads are cleared under similar circumstances they should be re-swept after the snow is cleared to be certain that all mines are removed.

Charles H. Owens
CHARLES H. OWENS
Colonel, 141st Infantry
COMMANDING

6 Incls:

- #1 - Narrative (6)
- #2 - Casualty Report (6)
- #3 - Awards & Decorations Report (6)
- #4 - Officer Roster (6)
- #5 - *Journal, with supporting documents (1)
- #6 - *Maps (1)

*To accompany original copy sent to Army Historical Section, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

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